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mike for you. Then if you don’t play by the rules, he’s
gone. If anyone doesn’t understand that, please raise
your hand.
Not everyone in this audience is going to agree
with what will be said. After all, this is America; we’re
built on the differences of opinion we might have. But
I’m asking you to be respectful of folks who have come
a great distance at cost of time and money to participate in this. Please give them the courtesy of your
attention and respect that they deserve.
I mentioned before our other two major sponsors. Bethine Church, widow of the late great Senator
Frank Church, is chair of the Frank Church Institute.
She is here this morning, and I ask her to make any
comment she would care to. Bethine Church.

CECIL D. ANDRUS: Welcome to this conference on freedom and secrecy, which is jointly
sponsored by the Andrus Center for Public Policy, the
Frank Church Institute, and the Idaho Statesman. We
have a very full schedule today. We will have the panel
discussions, and the Vice President will speak to us at
noon. Then tonight, we will end with an address by
one of Washington’s best and most respected reporters, one of the deans of journalism in America, David
Broder. Mr. Vice President, I know you’re leaving right
after your speech, so I’ll protect you tonight if he says
anything that needs response.
Let me acknowledge a variety of sponsors. You see
them on the screen over here; they are also on the back
of the program. Those people help us financially, and
they give of their dollars and their time. When you see
any of them, I ask you to thank them for their help.
The Andrus Center is a non-profit, as you know, so we
rely on the volunteers and the contributions.
Some people have asked: Why a conference on
freedom and secrecy? Take a look at this morning’s
newspaper. Many of the issues and concerns we will
discuss today are literally right there in the headlines
of your newspaper every day. The Andrus Center has
always taken pride in contributing to the public discussion about important current issues, and we think
this discussion today carries on that tradition. We
have some truly outstanding participants with us
today, genuine experts on all the issues we are going
to discuss.
You’ll have time for questions at various points
during the day, but I respectfully ask that you be courteous to people’s time and understand that a question is not a speech. Dr. Freemuth, who is the Senior
Fellow at the Andrus Center, is an academician and is
experienced in the private as well as the public sector.
He is very knowledgeable in his own right. He knows
aspiring politicians by sight, and he is not going to
hand the mike to you folks. He is going to hold the

BETHINE CHURCH: One thing I’ve learned as
life has gone by is that if you can get a helping hand,
get it. I’m just so pleased and want to welcome all of
you who have been staunch supporters of the Frank
Church Chair over the years. It is now being called
the Frank Church Institute because we are covering a
lot more territory, and I think that joining with Cece
Andrus would make Frank really happy. He liked
working with him over the years.
I see so many people that I dearly love, and I have
to tell you that Frank thought this was an important
thing to do. Long ago, just after he was out of the
Senate, he said that people should have a chance to talk
about the issues of the day, that it is not unpatriotic to
question what your government is doing. You are the
government. About the committee that he and the Vice
President — then Senator — were on, he said,
“The critical question before the committee
is to determine how the fundamental liberties
of the people can be maintained in the course of
the government’s efforts to protect their security.
The delicate balance of these basic goals of our
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government is often difficult to strike, but it can
and must be achieved.”

just for our country but right here at home. Consider:
If you get comfortable with secrecy at home, does
it make you more comfortable with secrecy in
Washington? The bottom line is, as you listen to these
global discussions today, what can you do or should
you do in our corner of the world? This is an important discussion for our community and our nation,
and I’m pleased that the Idaho Statesman is part of it.
Thank you taking the time to participate.

I know Frank would be delighted to have the
Statesman, the Andrus Center, and all of you here.
Thank you.
ANDRUS: Now, ladies and gentlemen, it is my
pleasure to introduce to you the president and publisher of the Idaho Statesman, Leslie Hurst, who came
to us just recently this year to head up the Statesman.
She came out of Huntington, West Virginia, where
she held the same office in the Herald Dispatch. Leslie,
welcome.

ANDRUS: Thank you very much, Leslie, and
thank you for your participation in this and other
conferences.
As we considered how to begin a conference,
we knew we wanted an individual who could speak
thoughtfully to the issues of a troubled and dangerous
world. We needed someone who possessed the experience, the perspective, and the knowledge of these difficult subjects. Ideally, we wanted an attorney’s analytical mind combined with a politician’s sense of the
possible with a good sense of history thrown in. We
found the right man just to the west of the Cascades in
the Pacific Northwest: a former state attorney general,
a three-term Republican United States Senator, a man
known on both sides of the political aisle for his study
and grasp of the issues.
Senator Slade Gorton is now practicing law in
Seattle but remains active in public affairs and currently serves as one of only ten members of the socalled “9/11 Commission,” the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Please welcome Senator Gorton to start us off today.

LESLIE HURST: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The Idaho Statesman is honored to partner
with the Andrus Center for the fourth year to sponsor a major conference on public policy issues. This
year, we are privileged also to join the Frank Church
Institute to bring you this day of discussion about the
balance between freedom and secrecy. It is a key part
of our mission to create forums that give you direct
access to thinkers with great experience. You’ll hear
them debate and struggle over some grey areas. You’ll
have a chance to ask them questions, and I hope you
will take that opportunity. It’s not often that you get
direct access to experts like these.
I also hope you’ll think about what these issues
mean for us here at home. The balance between freedom and secrecy is not just a national issue. At the
Statesman, we have written many stories and editorials
about fights for openness in Idaho, and we have done
some direct fighting ourselves to make sure information is not held secret. If you saw my legal bills, you’d
know what I am talking about.
Some examples: There are audits underway right
now at the University of Idaho regarding University
Place. Should they be released to the public? How
much detail should be released from the Boise
ombudsman’s investigation of citizen complaints
against the Police Department? Should the audit of
finances at Boise City Hall be reported in an open
meeting or behind closed doors? What checks and
balances should be placed on the new Criminal
Intelligence Unit in the Boise Police Department?
Should the ombudsman be able to investigate complaints against the CIU?
As you listen and ask questions today, consider
what balance of freedom and security you want — not

SLADE GORTON: Thank you very much. After
accepting this invitation and reflecting on my remarks,
I became increasingly disturbed by the title of the conference itself: Freedom & Secrecy: Trading Liberty for
Security? In my view, not only is that an unnecessary
question, implying that we are engaged in a zero sum
game, it’s rather profoundly destructive as the answer
to that question, for most Americans, would fall overwhelmingly on the security side of the ledger.
Let’s reflect back to our beginnings. Here is a
relevant part of the Preamble to the Constitution
of the United States of America: “We the people of
the United States, in order to secure the blessings of
liberty, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”
“In order to secure the blessings of liberty.” That
is to say that those two words or phrases go hand in
hand. Fundamentally, without security, there will
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be no liberty. People will ultimately demand security first. Many of the troubles that the United States
faces today in Iraq stem from the fact that the people
there want security far more than they want the liberty
that we have promised them. As we look at the effects
on government of this question, I am reminded of a
woman friend of mine who travels frequently from the
west coast to New York City. She remarked that it is
only in the last five years or so, both before and after
9/11, that she has felt secure enough to exercise the
freedom of walking outside alone after dark in that
city, a city that now claims to be the most secure of the
large cities of the United States.
So our goal, it seems to me, is liberty and security,
to do for our generation what those who wrote the
Constitution did for theirs and for our own, to secure
the blessings of liberty for all of us. It is not a zero-sum
game. It is not the obtaining of one at the expense of
the other.
Now with that, the triggering factor for this conference, of course, was 9/11 and the national reaction
to that attack. 9/11, if it did nothing else, illustrated
dramatically the failure of both preventive measures
and of intelligence on the part of our multitude of
national security agencies, particularly in the light of
a clear and explicit declaration of war a good decade
ago by Osama bin Laden against this nation, its society, and its most fundamental cultural aspects. It was
followed up by acts of war against us in Kenya, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen, each of which resulted in substantial losses of American lives and none of which was followed by any kind of dramatic response on our part.
Query for me as a member of the 9/11
Commission and for all of the people of the United
States: Was 9/11 effectively inevitable, or were there
relevant failures in U.S. foreign policy and its ineffectual responses to these earlier attacks? Or were
their failures in discovering and interdicting the 9/11
attacks themselves and in establishing and monitoring
safety regulations, particularly with respect to airline
security policies, failures that better and wiser policies
might have cured?
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence
Committees of both the House of Representatives
and the Senate of the United States mounted a joint
inquiry into those facts. Their deadline was December
of last year at the adjournment of that Congress. The
report that they filed then was voluminous. I have all
six or eight pounds of it in my brief case here. The
great bulk of it was not declassified until July of this

year, and even at that time, as we deal with the question of secrecy, 28 pages dealing primarily with Saudi
Arabia and its participation or non-participation in
the 9/11 attacks, remain classified.
That joint committee itself recognized, first, that
its inquiry was incomplete and had not ascertained
all of the facts. Second, given what the former Vice
President and I can agree is a healthy pessimism or
questioning about the objectivity of any Congressional
investigation, it created an outside independent commission to study the 9/11 failure and to build on what
the joint Senate and House Committee had found.
In those findings, there are roughly ten factual
findings or groups of closely-related findings with
respect to intelligence facts discovered by some U.S.
intelligence agencies prior to 9/11. There is at least
the implication in the joint committee’s findings that
if more attention had been given to them, had there
been better coordination among agencies, we might
possibly have prevented 9/11.
What is not included in the report of the joint
committee is the fact that those were ten facts or
groups of facts out of perhaps ten million facts on various intelligence subjects discovered during those years
by our various intelligence agencies. In other words,
we were hunting for ten needles in ten separate haystacks with an attempt to relate them to one another.
The creation of the 9/11 Commission was highly
controversial. The Administration didn’t like the idea;
it wanted this to be all over. In that, I think it was
probably like every other Administration with respect
to problems it would prefer to solve itself. Congress
probably would not have acted without the incentive
of a demand from the organizations of the families of
victims of 9/11 that more needed to be done than the
joint Senate-House Committee did and that such a
commission should be created. So in November of last
year, it created one.
There are ten members, evenly divided between
Republicans and Democrats. My first reflection is
how much of a role personality plays in these matters.
The chairman was to be picked by the President of the
United States, the vice chairman by the Democratic
leader of the Senate. They made those choices: Henry
Kissinger and George Mitchell, two of the most prominent and perhaps opinionated and certainly articulate
citizens of the United States. Within a week, they had
decided that they didn’t want anything to do with the
job for various reasons that are not particularly relevant here. The second choices of the president and the
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minority leader were former Governor Tom Kean of
New Jersey, now a university president there, and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, for many years the
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The contrast between the first pair and the second
pair could not be more dramatic from the very beginning. Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton
are soft-spoken, thoughtful, probably as non-partisan
as two former elected officials of the two political parties could conceivably be. They impressed me in their
management of the commission as being, for all practical purposes, twins. There has never been the slightest disagreement between the two. Perhaps I have
thought from time to time they don’t push the other
eight of us as hard as they might. Certainly they don’t
push us as hard as Kissinger and Mitchell would have.
To the extent that there’s a chance that this bi- partisan Commission will truly act in a bi-partisan fashion
and come out with unanimous or close to unanimous
recommendations, it will be due very largely to the
profound degree of cooperation and thoughtfulness of
the now chairman and vice chairman.
I had the distinction or the honor of having
been the first member picked. My qualifications were
basically that I was a close friend of then - Majority
Leader Trent Lott. It may have been his last official act
in that position.
I did serve for about three years on the Senate
Intelligence Committee, and because one of the subjects of this conference will be the quality of legislative
oversight of our intelligence activities, I can tell you that
I left it in boredom and frustration after about three
years, considering it to be an almost total waste of my
time. I can put it in this fashion: I cannot remember a
single significant fact that I heard in a closed hearing of
the Senate Intelligence Committee that I didn’t read in
the Washington Post within 48 hours.
Legislative oversight in that field is particularly
difficult. First, of course, it does take place behind
closed doors. Second, to do it right takes an immense
amount of time. Third, that immense amount of
time conflicts with the more public and, in many
respects, the more important duties of the members
of the House and Senate. When I was a member of
that committee, it was the fifth committee of which
I was a member. There simply wasn’t time to do the
job right.
There are a few exceptions. Senator William
Cohen, later Secretary of Defense, as chairman of the
committee, spent a huge amount of time on legisla-

tive oversight of the intelligence agencies. The present chairman of the House Committee, Porter Goss,
congressman from Florida, does the same thing, but
they are overwhelmingly the exceptions rather than
the rule.
The other seven members were picked in a manner similar to mine. They were all picked by the
Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. They include,
on the Republican side, Fred Fielding, an old
Washington hand and a lawyer in private practice in
Washington D.C. He has been a significant part of
several Republican Administrations, and he brings
great experience and wisdom to the task. It includes
John Lehman, the first Secretary of the Navy under
President Reagan, and Jim Thompson, a former governor of Illinois and former U.S. Attorney in Illinois.
The Democratic side includes a former colleague
of mine, Max Cleland from Georgia, who was defeated
for re-election just last year; Tim Rohmer, a former
member of the House of Representatives, who retired
from the House last year, who was the bridge between
the Commission and the joint committee. He was a
member of the House Intelligence Committee and of
that earlier House-Senate investigation. Richard BenVeniste, who gained fame as a Watergate lawyer and
later represented President Clinton, one of the finest cross-examiners during our hearings that I’ve ever
come across. It included Jamie Gorelick, number two
in the Clinton White House and before that, solicitor
for the Department of Defense, and she is a particular
favorite of mine. We have been paired as questioners
of many of the witnesses, and I have a profound appreciation for her skills, her intelligence, her thoughtfulness, and patriotism.
We have not moved rapidly, perhaps not as rapidly as we should have, in this connection. One of
the most intense elements of the debate over the creation of the commission was how long it would have
to make its report. Our deadline is May 27, 2004.
Personally, I think that was a great mistake. I think
it should have been after next year’s elections, but it’s
unlikely that Congress will extend that period of time.
We will make every effort to finish our deliberations
by then.
But the first six months or more of the commission’s existence have been spent almost entirely
on procedural matters and on our own self-education. As is the case with every administration, this
Administration was very slow in coming up with the
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documents and the papers that we needed. We had
a public news conference on that subject about three
months ago in which our chairman and vice chairman, particularly, criticized the Department of Justice
and the Department of Defense. Within three days,
we had almost a million documents that we had not
seen before. Publicity does help and does count.
We are now in the position of having in our possession more than two million pages of documents relevant in one respect or another to our inquiries. We
are still in a contest with the Administration over a
handful of vitally important documents about the way
in which deliberations take place in the White House
— who knows what and when do they know it — and
over a broader range of documents about the degree of
our access to them and whether we can physically have
them in hand or not.
I expect those questions all to be answered in our
favor. It is clear that we have received far more than
any other outside group has ever received in connection with an inquiry of this nature, infinitely more
than the joint Senate and House Committee received,
which was denied access to many Administration documents on the grounds of executive privilege, an executive privilege that they did not challenge. We have,
in other words, a great deal of important information
that was not available to our predecessor committee.
We are charged by the Congress, by the law creating us, to investigate the facts and circumstances leading up to 9/11, to investigate the immediate response
of our government on and immediately after 9/11, to
report as thoughtfully as we can on the lessons learned
from that tragedy and the improvements to the security of the United States since 9/11, to examine the
question of whether or not those improvements
impinge on civil liberties in any respect, and to make
recommendations for future reforms. This is all due
on May 27 of next year. The task is a massive one.
Now let’s get to substance. The great question that
the ten of us have before us is the degree to which we
can unite on coming up with a report on our deliberations. First, can we reach agreement on all the relevant facts leading up to and taking place on September
11th itself? In some respects, this is our most vital task
because we will be writing history. Reaching unanimity
on the facts is clearly within the realm of possibility.
Every one of the ten of us, during our first meeting, emphasized that it was vitally important that we
do that and particularly that we not divide along partisan lines. Does that mean, even if we reach a unani-

mous conclusion, that it will be definitive and unchallenged? I think not. The Warren Commission is not. In
fact, I read a review of a book in the last two months,
challenging the received facts on the Lincoln assassination. That we will be able to succeed in satisfying
everyone is unlikely. That we will be able to succeed in
satisfying most people as to the pure facts leading up
to 9/11 is clearly within the realm of possibility.
The second question we have before us is: Should
we characterize those facts? Should we attempt to
assign blame or credit? Should we go so far as to suggest that there are heads still in position that ought to
roll as a result of the failures of 9/11? The joint committee did not make any such recommendations. A
handful of its members, in a separate opinion, precisely did so, and none of those heads have rolled. I
think unanimity on those characterizations will be
much more difficult to reach on the part of all ten of
us than on the simple facts themselves.
Next, a critique of the reaction, the changes in
the two years since 9/11, and the results. Next, what
should be done organizationally in the future? Let
me for a few minutes discuss one aspect of that last
question. What shall be done in the future? It is a
question on which specific recommendations have
been requested, at least by members of Congress.
Perhaps the central question there is: How, in the
future, should the United States handle the problem
of domestic intelligence, domestic spying? Who is in
charge of determining whether or not there are plots
against the security of the United States taking place in
the country? How should they conduct that activity?
There are, I think, four alternatives in that connection that the people in the Congress need to consider. First: Let’s just let the FBI do it. Let me tell you,
the FBI, which currently, in my view, is led by a very
aggressive and very effective head, is industriously
attempting to win this debate simply by doing it, simply by creating facts. It has already created a separate
division for domestic intelligence. It has some but not
much experience in the field, and it is going at it very
aggressively.
Second, we could assign this responsibility to the
new Department of Homeland Security and make
it a division of that department as the FBI is of the
Department of Justice.
Third, we could follow the example of the United
Kingdom and many of the European countries and
create our own separate and independent entity on the
order of the British MI-5.
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Fourth, of course, we could give that responsibility,
a responsibility it has never had in the law, to the CIA.
From a purely personal point of view — and I
must say here that any opinions I express are mine
alone, not necessarily those of any of the other nine
members of the Commission — the advantage of the
FBI is that it is an existing agency and one that has
carried on its traditional responsibilities in a highly
effective manner. It has certain intelligence capabilities, and it is aggressively increasing them. It will fight
very hard in Congress to keep them against any contrary recommendation.
On the other hand, while the FBI is perhaps the
most effective and efficient in the United States or perhaps in the world, its primary duty has been to solve
crimes after they have been committed and to build
cases that are sufficient for United States Attorneys to
take to a jury and prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a
culture that is profoundly different from that of figuring out what might happen in the future, from using
forms of evidence that might not be admissible in
court, and from preventing terrorist activities. It is my
view that this function will always be secondary to the
primary function of the FBI.
OK. The Department of Homeland Security, a
logical agency. Homeland security is what it was created to preserve, and it could easily take the domestic
security commission. But of course it is a brand new
department. Its existing parts don’t fit together very well
yet and probably won’t for a number of years. It would
create another problem of coordination with other
related agencies, and where will it find the people?
Incidentally, that is one of the most profound
questions that we face. Where do you find good intelligence operatives and analysts? Certainly not in the
Help Wanted ads in the newspapers.
Third, an MI-5. It seems to work in other countries, all countries smaller than the United States. It
would be independent and would have a single function. On the other hand, it will also create another
problem of coordination, and clearly coordination
among agencies was one of the great shortcomings of
our responses before 9/11. To whom does it report?
Directly to the President or to someone else?
Finally, and the least considered so far, the CIA.
When the CIA was created in 1947, it was for foreign
intelligence activities alone. Intelligence about things
like terrorism are its business. They are its culture. It
could probably get up to speed more quickly than any
other agency, and it would be the least likely to lose

information between the cracks. But I would have to
say that the present CIA has rather poor leadership.
This would be a violation of history and would be the
most opposed by the general public. The CIA, by and
large, does not get good coverage.
Let me go back now to 9/11 itself, what we know,
and whether or not we should have been able to prevent it. Could 9/11 have been pre-empted with the
intelligence that was actually gathered before 9/11,
with the ten or a dozen facts or groups of facts known
by one agency or another at the time? The joint committee implied that the answer to that question might
possibly be yes. Personally, I doubt it.
Take one example. We went through security
checks in getting on airlines before 9/11. Those security checks did not and would not have discovered the
particular weapons the hijackers took on board with
them. They weren’t violations of the law, had they
been discovered. Why? To a certain extent, I suppose,
that’s due to a lack of imagination on the part of our
various agencies.
But the United States for 20 years, with respect
to airline hijacking, had the philosophy that hijackers
were not suicidal, that they would take a plane and fly
it to Cuba or some other place, use it for an exchange
of prisoners and the like, and that they weren’t primarily interested in killing the passengers on board the
airplane or certainly in using it for suicidal and attack
purposes.
Were there one or two indications before 9/11
that this might happen? Yes, but they were one or two
instances among literally thousands. Our intelligence
agencies thought that future terrorists attacks, like the
ones leading up to 9/11, might be against American
interests but would almost certainly be outside of the
United States itself.
Second question: Could 9/11 have been preempted had our intelligence agencies previously
been organized somewhat differently? What were the
effects of the Church Committee’s 1974 reforms on
our intelligence gathering? Had they not been so dramatic, had they not created a different culture in those
agencies, might we possibly, with less inhibited intelligence agencies, discovered more facts and enough facts
to put together to prevent 9/11? Perhaps, but that is
the purest possible speculation.
Third, could 9/11 have been prevented had
we reacted far more decisively to earlier attacks by
al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden on American people and interests overseas? I think there the answer
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is almost certainly yes, had we, for example, before
9/11, determined on an invasion of Afghanistan and a
destruction of the sanctuaries in which most of those
terrorists were trained.
But let’s look at that as a practical matter. Does
anyone here think that the Clinton Administration,
an administration for which I have very little sympathy, could possibly have made a decision sometime in the year 1999 or 2000 to invade Afghanistan
simply by publishing Osama bin Ladan’s declaration
of war against the United States? Could the Bush
Administration have done so in the first six months
of the year 2001? I submit that was not remotely a
possibility in either case, given public opinion at the
time. The controversies that we have had in minor
respects over Afghanistan and in a major respect over
Iraq, when motivations were much much clearer, simply were not present then. In my view, while we could
have prevented 9/11 in that fashion, there is no political possibility, in a free society like ours, that there
could have been created by either president the degree
of unity that would have been required for such an
aggressive form of preemption.
What and how do we think about the nature of
the threat which we, as a people and a nation, are
facing today? I must emphasize here that I am speaking at this point for myself alone. Certainly it is not
the threat presented by the Soviet Union for almost
half a century of the Cold War. There are at least two
major distinctions between this contest and that one.
The first is, of course, however our dangers can be
characterized, we are not faced with a nuclear-armed,
sovereign power. We are not faced in any respect with
a potential of a nuclear Armageddon that would
simply end civilization as we know it.
Second, on the other hand, we are dealing with
a much longer lasting and more firmly held antiWestern philosophy. Communism, it seemed to me,
did not last as a true believer’s philosophy or religion
for more than about three generations. During the last
twenty years of the Soviet Union, it was simply a cover
for protecting the perquisites of a privileged class.
Ultimately, it fell by its own weight.
On the other hand, militant Islam, in my view,
has a history as old as religion itself, perhaps mostly
or always a minority, but at least always a distinct
minority. It is unlikely to disappear spontaneously.
It certainly is impervious to western philosophical or
political argument. It is likely to cease to be a threat to
us only when it is a greater threat to the Muslim coun-

tries out of which it arises than those nations and those
societies are willing to bear.
Now, of course, most of them, including many of
the elements of the ruling classes of those countries,
blame the west for their relative decline. That decline,
in my view, is not only not going to be arrested but
will continue as long as so much knowledge and
adaptability to measures run afoul of religious dictates
and particularly so long as the female half of the population of that culture is barred from significant roles in
the society as a whole.
So I believe that elements of this will be in our
final conclusions. Our defenses must necessarily exist
on three distinct but related levels. First is the hardening of targets. In one part of that imperative, we seem
to have done a fairly good job. Aircraft security is now
on a far higher plane than it was pre 9/11. Even though
the cost has been great, greater security exists almost
entirely with respect to aviation, not with respect to
other modes of transportation, not with freight mobility in ships and the like.
One of the most profound scholars that has testified before us pointed out that for a free society to
attempt to defend itself simply by hardening targets is
to court the same bankruptcy the Soviet Union engaged
in with its defense policies. It is just inconsistent with
our freedom to protect effectively every single target. So
we have to set priorities within that field.
Have we been successful? Yes, in one narrow but
vitally important sense, we have. There has been no
repeat in the slightly more than two years since 9/11 of
the 9/11 forms of attack here in the United States.
It does not mean that terrorism has been made
any less of a threat. What we have done in many
respects has been to displace terrorism, and because
targets of the United States have been more difficult to
hit, we see nightclubs blown up in Indonesia, and we
see attacks in Saudi Arabia itself. We see the kind of
terrorism that took place fairly recently in Morocco.
Displacement, from the point of view of our own
society, is at least a partial success. Displacement, it
seems to me at least, is what Saudi Arabia has been
engaged in for years, perhaps encouraging directly
or indirectly the export of a philosophy that leads to
terrorism on the grounds that financing it elsewhere
might protect Saudi Arabia itself.
So in some respects, the May attacks in Saudi
Arabia may have been the most important single
event since 9/11 as Saudi Arabia finds that it can no
longer displace terrorism and must attack it directly.
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ANDRUS: What did I tell you? Analytical, insightful, constructive. Thank you very much, Senator. We
appreciate your opening this conference.
Now we have about 15 minutes for some questions.
If you raise your hand, Dr. Freemuth will approach you
with the microphone. No speeches, please.

I’m inclined to believe that its foreign policy changed
profoundly a few months ago, making not irrelevant
but less relevant some of the elements of our investigation as to its earlier participation.
Second, in addition to hardening targets, is the
necessity for more aggressive and certainly more effective intelligence and preemption than we engaged in
prior to 9/11. This whole question about how domestic intelligence should be handled is a part of that.
Training and recruitment of officers to engage in those
activities are a part of it.
A far greater degree of imagination is required to
determine what comes next. From the hijacking of
aircraft and crashing into buildings, what is required
for the next time around? And most particularly, how
does more effective intelligence, particularly here
within the United States, relate to the liberties that
they are designed to protect?
The third level, of course, is preemption on the
ground. It is the Afghanistans and the Iraqs. It was not
terribly controversial when it was Afghanistan and a
direct attack on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida but
more controversial when it took place in Iraq.
So the questions we face in this connection are
how each of those relates to one another. What are
the relative effectivenesses and priorities of (1) hardening targets, (2) more aggressive intelligence, and (3)
preemption? How do you set the values and policies
within each one of those? What impacts do those policies have here in the United States?
To go back to my own duties. I have every hope
that we can be unanimous in setting a factual background of what led up to 9/11 and the facts, minute
by minute and second by second, on that disastrous
and tragic morning. I hope that some of our procedural recommendations can also be unanimous. Our
setting of values for a free society and our comments
on some of the questions I’ve covered here — if indeed,
we make them at all — are very unlikely to be unanimous because there is nothing close to unanimity on
the part of the people of the United States themselves.
The best result we can have is to set out those questions and those value judgments as dispassionately as
we can and try to help that debate so that an informed
American people can come up with informed answers,
which do not set liberty against security but provide
for securing the liberties of the United States in the
future as they have in the past.
Thank you very much.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: You said that you
wished your commission’s report would not be due
until after the next presidential election. Why is that?
GORTON: It’s so easy for one side to say,” It’s all
Clinton’s fault” and for another side to say, “It’s all Bush’s
fault.” No matter what we say, unanimous or divided,
the political parties in a presidential year are likely to
try to pick it apart to make political points between
May and November. If it’s to have any great and lasting value, it seems to me that if it were issued after the
election is over, it would be judged more dispassionately
than in the immediate run-up to an election.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, your needle in the haystack analogy. Don’t you think that the
rather detailed plans to fly planes into U.S. buildings
— and I think the World Trade Center was among
them — should have glinted a little bit more than the
average needle in the haystack?
GORTON: Our hindsight is always 20-20. I can
always say, “I wish they had been. I wish someone in
the FBI had paid more attention to the report coming
from Phoenix. I wish that the FBI had gone for a warrant to look at Moussaoui’s laptop. All of these things
look extremely plain in the aftermath. Obviously, they
didn’t at the time. As I say, it was a failure of imagination, but we were not imagining this kind of thing
taking place. There was a plot from the Philippines to
hijack airlines and to use them in a suicidal fashion.
No one connected those dots, and I want to be very
cautious about coming to a conclusion afterward that,
in all of the huge numbers of findings on a wide range
of subjects in which terrorism was only one for which
are intelligence agencies are responsible, someone
should have picked up on that. I wish someone had
picked up on that. I wish someone had done something about it.
My best guess is that even if someone had said,
“Hey, I think this is going to happen, and we’d better have the FAA tell all airlines to barricade doors,
and we’d better create a federal agency for security at
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our airports,” I don’t imagine that would have gotten
through Congress. Both public opinion and the airlines would have killed those recommendations at the
time. Just as I don’t think it’s appropriate to criticize
President Clinton for not taking Osama bin Laden’s
declaration of war as seriously as one would a declaration of war by some sovereign power. I wish it had
happened. In a perfect world with perfect intelligence,
it would. I am very reluctant to come to the judgment
that it should have.

democracy. We should be doing everything we can to
encourage that movement against a repressive religious
government.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, do you
believe that the United States, in the long term, can
economically afford the kind of foreign military intervention that the new foreign policy of preemption
seems to involve?
GORTON: The answer to that question is yes.
Just as a similar question in the Cold War — Could
the United States afford to stay firm against the Soviet
Union? — gets the same answer. It seems to me we
couldn’t afford not to.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: So far, the Bush
Administration has not had a reputation for paying
much attention to the facts re the Iraq War, so what
gives you the hope that this Administration would pay
attention to the facts that you find in your committee?

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I think it’s fair to say
that a great many Americans do not understand why
the Saudis were given a pass on 9/11. Perhaps more
important, do we face future threats from Saudi personnel and Saudi money that would attack American
interests? If so, how is that going to be dealt with?

GORTON: My opinion is that the Bush
Administration has paid quite close attention to the
facts and has taken a number of significant measures
in the right direction. The nature of your question
almost answers the first question I had. When we put
this report out in the midst of a presidential election,
it’s more likely to be misused than used.

GORTON: It seems clear that much of the money
and support for a particular form of Suni Muslim
extremism, including Osama bin Laden, is centered in
a religious philosophy in Saudi Arabia. Much of that
religious philosophy is aimed almost as much against
the Saudi rulers as it is against outsiders. I personally
think it’s clear, without going into any classified information and just based on the question you asked, that
we certainly dealt with a very mixed bag.
I think it’s appropriate to say that the Saudis
rather consciously thought that if they exported it, if
they displaced it, they would be protecting themselves.
That’s why I think May 14th was such a profoundly
important event. The Saudis have discovered now that
displacement is not the answer. But was there Saudi
money involved? Is there a Saudi philosophy involved?
Were we too soft on it? I would have to answer all
three of those questions very much in the affirmative.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I certainly agree
wholeheartedly with your suggestions that an
informed citizenry is the basis of this democracy, but
I find it very very difficult to reconcile that advocating secrecy results in that informed population. As an
Iranian immigrant, I find it very difficult to listen to
our Administration advocating taking democracy to
the Middle East, knowing full well the history of my
two countries and the intervention of the CIA in stifling democracy in Iran in 1953. My question is: How
do we reconcile having covert operations and, at the
same time, advocating an informed citizenry?
GORTON: It will be impossible for us to deal with
any kind of threat — it was impossible at the time of
the Soviet Union and is impossible now — of terrorism
without having covert activities. In fact, if our covert
activities had been more effective pre 9/11, that in itself
might possibly reduced or eliminated that threat.
As for supporting democracy in the Middle East,
I think that’s precisely what we ought to be doing.
My own personal view, which has nothing to do with
9/11, is that there is some very real promise in Iran.
It seems to me that, in that nation at least, a majority
of the people yearn for greater freedom and for greater

AUDIENCE QUESTION: During the Monica
Lewinsky scandal and right about the time the Wag the
Dog movie came out, there was an attack waged by the
Clinton Administration on a terrorist target, which
the public viewed cynically — myself included — as
an attempt to divert attention from his personal crisis. Wasn’t that, in fact, an attack on Osama bin Laden
or an attempt on an al-Qaida network? The question
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AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, I am curious
about your thoughts on our new policy of preemptive
strikes when the first preemptive strike in the history
of the United States seems to have been founded on
poor intelligence.

is: That wasn’t viewed very well in the public, so how
could any intelligence really have been acted upon if
that was, in fact, Osama?
GORTON: The last part of your question is the
important part. Yes, that particular one-day attack
was viewed with great cynicism by a large part of the
American people. But doesn’t that prove the point I
made earlier? What if President Clinton, under those
circumstances, had said, “Damn it. We’re going to
invade Afghanistan.” Could he have had any believability under those circumstances? It seems to me
extremely difficult to say so. I don’t think, in the
absence of a Monica Lewinsky in July of 2001,
President Bush could conceivably have done that
on the basis of what we knew at the time. Was the
response inadequate? Yes. Could the response have
been dramatically greater in this country at that time?
I can’t see it. Would Clinton have acted any differently if there had been no Monica Lewinsky? I doubt
that he would have acted much differently than that
because that was the type of response we had to other
similar provocations at the time. We certainly didn’t
respond any more dramatically to the U.S.S. Cole.

GORTON: To call Iraq the first preemptive attack
by the United States is a wild exaggeration. We had
a little one-day war in Grenada that certainly didn’t
threaten the United States or its security. We went after
Barbary pirates early in the 19th Century. Certainly
Afghanistan was a preemptive attack. My own view
is that the attack on Iraq was more than justified and
has already paid positive dividends with respect to terrorism and will pay more. But, can we reach a general
rule from either one of those things? I don’t think we
can. I think every set of circumstances is dramatically
different from every other one and requires debate and
judgment, based on those particular facts.
ANDRUS: Please help me thank Senator Gorton
for being here today and for sharing his knowledge
and wisdom.
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PANEL: Intelligence, National Security and Secrecy
Moderator: Patrick A. Shea
PATRICK A. SHEA: We will attempt to accomplish two things: To establish the historic context of
the Church Committee and to consider its legacy to
us today as we confront these issues.
I thought to begin with Dr. LeRoy Ashby,
Professor of History at Washington State University
and biographer of several distinguished Americans,
including Senator Frank Church. I’ve asked him to
give us a sense of where Senator Church was in 1974
and 1975.
In regard to genealogy, it should be known that
Bethine Church considers me one of her wandering children, so I operate under her rules on occasion. Dr. Ashby.

the mid-1970s. Very quickly, I want to just tick off
some things that were happening:
1) The impact of the Watergate scandals. They
revealed increasingly staggering kinds of information on levels of corruption and conspiracy
that Americans simply had not previously conceived of;
2) Reports that the CIA had conducted a massive
domestic spying campaign against U.S. citizens;
3) The Vietnam War, which had raised questions
about the pursuit of a foreign policy based in
secrecy, lies, and deception;
4) A growing concern in the country about the need
to rein in what was increasingly called “the imperial presidency”;
5) The recent findings of a subcommittee that
Senator Church chaired regarding the conduct
of multi-national corporations abroad. That
subcommittee had discovered recently and shockingly that the CIA had conspired with a huge
corporation, ITT, to block the election of Chilean
President Salvador Allende and, failing that objective, to de-stabilize and topple that legally-elected
government.

LEROY ASHBY, Ph.D.: A couple of days ago,
Pat called to give me my marching orders for this
panel. He said, “I’d like to have you put the Church
Committee in its historic context, and you have four
minutes.” I am an academic, and academics speak in
50- minute time slots, at the least. In four minutes, I
couldn’t even read two pages of Loch Johnson’s excellent history of the Church Committee.
On September 11, 2001, I was stunned, numbed,
and bewildered by the events. Then I began to worry
that we might compound the tragedy in an effort to
place blame for the attack by blaming Senator Frank
Church for his work in the mid 1970s. Some said
Church was to blame for the failures of the intelligence community prior to 9/11. Among the critics
was Senator James Baker, the Wall Street Journal, and
novelist Tom Clancy, who said, and I quote: “The CIA
was gutted by people on the political left. As an indirect result of that, we have lost 5000 citizens,” a very
serious charge.
I want to step back initially, given the scapegoating, and look at why those investigations occurred in

It was against the backdrop of those developments that, early in 1975, the U.S. Senate, in a big vote
(82-4), moved to establish that Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities. It was supposed to operate for
about nine months. It operated for a bit longer than that,
as it turned out. Church was Chairman, of course. Ten
senators were appointed, including Senator Mondale,
and it was an ideologically balanced committee. The
hearings lasted until December of 1975, and in the
spring of 1976, a seven-volume report was published.
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Newsweek described the report as “probably the
most comprehensive and thoughtfully critical study
yet made of the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence.”
According to the Washington Post columnist Mary
McGrory, “The Committee turned up some maggoty
horrors,” what the New York Times viewed as “inexcusable products of an amoral secret bureaucracy that
endangered democratic ideals, freedom, and a government of laws.” Again, very compelling assessments of
the Church Committee findings.
Now controversy did surround the committee
from the very moment it started and, of course, its
findings. First of all was the issue of Frank Church
himself. Critics claimed that his presidential ambitions compromised the investigations. Another charge
was summed up in a newspaper headline that said,
“Senator Church Aids Reds.” Keep in mind, that
was a cold war setting. President Ford, Vice President
Rockefeller, Secretary of State Kissinger — all joined
in that particular chorus, I might add.
A quite different complaint came, though, from
investigative journalists, such as Seymour Hersh and
some staffers of the Intelligence Committee themselves. Their point was that the committee had veered
down the most sensational paths and, by doing so, had
been diverted from examining, as they saw it, more
systemic issues regarding government and the intelligence community.
Early in the investigations, for example, Church
received information about a CIA internal study, “the
family jewels” as it was known. That study had some
searing kinds of information and revelations, showing
that, in fact, the U.S. government had plotted assassinations of foreign leaders. Some staffers at the time
urged Senator Church not to focus on those revelations. They said this would lead the committee into
a briar patch and turn the investigation into a kind
of media circus. Church, though, believed he had no
choice and that not to go into that briar patch would
be a big mistake.
Church also drew fire by raising the possibility that the CIA had been operating, in his words,
like a “rogue elephant.” To critics, this suggested that
this was an aberration in terms of legal conduct and
not something that was more deeply involved in the
processes of the whole intelligence community and
the government. So a political storm enveloped the
Church Committee from the outset and right on
through. As we can see from the post 9/11 search for
scapegoats, that particular controversy continues with

the targeting, in this case, of Frank Church as the person responsible for what happened on 9/11.
Such attacks don’t take into account why that
committee came into being in the first place. That’s
why I spent some time talking about the setting. There
was an 82-4 vote to set up the committee to investigate
some real problems in the intelligence-gathering community. The criticism ignored the accomplishments of
the committee and its findings. Several people on the
panel are going to talk in more detail about those.
Most important, regarding the current situation,
at the heart of Senator Church’s concerns were issues
of government accountability and the perils of secrecy
in a free society. These issues involve the sanctity of the
legal and the political processes in a democracy and
the idea that, under the U.S. Constitution, no one —
I mean no one — is supposed to act outside the law,
whether it’s under the rubric of national security or
anything else. Church’s understanding of these issues
bears directly on the topic that we’re looking at today.
I thought I would take a little bit of time from
Steve Emerson, who is not here, so I am over my
four minutes. Time and again, Frank Church warned
about the dangers and ironies of destroying basic freedoms in order to save them. He noted that totalitarian governments hide behind a veil of secrecy, but our
society, Church said proudly, has drawn its inspiration
from the old Biblical injunction, “Ye shall know the
truth, and the truth shall make you free.”
In Church’s opinion, democracy depends upon
a well-informed electorate. In that context, efforts to
hide governmental efforts under cloaks of misinformation, intimidation, or the denial of civil liberties eventually subvert the very system they are allegedly protecting. The United States should not, Church argued,
create a security system that was, in his words, “a mere
image of the evil it is designed to combat.” Church’s
words, of course, came during the cold war when
Americans saw communism as the central threat.
The Senator was well aware of that threat, and
he advised Americans to reject the idea that since the
Soviets do it, we must do it, too. Church often drew
the analogy, a painful one, about Vietnam, when an
officer said they had just burned the village in order
to save it. Church made the point again and again
that we have to be very careful in terms of protecting
our own security and our own country that we don’t
destroy it in order to save it.
Thank you.
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PATRICK SHEA: Our next speaker is Mark
Gitenstein. He is a partner at the law firm of Mayer
& Brown in Washington, D.C. On the Intelligence
Committee, there were 140 staff people, and my job
was to be the fire person — some people said I was
the fire hydrant — but there were a few people — and
Mark was one of them — on whom you could always
rely to give you very straight answers to often very complicated situations. He went on to be, first, the minority counsel and then the Chief Counsel for the Senate
Judiciary Committee and has had a distinguished legal
career with a particular focus on civil liberties.

kill each other.
Number four: The fourth example was an extensive use of foreign intelligence informants. Indeed, it
was our finding that in fiscal 1976, the FBI had twice
as many domestic intelligence informants as they did
organized crime informants.
Number five: The fifth example is warrantless
electronic surveillance, which went on basically on
the signature of the director of the FBI until 1972,
when it was prohibited by a Supreme Court decision
known as the Keith case. As we were investigating in
the foreign intelligence area, it was continuing basically unabated.
Number six: The sixth example is warrantless
entry, what was known colloquially as “black bag
jobs,” which was basically breaking and entering into
American citizens’ houses. We found examples that
between 1948 and 1966, there were 200 of those that
were unrelated to planting bugs or electronic surveillance, a number of them directed at American dissidents like Dr. King and anti-war dissidents.
Number seven: A seventh example is that between
1940 and 1973, the FBI and the CIA opened approximately several hundred thousand pieces of first-class
mail of American citizens.
Number eight: The eighth example was that the
CIA engaged in a program between 1967 and 1974,
directed at American anti-war activists and involving
thousands of them, probably in direct contravention
of the 1947 National Security Act.
Number Nine: The ninth example is that the
National Security Agency, between 1945 and 1975,
intercepted the international communications of
thousands of American citizens by a watch list. The
watch list contained “individuals whose activities may
result in civil disobedience.”
So that’s what we found in the 70’s, and Senator
Mondale did an excellent job of laying out this information in the hearings with greater detail and greater
eloquence than I can. Let me just say a thing or two,
so I can stick to my four minutes, Pat.
The reforms that grew out of the Church
Committee work:
First, we established a structure for permanent
oversight of the intelligence community. That is still
in force. Second, Attorney General Levy, after some
polite and some impolite conversations with Senator
Mondale, established the Levy guidelines on domestic
intelligence, which endure to this day.
Third: I don’t know whether the Senator remem-

MARK GITENSTEIN: Thank you, Pat. What
I’ll proceed to do here is summarize this thousand
pages in three minutes. The few little bullets I want to
give you now I first gave to then - Senator Mondale,
our member, in his Capitol hideaway, and I think he
was a little surprised.
Mike Epstein, a dear friend who unfortunately
has passed away, and I summarized these facts along
with John Elliff, another staffer who worked with me.
He said, “You must present this to the Committee.”
I don’t know if you remember this, Pat. It’s related
in Loch’s story. Former Senator Phil Hart was there.
I think he was so stunned with the result, he extemporaneously said, “You know, my kids used to tell me
that this was happening — they are anti-war kids —
and I never believed them.”
Let me give you these facts very quickly. Number
one: Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI engaged in a
program called “Cointelpro,” in which they directed
over 2000 actions against basically domestic political groups like the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, the direct purpose of which was to disrupt their activities in seeking civil rights and in antiwar activities.
Number two: One particularly heinous example
of that is what was done to Dr. Martin Luther King,
in which he was covertly and illegally wiretapped from
1963 to 1968. The contents of those wiretaps were
then used not only to discredit him with the national
media and the Congress but to be given covertly to his
wife in an effort to force a divorce and, quite explicitly,
to get him to commit suicide.
Number three: The third item was a covert
action against the Black Panthers, which, as some of
you may remember, was a civil rights group. The purpose there was basically to encourage gang violence
within the Black Panther party so that they would
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bers this, but he and I testified before the Senate
Judiciary, together with David Aaron, on the need to
establish a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the
so-called FISA statute, which also endures to this day.
I would make the case that those three legs of the stool
still exist. None of the abuses that we talk about today
could really occur today if they are honestly enforced.
Notwithstanding what Senator Gorton said, I think
a good and aggressive oversight committee can make
that system work.
What is interesting about this period is, despite
what the Wall Street Journal and others said about
how the Church Committee reforms caused all this,
after everything was said and done, nothing was really
changed as to the core legs that I’ve described. Those
structures still exist. The Patriot Act basically nibbled at the edges. That is not to say that there are not
some problems, especially with the next version of the
Patriot Act, but we’ll get into that later.
My bottom line is that I believe, as Senator
Gorton suggested, the problems that we have post9/11 with the FBI and the CIA are structural problems within those agencies. We’re going to have to deal
with them, but they probably have little or nothing to
do with the Church Committee reforms. We can talk
more about that later.

Church was a dedicated student and articulate proponent of these principles. He well understood a comment from James Madison that has been etched into
the wall of the Library of Congress: “Power lodged, as
it must be, in human hands is ever liable to abuse.”
The gift of the founders, Frank Church said, lies
in the safeguards they gave this nation to prevent the
abuse of power. Senator Church, Senator Mondale,
and others on the Church Committee had witnessed
the erosion of these principles and these safeguards,
the mendacity of the executive branch during the war
in Vietnam, and the Watergate cover up. Newspaper
reports on CIA spying at home seemed to be the final
straw. Something had to be done, and for sixteen
months in 1975-76, the Church Committee took up
that challenge.
As you’ve heard, what the committee found was a
Pandora’s box of horrors: spying at home by the very
agencies created to protect us, not only by the CIA but
by a host of military intelligence agencies as well; secret
harassment by the FBI against Vietnam war dissenters
and civil rights activists; assassination plots against foreign leaders; and efforts to topple the democratically
elected leader of Chile. None of this information came
easily. It had to be fought for, and Mr. Church and Mr.
Mondale carried the banner into that battle.
Eventually the committee was able to establish
genuine accountability through the creation of a new
oversight committee. Congress would be a co-equal to
the executive branch when it came to intelligence. The
CIA would become a part of the American government with all of its checks and balances. The committee set guidelines for the FBI and the CIA and struck
a much better balance between liberty and security.
Above all, the Church Committee created a new attitude in Washington. We would have security, yes,
but we would have it under the rule of law and with
accountability.
Did it weaken our intelligence agencies? Absolutely
not, no more than cleaning out some pockets of corruption in a police department would weaken the
department. It strengthened the intelligence community. If you dig into the antecedents for 9/11, you’ll
find it has a lot more to do with our failure to focus on
the Middle East and South Asia during the Cold War,
our lack of human intelligence in that area, and a lot
of much more complicated matters than the likes of
Tom Clancy either admit or are aware of.
We did not create a perfect system. After all, IranContra came in the 80’s. But the Church Committee

SHEA: Thank you, Mark. Loch Johnson is a
professor at the University of Georgia. He has written extensively on the intelligence community and
the activities there. It was interesting that, as we went
through the process of setting the agendas for the different public hearings and eventually the reports, one
of my jobs was to inform the different members of the
committee about the identity of the witnesses and the
responsible staff person. When Loch’s name came up,
great attention was paid because good quality always
came. With most of the staff, that was certainly true,
but there were a few notable exceptions. That always
caused us some heartburn. But Loch was a great staffperson. Professor Johnson, take it away.
LOCH JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Pat.
How wonderful to be in Boise, one of the great places
in the United States. I’ve missed it very much, and it’s
good to be back.
Pat asked me a couple of days ago what we were
about and to do so within the famous four-minute
rule. We were about helping to restore the government
of the United State to its founding principles. Frank
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took a giant stride forward, it took a strong stand on
behalf of civil liberties, and it set statutory boundaries
for intelligence operations. It established rigorous oversight — not the “overlook” we had experienced before.
These reforms have stood the test of time. There has
been a lot of research on these matters since 1976 — a
couple of books even this year. They reinforce and add
to the Church Committee findings but don’t challenge
them in any serious way or change them.
I just came from a conference in Norway where
people, including parliamentarians and others, from
all over the world gathered to talk about intelligence
oversight. What everyone was talking about was the
Church Committee as a model of what they hoped to
adopt for their own countries.
Robert Gates, a director of the CIA appointed
by the first President Bush, summed up quite well
the value of the approach taken by the Church
Committee. I am reading from his recent memoir:

windup of it when Sy Hersh broke his great story in
the New York Times about domestic spying and the
CIA. So the trial ended, and the next day I was told,
“Get busy.” So I covered the investigations of the CIA
and the FBI and other government gumshoes in the
70’s and for some years thereafter.
I have what may be a contrarian view of them.
They were a great revelation of government lawlessness, but they were also a failure, a failure that was not
appreciated then and, I’m afraid, is not appreciated
now. The investigators, as Loch Johnson has pointed
out, were quite properly shocked at the abuses they
discovered.
What they passed over too lightly, I think, was the
fact that excesses in the name of national security are
as old and ingrained as the republic itself. They weren’t
going to be cured by the creation of Congressional
committees that inevitably come to look and think
like the people they are supposed to regulate. What
was needed was new law, even a charter for the intelligence community. We didn’t get it. What we got were
bits and pieces.
Let me emphasize first that Frank Church should
be the last person to blame for this unfortunate outcome. I personally think he could have been president
if he had not stuck with the investigation for so long.
Once he finally got in the race, late in 1976, he beat
the pants off Jimmy Carter every time they had a faceoff, but it was too late. He lost, and I think the nation
was a loser, too. Instead of winning his party’s nomination, Church was vilified again and again by the whining intelligence community that still likes to attribute
their failures to him while ignoring their own incompetence and by complaining endlessly about the few
and too feeble restrictions that have been put upon it.
The FISA Act was mentioned. Not once has a
judge denied a warrant under the FISA law, except
maybe once.
But back to the investigation. It would be a mistake to think they were supported by a sustained
nationwide burst of indignation at the disclosures
of domestic spying by the CIA and lawlessness by
the FBI. The crusade was much more tenuous, confined in large measure to that minority in official
Washington and around the country that is genuinely
dedicated to civil liberties.
The tensions between those advocates of liberty
and the advocates of order and secrecy have always
been with us. To those who wrote the Constitution —
in secrecy, remember — a strong central government

“Some awfully crazy schemes might well
have been approved had everyone present not
known and expected hard questions, debate,
and criticism from the Hill. And when, on a
few occasions, Congress was kept in the dark and
such schemes did proceed, it was nearly always to
the lasting regret of the presidents involved.”
That can be said more succinctly. The purpose
of accountability is to try to prevent the executive
branch from doing something stupid. That remains
a worthy goal.
SHEA: Thank you, Loch. George Lardner has
been with the Washington Post since 1963. He has
written several interesting and revealing news articles on the committee. One of my other jobs was to
attempt to be the plumber, to figure out where the
leak had come from, and then to inform the committee. There were several reporters in Washington with
whom it was like a cat-and- mouse game. I was always
the mouse getting pounced upon, but for a reporter
you could go to, talk with, and know he would never
reveal sources or method, George Lardner was the
guy. The Washington press corps was well served and
is well served by him. So George, give us a sense of
where the press was.
GEORGE LARDNER: Well, I was minding my
own business, covering the Watergate trial and the
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was the overriding goal. They saw no need for a Bill
of Rights until it became plain they would not have a
constitution without one.
Frontiersmen and rural folk had a different view.
To them, the Revolution was or should have been a
victory for liberty, freedom from far-away rules and
onerous taxes, no matter whether they were imposed
in London or in Philadelphia. The huge forces dispatched, for example, to crush the Whiskey Rebellion
and an even milder uprising a few years later hammered them into submission. So did the Alien and
Sedition Acts, which purported to counter “proFrench subversion” and which made it a crime to criticize the president.
Those salute-the-flag tendencies were in remission when the investigations of 1975 and 76 came
into play, but careful handling was still required. What
the Church Committee ignored was the importance
of the educational function, the need for lights, camera, action day after day until the lessons were driven
home. Some Senate hearings were held in public, but
they had the flavor of hastily-organized afterthoughts.
Decisions about what incriminating documents
would be made public were made at the last minute.
The records were excessively censored. In the end, the
investigators were left with a tangle of loose ends.
The Senate Committee was blunt enough about
the illegalities and outrages of the FBI, but it was
almost sycophantic in some of its assessments of the
CIA and the presidential involvement in some of
those assassination attempts. Even the Rockefeller
Commission, the executive branch’s investigator, had
flatly branded aspects of the CIA’s domestic spy work
“unlawful and improper.” Not once did a Senate staff
report go that far, instead calling it “a step toward the
danger” of a domestic secret police.
So what do we have now? What we had in the
mid-70s was a normal Constitution, operative in
days of a strong desire for peace and shock over the
Watergate scandals. What we have now is what historian Robert Higgs has called “the Crisis Constitution,”
which always overrides the normal Constitution in
times of emergency, making the government’s exercise of power far more important than the protection
of individual rights. And all this under a suffocating
cloud of secrecy that reaches now into every corner of
the government.
We’re almost back, I’m afraid, to the early days
when excesses in the name of national security became
as American as apple pie, when immigrants were

suspect, and when criticisms of the president were
denounced as acts of disloyalty.
We are in trouble.
Thank you.
SHEA: What I’d like to do now is have some questions among the panelists. The question I would throw
out, just at the beginning: If in 1976, as we were wrapping up the final report, Senator Church or Senator
Tower had called the staff together and said, in the
Utah tradition, “I’ve had a thought about the future,
and I’m going to tell you that the staff director of the
Intelligence Committee is going to become the director
of the CIA,” what would your reaction have been?
LARDNER: Outrage. You’re referring to George
Tenet. I think that would have been unacceptable.
It wouldn’t have been done because the staff of the
Church Committee was much more bent on curing
the excesses in those agencies and never would have
had a chance. The appointment of Tenet goes to the
point I was making. The committees come to look
and think too much like the people they are regulating
over a few years passage of time.
JOHNSON: I would disagree markedly on that
point. I think it’s very healthy to have someone from
Capitol Hill who understands the accountability procedure to be at the top of the intelligence community
and bring that understanding to those thirteen agencies. One of the biggest problems we have had in the
past is that the people in the intelligence community
think that Congress is an alien entity and don’t understand what its purpose really is. They would like to see
it float off down the Potomac River into the Atlantic
Ocean, never to be seen again. So it’s good to have
someone from the Hill there.
LARDNER: Tenet, for example, is the one who
recently blocked, after a couple of years of success, the
publication of the intelligence budget in total and in
some component parts. He’s gone over.
GITENSTEIN: I’m afraid I’m more in the Loch
Johnson school on this one. I would like to use this as
an opportunity to respond to one thing George said
about FISA. I think it illustrates a larger point.
I’m not surprised that the court has not denied a
single FISA warrant, but it could have something to do
with the fact that the FBI and the Justice Department
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don’t take cases to that court that wouldn’t be
approved. I can tell you that I am absolutely dead certain that warrantless surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther
King would not take place under this FISA court.
As an example of why it’s important: You said that
part of the purpose of this committee was to educate
the American people. I certainly agree, and I think we
did a good job of that in terms of the FBI. Incidentally,
this whole report, which I summarized, was public.
The second point is that another function of the
Committee was to educate the intelligence agencies.
Barbara Bannock and I were interviewing the deputy
chief of the intelligence section of the FBI about the
King investigation. About 2/3 of the way through the
interview, after he had told me about trying to get
Dr. King to commit suicide and what the purpose
was and showing me a bunch of documents, I asked,
“Did it ever cross your mind that this might violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution?” At that
point, he asked me what the First Amendment of the
Constitution was. Now, I don’t think that would happen in today’s world. Indeed at that point, we warned
him of his rights because clearly the guy did not know
that he was violating the law, the civil rights of Dr.
King. He really didn’t understand that. That is a big
change from 25 years ago.
One of the arguments that I’m sure Senator
Gorton is going to hear is not so much that any particular rule affected FBI agents but that they were scared
to do things because they thought it might be a violation. I think there is some truth to that. I don’t think
there was any particular provision of the Levy guidelines that restricted them, but they were anxious. A lot
of us believe that’s healthy. A certain amount of skepticism is healthy; too much may be dangerous. We saw
that in the Phoenix example.
Anyway, I would fundamentally disagree with
George’s point about that.

ing part of the system, the lobbyist making the laws,
in effect.
GITENSTEIN: The structure of these committees is rotation. No one can stay on these committees
more than six years. Maybe we should have greater
rotation of the staff, but the members themselves, if
they exercise their jurisdiction, can certainly fix that
problem.
SHEA: But I think Senator Gorton was quite
honest in saying that most members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee — and I think this is true for
the House — found that if you were actually going
to spend the necessary time, you could not spend any
other time. Senator Cohen is a good example of someone who did make that choice and obviously did a
very good job.
There is another complexity I want to raise
here. I had the fortune of serving in the Clinton
Administration and had to go through the confirmation process. So instead of being behind the Senators,
handing them cards to ask the nominee questions, I
was the nominee. In 1969, when I first worked on the
Hill, there were about 2500 Senate staffers, and at the
time of my confirmation, the number of Senate staffers had grown to 11,000. So there was this constant
barrage of information from the supposed watch dogs,
who had become more publicity dogs than watch
dogs. Any thoughts about what might be done to
change that?
JOHNSON: One thing that certainly must be
done is to increase the public’s understanding about
the role of accountability. When most Americans think
about the legislative process, they think about law-making. They don’t think so much about people sitting in
rooms, going through budgets, and holding hearings.
This is the hard work that must be done in order to
make sure that the laws we do have work properly. It
doesn’t get enough credit. I’d like to see the Church
Institute and the Andrus Center give an annual award
to a legislator in Washington and maybe to one at the
state level as well for doing a good job as a watch dog for
accountability, not just passing another law.

ASHBY: It’s always important to have people
involved on down the line after an investigation,
people informed about the issue, people who might
have been involved in pursuing the information. The
problem historically has been that those various committees or commissions or bureaus that have been set
up have eventually, in effect, become then part of the
whole system that they are supposed to be surveying
and watching. The watchdogs become the lap dogs,
as someone has put it. I think that becomes the real
danger — the danger of being co-opted and becom-

SHEA: Any other questions you’d like to ask each
other before we go to the audience?
ASHBY: Senator Gorton noted the frustration
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that he and others on the 9/11 Commission felt early
on when the information and documents you hoped
to get were slow in coming. I’d like to hear from those
of you who worked on the committee and observed
directly at the time how you felt about some of the
things you encountered, the reluctance on the part of
the Administration to give documents you needed, a
kind of stonewalling that took place. Could you comment a little bit on that?

learned about the King story. We didn’t have a single
document at that time. In that interview, he identified
documents that we were able to get our hands on.
Look, I want to say something about FBI agents.
I found them to be largely people of great integrity.
The ones that were doing the domestic intelligence
work were under a tremendous amount of pressure
to do what they were told to do by the hierarchy of
the Bureau. When you sat down with them and laid
these issues out, they actually were quite honest with
us about what had happened and helped us to identify documents and programs that eventually were
revealed. I’m sure Senator Gorton will find the same
thing in the agencies he’ll be talking to.

GITENSTEIN: We faced exactly the same problems that Senator Gorton did, and I think Senator
Mondale and Senator Church did a very good job of
going public when they needed to in order to put the
pressure on Attorney General Levy and the President
at the time. So we got the documents; otherwise, we
could never have told the story. This is just endemic to
the separation of powers.

SHEA: I did want to mention also that there were
several instances when Director Colby, then the director of the CIA, in cooperation with Senator Church,
Senator Mondale, and others, was very thorough in
getting CIA individuals to be helpful.
In fact, a native of Idaho, who was the head of
counterintelligence, Mr. Angleton, was very uncooperative when it came to investigating counterintelligence, and it was only with Director Colby’s intervention that a modicum of information was obtained.
What I was suspicious of — and maybe it was
simply where I was seated in the committee staff
— was that there seemed to be at times something
thrown over the transom at a very important time,
something that everybody knew they would go after. It
was almost as if there were an orchestration going on.
That is, they knew the “family jewels,” and then you
laid them down on the table in a poker game sort of
way: the dart gun, the botulism to assassinate Castro.
Indeed, in the case of Bill Sullivan, that interview
probably wouldn’t have happened had there not been
some agreement within the hierarchy of the bureau.

JOHNSON: I can remember some horror stories
about stonewalling by the Ford Administration during
our inquiry. For instance, we had requested a number of
key documents from the Defense Department. It took
months, and nothing ever happened. Finally Senator
Church weighed in, and the next day, a half-ton truck
came over to our building, filled with documents. We
were elated, and we spent the next several weeks going
through them. There wasn’t a single useful document in
the whole bunch, so I wouldn’t be too impressed by the
two million documents you’ve received.
By the way, it seems to me there are two keys
for effective accountability. Number one is executive branch cooperation. The Congress only knows
about executive branch operation to the extent
that branch wants it to know. So we have to get the
executive branch in the mood, unlike this current
Administration, of comity, of sharing with Congress.
The second ingredient is member motivation.
Some members of these oversight committees have
been truly dedicated to accountability, and others,
frankly, have not. What one would like to see is more
members of these committees putting their shoulders
to the wheel.

GITENSTEIN: Sullivan wasn’t even at the Bureau
any more. We found that less to be the case at the
Bureau than I think you did at the Agency. I found that
when you finally confronted some of these agents with
some of the allegations that we had, they were quite
forthcoming. There was a different level of sophistication within the Agency, and I agree with what George
has suggested. The CIA was much more effective at
manipulating the oversight than the FBI was.

GITENSTEIN: I would add one thing, and
I’m sure the 9/11 Commission has found this to be
true. Documents are important, but there is nothing
like interviews. I can remember going with Senator
Mondale up to New Hampshire when we interviewed
Bill Sullivan for the first time. That’s when we first

SHEA: John, do you have some questioners?
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AUDIENCE QUESTION: In regard to abusiveness, competence, and other things you have
mentioned in regard to the CIA and the FBI, how would
you gentlemen rate the National Security Agency?

processing. That is to say, they gather so much information that it is overwhelming, and they have to sort
through it and pick out what’s really important.
On September 10, 2001, they intercepted a
message from two al-Qaida operatives that said,
“Tomorrow is zero hour.” That message was translated
on September 12. Getting the right information, getting it translated, and acting upon it is extremely difficult but so important, and NSA plays a major role.

LARDNER: I would rate it as the most secretive,
and so the least known of any of the agencies. They do
surveillance, satellites, things like that. They spend a
huge amount of money, much more than is indicated
in the $30 billion or so budget that the intelligence
community is usually thought to be spending, because
they have all these thousands of military people all
over the world, helping their surveillance networks.
That, I don’t think, is counted in the $30 billion.
But they can see into people’s homes from huge
distances. One doesn’t know except for the glimpses
we did get in the days of the 70s about what they
could do. They raided the files or telegrams of various
telegraph companies. They were held to account for
that, but they escaped pretty much the review that the
FBI and the CIA have gotten.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to ask the
panelists how they believe the things that were put
into place 28 years ago to regulate the intelligence
community have been affected by the Patriot Act that
was passed and the current proposed Patriot Act.
LARDNER: I think that new abuses have come
up that weren’t contemplated or dealt with 28 years
ago. I’m not talking about the Patriot Act in particular. For example, the FBI has now developed a habit
of designating “persons of interest” and surveilling
them, hounding them. What is that? What law says
you can be a “person of interest” and then surveilled
day and night?
Then we have the secret detentions of Muslim
people without any warrants, without any notice.
About a year ago, I came across some FBI affidavits
that justified holding people in detention because they
were “persons of interest.” The Bureau just held them
and held them until they were completely, 100% satisfied that they had committed no crime. The burden of
proof has been completely turned upside down.

GITENSTEIN: My job was primarily with
the Bureau, but my last year at the Intelligence
Committee, I did an extensive amount of work with
the NSA over the Panama Canal Treaty and the allegations involved in the Treos brothers. We got tremendous access then, but then - President Carter directed
them to give us access. They gave us extremely
valuable information, which was ultimately very helpful in getting the treaty confirmed by the Senate.
The difficulty with oversight of NSA is that the
disclosure of information related to NSA can truly
jeopardize sources and methods because the disclosure
of a bit of sentence that actually could be totally legitimate could disclose to the foreign power exactly what
link you’ve intercepted and will do tremendous damage to our national security. So it’s a very difficult thing
to do. I found NSA, in my years in that particular episode, quite helpful. What they did with the intercepts
of foreign U.S. citizens was bad, but the FISA statute
does basically regulate that. That is subject to federal
statutory control, which did not exist at the time.

ASHBY: I think we may be watching an historical maxim working out. Way back in 1917, a writer
named Randolph Bourn said, “War is the health of the
state.” I think again and again, we’ve seen examples of
that. In the name of security, which is understandable,
there is a sense that we have to protect ourselves almost
at all costs. Almost invariably, even if the laws are in
place and protections are in place to protect civil liberties, the tendency is to give ground. Beyond that, if
you then criticize the giving of ground, you, yourself,
are labeled as disloyal.
Unfortunately, we’ve seen that all too recently. Just
a few weeks ago, here in Boise, the Attorney General
implied that the people who would question the
Patriot Act basically were helping the enemy. That’s
where you get this vicious cycle underway, so even if
the laws are in effect and the protections are in effect,

JOHNSON: I think you asked for an evaluation of NSA, and I would say that signals intelligence,
which it carries out, is extremely important to this
nation’s safety. Intercepting what our enemies are saying obviously can be very valuable. The NSA has three
major problems though. Processing, processing, and
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I see slippage. I worry, frankly, about Patriot I and
Patriot II even more.

bought analog radios, and the Forest Service had
bought digital radios. When they showed up at the
same fire, they couldn’t communicate unless they
pulled out a cell phone and talked to one another.
Oftentimes in Washington, the jurisdictional battles
get in the way of doing the data mining. The data is
there, but there are such intense rivalries between different agencies of government that we, as a society, fall
victim to those jurisdictional jealousies. Half of what
government does — and this is where Vice President
Mondale was so effective — is finding ways of getting
those jurisdictional disputes not to become so intense
that they can’t operate.

GITENSTEIN: I was consulted to some extent
on the drafting of Patriot I. I was troubled by some of
the provisions, but for the most part, not terribly troubled by the Act that was finally passed. I am troubled a
considerable amount by the second version, Patriot II,
especially the administrative subpoena section.
I think Senator Gorton touched on this. The
problem that we’re facing now is essentially the same
problem we faced after Pearl Harbor. We have bits and
pieces of information all over the government, and we
don’t know how to get our hands on it at the right
moment. That’s really why they created the CIA.
With computers, we have tremendous technological capability to analyze enormous amounts of information very quickly. I think what you’re seeing in
Patriot II and the dilemma that the 9/11 Commission
and policy makers generally are facing is the notion
of “data mining.” We have the technological capability now to gather tons of information and bring it to
policy makers and enforcement people very rapidly.
It also requires us to gather a lot of personal information about people. You’re seeing this in the airlines
now with the Caps I and II Project, which has gotten some notoriety. When I flew out here to Boise, I
wanted to know that the guy sitting next to me really
was the guy he said he was. I’d just as soon land at the
airport instead of flying into the hotel. So I think there
is some legitimacy in gathering that data and sharing it
with the right people.
The problem that Patriot Act II will face — and I
predict that you, Senator Gorton, will face — is: How
do you balance that? How do you allow that information to be gathered and analyzed? Huge databases are
now housed in some private corporations, and they
want to share them with the Bureau. The Bureau and
the Agency want to have access to that information.
How do you share that information, some of which
is public, and some of which is not? How do you get
it to the right policy makers and get it to them on
September 9th instead of September 12th? That is
very, very difficult.
It’s easy for us, as civil libertarians, to say none of
that should happen, but we are going to have to face
that problem both at the borders and at the airports.

GITENSTEIN: Pat, some of those issues are
jurisdictional, and some relate to civil liberties. We
don’t have the FBI and the CIA seamlessly sharing
data because one is an enforcement agency and one is
an intelligence agency.
SHEA: I do think the point, though, about not
having a charter is important because that debate
went on and on. In my judgment, the attention of
the American public and therefore their tolerance for
change diminished over time, and there were people
in those respective jurisdictions — both FBI and CIA
— who did not want a charter and knew that time
was on their side. Some of the problems we’ve been
discussing today would have been avoided had there
been a charter.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have a question on
the federal Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information
Act. In 1978, I had the Navy Investigation Desk, and
we had to respond to public requests on air crashes,
deaths, fires, explosion, but we also had to first screen
and redact not only Social Security numbers but
unduly sensitive matters, which, under the Privacy
Act, should not be released. As we cope with the terrorism, do any of you foresee a legislative contraction
of the Freedom of Information Act and possibly even
a legislative expansion of the Privacy Act?
LARDNER: The Act has already been retracted
legislatively and even more in the courts. For example, I think in the Homeland Security Act, there is a
provision for “sensitive but unclassified information”
— whatever the hell that means — that can be withheld. There is a also a provision for “critical infrastructure information” that is voluntarily supplied by pri-

SHEA: I tell the story that when I was at the
BLM, we faced a very serious problem. BLM had

20

LARDNER: That was one of the problems that Pat
has pointed out. With all the meat that you got – the
dart guns, the botulism, and all that — we tend to forget that there was another committee over in the House
that did try to get into process. I think the CIA was
much more frightened about that and did a hatchet job
on the Pike Committee. Dan Schorer’s great discovery
of that report and his publication of it after the House
voted to suppress it meant that most of us have never
seen that report. You can’t get it at a government bookstore. That committee was genuinely trying but didn’t
have as good a staff to get into process.

vate industry — let’s say plans for a power plant. Well,
that could be used by a terrorist to plant a bomb there.
It could also be kept secret because the power plant
wasn’t built right, and nobody can get to it. Those
problems, laws, and administrative regulations are
causing increasing difficulties.
The FBI is supposed to be a law enforcement
agency, but it is a law breaker when it comes to the
Freedom of Information. I speak personally from that.
Twelve years ago, I asked for information on a bunch
of top hoodlums. The FBI had a “Top Hoodlum
Program” in the 1950s when Hoover was pretending
that there was no Mafia. I thought it would be interesting to get those, and I got about eleven volumes,
hugely redacted, after eleven years. I am suing them
now. They even took out the names of gangsters who,
according to the very documents, were being prosecuted, and there were public indictments against
them. It’s mind-boggling.

GITENSTEIN: The most disturbing thing I
have heard today — and I think it was honest, and it
does genuinely bother me — is what Senator Gorton
said about the ineffectiveness of oversight. I think the
role of conferences like this and the media generally,
George, is to help the American people understand
what the consequences of bad oversight are. That’s
partially a political problem. People on the Hill need
to be more aggressive in making this a political issue.
Patriot One sunsets in December of 2005, so that’s
an opportunity for a genuine debate, and I hope we’ll
have a good, solid debate before then about this issue.
One issue that is clearly going to come to the forefront is the controversy over libraries that we’ve heard
a lot about. People on the Hill — a lot of Republicans,
too — are trying to press the Justice Department, the
Bureau, and the CIA to disclose more information on
various provisions, how often they are being used. I
hope the press will do the same. That’s a form of oversight that has a very positive effect on the agencies
themselves. It deters them from abusing the provisions
because they are literally held accountable because they
have to disclose the numbers. That’s very valuable.
I worked a little bit on the FBI Charter. I found
that reducing all this to statutory language became a
political nightmare. It is not a productive area, at least
in this environment. I think we’re going to have to
deal with pieces and parts of this, like the FISA statute.
One thing that has a huge impact is disclosure itself
and greater accountability for the number of times
and the circumstances in which these provisions are
being used.
One last point: I’ll bet you a lot of what is done
behind closed doors could be disclosed. The Church
Committee did closed-door hearings, then redacted
the really sensitive stuff, and disclosed them. You see
very little of that now in the oversight committees.

SHEA: I’d like to ask each of you to give a oneminute summary. Just to start it off, the one thing
I would observe is that oftentimes on the Church
Committee, we seemed to go from process, which I
think we were very good at, to personalities because
the media could cover the personality and tell the public the story, based on a face, based on an individual,
when in fact the more important systemic question
related to process. At times, particularly under the
pressure of deadlines at the end, we slipped into the
personality mode more than the process mode.
Loch?
JOHNSON: I would say that from 1789 until
1974, we were living in the Dark Ages when it came to
intelligence. Intelligence was considered exceptional.
It would not be a part of the government. The programs were too sensitive for legislators to be involved
with. I think the Church Committee brought these
secret agencies more into the open, at the same time
protecting the necessary secrecy that we had to have.
I think George [Lardner] is exactly right: It has
been an imperfect system, and we do need an intelligence charter. I think Senator Gorton is right: The
committees can be frustrating and boring, and sometimes they don’t work the way we, back in 1975, had
hoped. But keep in mind that this remains the difference between night and day. We have genuine
accountability in the United States, and it’s very rare
around the world.
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That would be a productive thing. I hope the 9/11
Commission could recommend that.

about. In terms of government, it’s holding government accountable and trying to see how power is
exercised, whether it’s being exercised well or being
abused. It’s as simple as that. That’s the role of the
media in reporting on any segment of society: governments, non-profits, institutions, corporations. That’s
its basic job, and it will never change.

ASHBY: Ideally, as Senator Gorton said this
morning, we should have liberty and security. There
shouldn’t be those tensions, but in fact, historically,
there have been those tensions, again and again.
Civil War, World War I, World War II, Cold War.
Invariably there have been conflicts between, on the
one hand, the quest for security and, on the other, the
need to protect First Amendment freedoms. It’s part of
the historical animal. It was in that context that Frank
Church’s committee operated.
Frank Church understood the importance of
intelligence. Here was someone who had been an
intelligence officer in World War II, serving in southeast Asia, so he recognized that it is not a perfect world,
and you have to have information on your enemy.
At the same time, here is why the Church
Committee became so important. A kind of paradigm
shift took place, at least for a brief moment, from the
old idea — don’t ask what these various agencies are
doing — to one in which suddenly the focus, the tilt
at least, was more toward openness, toward trying to
find out what in fact we’re doing to protect ourselves.
It was a remarkable moment, a kind of opening
of a window. What bothers me is that under the pressures of what is happening now, we may start closing that window more and more. What the Church
Committee tried to do was to say, yes, we have to have
these processes, but let’s make sure those processes
work around straight corners. We don’t cut corners,
and you get back to the matter of accountability. Who
is doing what and when? It’s a tough question to deal
with, but we have to deal with it, we have to be aware
of the dangers of the ways in which we protect our
security, ways that can, in fact, threaten the very things
we are trying to defend.

SHEA: I’ve spent 20 years defending the media,
but with the consolidation of the media, where individual companies now own 600 radio stations and
potentially will be owning television and newspapers
in the same market, we are faced with a real dilemma.
Chris Matthews of “Hard Ball” fame started at Capitol
Hill the same time I did. We were house mates for a
short time, and he, as my own 18-year-old son says,
has become a specialist at interrupting people. Chris is
a very bright guy and well- intentioned, but the media
has moved, in many instances, to rating raves rather
than substantive news.
It also reflects a bit of the change in the environment in Washington. Senator Gorton, Vice President
Mondale, and Governor Andrus are certainly experts
in this area and saw a Washington that, in my judgment, was much more civil. People could disagree but
still sit down and have lunch or dinner together or
share some thoughts.
I used to go on the overseas trips because the
Foreign Relations Committee had jurisdiction on
that, and many times, I saw senators with exactly
opposite political views being able to share five days
or a week and come to have better understanding of
each other. There was a holistic view of the Senate or
the body politic at Capitol Hill that they needed to
work out. We’re now into these five-minute, hard-hitting political advertisements that don’t allow serious
people to come up with policy positions as they would
otherwise.
The media does reflect what we as the audience
want it to show us, so maybe we need to have organized efforts to reward quality newspapers. The Idaho
Statesman, the Washington Post, and the New York Times
are all good examples, but they are fewer and fewer in
number. You have people in this White House, as you
had in the previous White House, whose only role in
life is to figure out how to get their person on the news
that night with a particular message.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I would like to ask
what the role of the media is in regard to this question. I’m particularly concerned because so many people these days don’t even take the newspaper. Could
you explain what you think the media’s role is at this
point. Does it make any difference whether it is the
electronic or the print media in general?
LARDNER: It shouldn’t, but if you’re on TV, it’s
easier to get your phone calls answered. I don’t think
there is any basic difference in what the media is all

GITENSTEIN: One thing about the media and
the current environment. I can’t remember where I
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saw the story about the abuse of the Patriot Act in
respect to libraries, but that created a lot of energy in
Washington. It actually resulted in a vote in the House
of Representatives to restrict the expenditure of funds
under the Patriot Act with respect to Section 215,
which, in turn, prompted Attorney General Ashcroft
to go on his grand tour of the United States to save
the Patriot Act. The media deserves credit as does the
natural common sense of Americans. It had a political
impact even in this environment. The librarians themselves were politically active on it.
I’m just saying let’s not give up here. I think the
media has done a good job on the Act and needs to do
a lot more.

far. I really worry about predator, unmanned aerial
vehicles going into these countries where supposedly
there are terrorists — as happened in Yemen earlier
this year — and firing missiles from a height of 10,000
feet at automobiles, thinking there might be terrorists
in those automobiles. In that particular case in Yemen,
one of the six passengers in that automobile was an
American citizen. When did he get his day in court?
Where was his counsel? He was murdered by a predator, unmanned aerial vehicle.
GITENSTEIN: I’m not terribly troubled by the
war metaphor. We have a war on drugs, a war on crime,
a war on energy during the Carter Administration.
One of the things that has worked during this period
is greater awareness on the part of the American people of the dangers and more partnering with local law
enforcement. In effect, it’s the citizens hardening their
own targets, which is probably a healthy thing as long
as it doesn’t go overboard.
I return to the point I made earlier: We’re not coping with the difficult problems yet, which is how to better coordinate these agencies without jeopardizing civil
liberties. How can we better share this data — private
data or data within these agencies — so that we find out
things on September 9th instead of September 12th?
Those are difficult issues that lie ahead for us, issues that
I hope Senator Gorton’s Commission will address.
Creating a Homeland Security Department
doesn’t solve that problem because it doesn’t say where
the FBI and the CIA are and how they are going to
share data. We tried to grapple with this issue in the
Church Committee, and we didn’t resolve that issue.
We dealt with the Bureau, and we dealt with the CIA.
We didn’t deal with the CIA and the Bureau.

JOHNSON: I spent the last year at Oxford and
read a lot of British newspapers. I found them rather
disappointing because they have become advocacy
journals. There was very little objective reporting in
my view. I see a little of that creeping into our own
journalism in this country. That’s a great danger.
SHEA: Let me raise one other question, and it has
been a pet peeve of mine: the notion of a “war on terrorism” is almost an oxymoron. A war, in political theory at least, is between organized states, and terrorism
by its very nature is not an organized state. It seems to
me that, if you look at speeches that have been given
both on Capitol Hill and in the Administration, there
is constant use of the war metaphor because it does
rally popular support and a willingness to go along.
Terrorism is, at its heart, an illegal act. They are criminals, and they ought to be prosecuted as criminals,
using a law enforcement model.
I agree with Mark. In the FBI, the CIA, and the
NSA, the people that were doing the operations had
enormous intelligence and great integrity. It was generally the people above them in political positions that
caused the abuse, or as Senator Gorton said, had not
thought through the process, thereby creating bad
policies. If we had used the post-9/11 environment to
mount a truly significant and sustained international
law enforcement activity against terrorists, would we
be in a better position today than we are?

ASHBY: You used the right word: complexity. Terrorism is such an amorphous term, and you
think of the blowing up of the Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City. That was done by domestic terrorists, but it wasn’t terrorism. You can find all different
shapes and forms, and in that sense, if you’re having a
war against it — getting back to your point, Pat — it’s
awfully difficult to know who is out there.

JOHNSON: What you say has a lot of merit to
it, but it’s also a war in my view. When another country or group flies an airplane into your buildings, that’s
an act of war. We have responded in that way, and I
think we have to. In my opinion, we have gone too

LARDNER: I would agree with you. The “war”
is against whom? To immigrants in this country, it’s
against them. To the law enforcement agencies and/or
the intelligence agencies, it’s their job now, they perceive, to suspect everybody and to hold them account-
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ANDRUS: Thank you very much. A very stimulating and enlightening morning, and the afternoon
session will be equally stimulating. Let me make one
introduction before we go to lunch. Dave Broder has
arrived. Thank you very much for making the effort,
Dave. We are looking forward to listening to you this
evening.

able until it’s proven that they’re innocent, not until
they are proved to be guilty. I think that’s the tendency
we have to avoid, but that’s the direction we’re going.
SHEA: Thank you very much. Please thank the
panel for their time.

END OF MORNING SESSION

24

FREEDOM & SECRECY: Trading Liberty for Security?
October 2, 2003
Boise State University Student Union
Presented by:
The Andrus Center for Public Policy
The Frank Church Institute
The Idaho Statesman
LUNCHEON
Address by: Vice President Walter F. Mondale

CECIL D. ANDRUS: We used to work it around
with Air Force 2, which didn’t leave until the Vice
President was on board. Now the Vice President needs
to be out of here by 1:00 PM to catch a Northwest
flight.
I’d like to introduce the lady who will introduce
Vice President Mondale, the grand lady of Idaho,
also the chair of the Frank Church Institute, Bethine
Church.

This just touches briefly on his accomplishments
from the U.S. Army service early to his wonderful
marriage to Joan. They have three children and three
grandchildren. It’s my special honor and joy to introduce two special friends: Joan Mondale, a supporter of
the arts and crafts all over the country and a wonderful
Vice President’s wife.
Now to your special enlightenment, I will introduce Walter Fritz Mondale, a fisherman, a tennis
player, a skier who, like Idahoans, enjoys reading and
a good barbecue. Welcome Senator, Vice President,
Ambassador Mondale.

BETHINE CHURCH: This morning reminded
me. Frank came home one night, and he said, “I
talked to Everett Saltonstall, [a United States Senator
from the northeast], and I said, ‘How do you conduct
intelligence oversight because I am going on the intelligence committee?’ Saltonstall said, ‘Oh, Frank, there
are things gentlemen don’t want to know.’”
How can you do justice to an introduction of such
a well- known statesman as Walter F. Mondale? Having
served in the U.S. Senate and on so many important
committees with Frank, especially on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, he will always be
“Senator” to me. However, he has been Vice President
of the United States, and he added to his accomplishments by serving as United States Ambassador to
Japan, one of our most critical diplomatic posts. He
didn’t stop at that. He is a diplomat extraordinaire.
He was President Clinton’s special envoy to Indonesia
to meet with President Suharto regarding the Asian
financial crisis and economic reforms in Indonesia.
He went on to chair the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, an important
Washington, D.C. organization that conducts nonpartisan programs and often oversees elections in foreign countries, thus helping to build and, when they
have a chance, maintain vital democratic institutions.

WALTER F. MONDALE: Thank you very
much, Bethine, for inviting Joan and me to be with
you today. Thank your for those kind words and for all
those wonderful years we had together in Washington
D.C. When we received your letter, inviting us to this
event, unlike most invitations for me these days, I
immediately called Joan, and we had an acceptance
on its way within about 35 seconds. We wanted to be
with you, and also this subject is so crucial to all of us
and to our nation.
I really enjoyed the speech this morning by Senator
Gorton. It’s great to have someone who has been on
these committees recently, giving us their reports. The
panel this morning talked about events 25 years ago.
In addition to being enlightening, it was just like being
born again. I loved all of it. Then to be able to do this
in the name of Frank Church, certainly one of the most
gifted, effective, and caring public servants of our time,
makes the whole event truly exciting.
In the early 70s, we saw the recurrent struggle between faith and fear played out in our painful national debate on Vietnam, the revelation of the
government’s public deceit in support of the war, and
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the Watergate scandal, which ended in driving a president out of office. Then came the shocking news, disclosed in Sy Hersh’s New York Times story, accusing
the CIA of a massive spy operation aimed at American
citizens here at home. Almost immediately, Senator
Pastore moved to create a Senate Select Committee
on Governmental Operations to Investigate the
Intelligence Agencies, and of course that committee
became the famous Church Committee, which we are
discussing today.
That committee and its work marked the first
time in the history of this nation or any other nation
that intelligence agencies would be subject to this kind
of thorough investigation. Frank Church asked me
to serve with what he called a “domestic task force,”
charged with investigating the intelligence community’s abuses against Americans here at home: the FBI, the
CIA, the NSA, the Army, the Post Office, and the IRS.
The earlier panel this morning has already discussed much of what we uncovered. Our final report,
just on the domestic part, was 396 pages. All told, the
Church Committee issued 13 separate volumes of evidence as a result of its hearings and 96 recommendations for reform.
It’s important to remember that none of the intelligence agencies ever questioned the accuracy of our
findings, which is a remarkable thing. After all this time
and all these facts, not one of them — even today — has
ever been questioned. I think we did our work well.
As we’ve heard this morning. These agencies
targeted Americans from every walk of life: women’s
groups, veterans organizations, academic, religious,
environmental, civil rights, anti-war — almost anything was subject to being reviewed. During this time
when we were holding these hearings, I was often
asked about it when I came home. “Get away from
that. If you aren’t doing anything wrong, you don’t
have anything worry about. These people are looking
for bad guys, so leave them alone.” In fact, what we
found were a lot of good guys and good women who
were targeted and hurt by these activities.
The most shocking of all, which reveals the dangers of unaccountable governmental power more
powerfully than anything else, is Hoover’s secret
war against Dr. Martin Luther King. Dr. King had
violated no law. He was the nation’s greatest civil rights
hero, an apostle of non-violence, a religious leader acting from deepest beliefs. In fact, by insisting that the
civil rights movement adhere to non-violence, he may
have saved our nation.

Yet, under the Cointel program (the Counterintelligence Program mentioned this morning), King’s
Southern Leadership Conference was classified as a
“black hate group.” King himself was described as
“the most dangerous Negro leader in America.” The
Bureau’s campaign against King involved wiretaps, paid
informants, and agents who shadowed his every step.
It didn’t end with spying. The Bureau set out to
destroy his career and his marriage. At the height of
the campaign, the Bureau mailed an anonymous letter and embarrassing tapes to King in what is widely
regarded as an effort to get King to commit suicide.
Whatever the reason for Hoover’s anger, he hounded
King for years and subjected him to vindictive and
relentless harassment.
After all of those 48 years as FBI Director, Hoover
had gained far too much power and was armed with
a personal collection of secret files, kept in his own
office. Hoover collected embarrassing information
and gossip on nearly everyone in Washington. No one
— not even the Attorney General under whom he was
supposedly serving, not the President who appointed
him — dared challenge him. With time, Hoover
became a very twisted man. Respected reporters, who
knew about the FBI attacks on Dr. King, later admitted that they were afraid to write about it.
But it is too easy to just talk about Hoover
because he was not the sole villain. Lyndon Johnson,
the Kennedys — our committee found that every
president from Roosevelt to Nixon had pressed these
secret agencies to go beyond the law. This was a bipartisan problem. These presidents saw the intelligence
agencies as extensions of their own personal power as,
indeed, they were. In an office that has driven every
one of its occupants crazy, the temptation to use these
secret organizations to accomplish agendas unrestrained by others is almost too much to resist. And
that’s what happened.
What those presidents and Hoover shared was
also the fear that we might not be able to protect ourselves from our enemies without breaking the law. But
these fears were always exaggerated. Hoover fed the
public fears of widespread American disloyalty. When
Williams, whose name came up earlier today, told
Hoover that his agents could find no evidence that Dr.
King was under the influence of Communists, Hoover
angrily rejected his report and forced him to rewrite
it. As we have just learned since they opened up the
KGB files, the Soviets as well were targeting him
because they thought he was too modern and wanted
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to undermine him.
Throughout the long hearings, we asked government officials again and again this question: What
happened to the law? The one example I will give
was repeated many, many times. This was a question
to Mr. Buffman, who was with the National Security
Agency, when we were asking about their abuses:
“Were you concerned about its legality?” Answer:
“Legality?” Question: “Was it legal?” Answer: “In what
sense?” Question: “Whether that would have been a
legal thing to do?” Answer: “That didn’t enter into the
discussions.” My following question was: “I was asking whether you were concerned about whether that
would be legal and proper?” Answer: “We didn’t consider that at the time, no.” We heard a similar answer
from many, many agency chiefs.
Unfortunately, what we were seeing, the victory of
fear over faith, was nothing new for America. We saw
it in the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 18th Century,
in the notorious red-scare Palmer raids following
World War I, and in the disgraceful internment of
Japanese-Americans in World War II. It’s what Joe
McCarthy and the House UnAmerican Activities
Committee were all about. We now know that all of it
was based on unfounded fear. We disgraced ourselves,
and we hurt a lot of innocent Americans.
The efforts by Frank Church and the Committee
were astoundingly successful. In fact, later FBI and
CIA directors have repeatedly said that these committee reforms helped their agencies do their jobs. If
we were successful — and I believe we were — it was
for many reasons. First of all, our chairman, Frank
Church. He was a superb chairman, he picked a gifted
staff, and he handled a very strong bi-partisan committee and kept it working together. Our House counterpart committee blew up a couple of months after it
was created. They couldn’t keep it working together.
Church kept us working together all the way through
our efforts. We did disagree, but we got it done. While
we had our differences with the Ford Administration,
it also should be said that they, too, wanted to work
out something acceptable. Attorney General Levy was
a very strong, positive force in all of our efforts.
Another factor, not widely mentioned, was the
largely undisclosed concern to be found within the
FBI, within the CIA, and across the board among
the officers of these agencies, who were worried
about what was going on in their own agencies and
knew that their agencies were losing public support.
Something had to be done.

The vastness of our findings, facts now replacing suspicion, drove a profound national demand for
reforms. Most important, both houses of Congress
created permanent intelligence legislative committees
with sweeping powers to hear and investigate and to
authorize appropriations. Our reforms all sought to
strengthen the most fundamental of Constitutional
principles: Government power must be accountable
to the Congress, to the courts, to the press, and finally
to the American people. Every president has resisted
that principle.
The current Administration has an almost unprecedented contempt for the idea of its accountability.
I have heard reports from friends that members of the
Intelligence Committee, on which Senator Gorton
sits, often feel that they are hearing only screened
information. Some members of the special 9/11 joint
committee have made that complaint, and part of
its report, recommended by the committee, remains
censored by the executive branch. The Kean
Commission, on which Senator Gorton also sits, has
recently issued a report on cooperation with the executive branch but mentioned that key executive documents have not yet been produced.
Ashcroft is proposing to substitute administrative warrants, free from court oversight. The newlyimposed blackout of presidential papers, that rich
source of history that is so crucial to our understanding; the essential unavailability of the president to
probing news conferences; the contempt often shown
to Congressional inquiries — all should worry us.
We should also worry that Mr. Ashcroft lays claim
to power to detain indefinitely any American citizen,
arrested on American soil, without access to any attorney, based solely on the government’s unchallenged
allegation that the detainee is an ”enemy combatant.”
The future of these citizen detainees is now
decided in private by the same government that put
them there. If ours is a government of and by the
people, as Lincoln said and as I believe, then the highest priority must be placed on public information.
I spent years in the Senate, working with the Bureau
and the intelligence agencies. I spent four years in
the White House at the center of the nation’s most
sensitive information. I respect these agencies and
admire many of their leaders, but I believe a vast
amount of what should be public information is
routinely suppressed.
After a lifetime of public service, let me say this.
Never underestimate the lengths Administrations of
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either political party will go to protect themselves
from public disclosure of erroneous, unethical, or
illegal behavior — or just plain embarrassment. The
instinct for self-protection is often disguised in the
name of national security.
Nevertheless, there are secrets that must be kept.
One of the greatest challenges facing these intelligence
committees is to handle that information in such a
way that it can drive policy without disclosure during
that period.
When you place American history beside the
history of the great nations that were in being at our
beginning, it is striking that all of those systems are
gone, many of them a long time ago. But America
remains free and is becoming stronger all the time.
The great difference between the two examples was
that America was based on freedom and accountability of government.
You read the Federalist papers, and they wanted
to make certain that public servants in America had to
account. They wanted to make certain that power was
separated and divided. It was a document very suspicious about what happens to people when they are in
power, and they wanted to make certain that they had
to account.
The other proud nations thought that they could
be made strong by imperial fiat. It turned out instead
that it was freedom and equality under the law that
drove the reforms, built the trust, expanded our opportunity, and built the strength of this great nation. We
must never abandon the Constitution in the futile,
self-defeating search for security by an unaccountable
government. In fact, the abuse of Constitutional rights
will inevitably weaken our nation by undermining our
respect for the law at home and diminishing America’s
global stature.
One issue kept coming up this morning, a good
issue. What happens when these Congressional intelligence committees have trouble getting information
out of the executive branch? I think that will be a
continuing problem. We bet that what the founding fathers had in mind — that is, pitting ambition
against ambition — would result in Senate and House
committees constantly pressing whoever was the president to disclose this information. We need comity, but
we need those members of the Senate and members of
the House constantly pressing, pushing to try to get
the real story.
The success of the Church committee was possible
only because we got the facts. If we had been refused

the information that you find in those reports, which
drove our recommendations, we would have failed. So
it’s not just an interesting situation; it is fundamental
to the success of the whole accountability program.
Another thing that has struck me in recent
months is this: What is the role of leaders of our intelligence committees when they advise the executive
branch on issues of grave importance? Why is what
they have stated as facts somehow not stated as clearly
to the public?
In England recently, they had a judicial inquiry
into how Prime Minister Blair shaped his arguments
for going into the war in Iraq. It was an unbelievably searching review of inside papers and internal documents within the Prime Minister’s office.
You saw what happened. What happened was an
Administration wanting to make the decision to go
to war and trying to increase and extend justification
beyond what information they had in order to make
the people of England believe they would be in immediate peril if they didn’t do it. It turns out that a lot of
that was exaggeration, and the judge has said so.
What is the duty in the United States of our key
intelligence committee officials? When they believe
certain fundamental facts, they’ve talked about being
ignored when they are in the middle of a debate like
that. What are the rights of the American people?
What are the rights of the committee to hear what
we’ve paid for in these intelligence committees and
hear it clearly so that it can be a part of the debate at
the time when it is most useful?
Our nation will continue to struggle, as we have
from the beginning, to balance our often very real fears
with our belief in the strength of the law as a protector. As we do so, thanks to Frank Church, America has
now before it a priceless record never before available,
describing how unaccountable secret government can
lose its way, how human beings can be tempted by the
lack of accountability, what it can cost us, and what we
can do to remain free and strong.
Frank Church had a long, rich, incredibly productive public career, and Bethine was right there
with him all the way. The achievements of the Church
Committee will go down as the most valuable legacy
of all.
Thank you.
ANDRUS: To you and Joan, thank you very, very
much for being here with us today. We will make certain that you will make that airplane, but the Vice
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President has consented to respond to questions for
about 12 or 13 minutes. If you have a question, John
Freemuth will come to you with a microphone.

ing allegation that high government officials in the
White House would out CIA agents. Is this surprising to you?

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Please comment on
Pat Shea’s last point: the appropriateness of a war on
terrorism as opposed to a police-type operation.

MONDALE: I read the same stuff you do. Bush
doesn’t call me as much as he could. We’re at the
early stages of that. I know what the allegations are.
I’m hoping that there will be an investigation of this
serious charge and one conducted in a way that will
inspire public confidence. Traditionally, over the last
four years or so, when a sitting Administration gets
into a potentially embarrassing place where they are
investigating themselves and the public might not
believe it is a true investigation, they reach out for
some distinguished person outside the government to
conduct it. I hope they will do that this time because
in that way, if in fact it is without foundation, the public will accept that more readily than if it is conducted
under the current Attorney General.

MONDALE: The word “war” has been used in
all kinds of ways. We had a war on poverty, etc. I don’t
want to get involved in the semantics. What I want
to get involved in is finding a clear understanding of
the difference between a war between nation states,
which we can win all the time — we’re the strongest,
most unbelievably powerful military nation on earth
— and a war against terrorism — this amorphous
dark spooky threat that can come from any source at
any time and that thrives on failed nations and weak
governments elsewhere to find their haven. We should
be careful that the word “war” doesn’t confuse us so
that we believe it’s the same thing. It’s much more
difficult; it involves different strategies; and it also
involves America behaving in a way that we make
friends every day. We must build support around the
world, so that nations find it more comfortable to
cooperate with us because intelligence is very important, and that cannot be ordered all the time. Even
America has to have friends.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Our Attorney
General, John Ashcroft, has just completed a road
show where he spoke to law enforcement but not to
the public, and he didn’t engage the public. Earlier, he
spoke to a Congressional committee, saying that those
who questioned the Government’s reaction to the war
on terrorism aid terrorists. President Bush continues
to try to give the Attorney General more powers to
conduct his war on terrorism. You commented on
J. Edgar Hoover’s legacy. To what extent do you see
parallels? To what extent does our current Attorney
General’s behavior concern you?

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Several years ago
when there were problems in the nuclear industry,
particularly in the matter of waste, the bureaucrats
at Hanford used children in their ads, trying to gain
support. The children were saying, “Our dads work
at Hanford, and we trust them. They wouldn’t do
anything to hurt us.” Isn’t there a parallel with our
Attorney General making this grand tour, telling us,
his children, to trust him because he wouldn’t do anything to hurt us?

MONDALE: I should have left 15 minutes ago.
Too late now. I don’t know what it is about Ashcroft.
He has this idea almost every day of pushing, pressing,
demanding more things related to freedom for him to
do what he wants beyond the law. As Mark Gitenstein
said this morning, his rhetoric is almost worse than
what he is doing.
Now he is talking up the Patriot II proposal, which
would expand government access to private data,
allowing federal agents to issue subpoenas for private
medical, financial, and other records without a court
order. Lack of judicial oversight removes an important
check on government misconduct, and record holders
would be required to comply with those requests or
face prison. They would be barred from telling anyone
about the subpoena.
This is la-la land. This will not strengthen us. This

MONDALE: I believe in public trust. We need it;
we need comity. But our system is based on accountability. Let us hear the facts, and then we’ll decide
what to trust. It’s not just a general pitch for trust that
American people need to hear. It’s the facts, ma’am. It’s
what is really going on. That is why accountability is
crucial to the future and the vitality of our society.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to hear
whether you have any views on the rather surpris-
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ANDRUS: Fritz and Joan, thank you for being
here. You can feel the affection in that applause. Let
me ask the audience: Let them leave through here, and
don’t stop them for autographs. Planes don’t wait anymore.
Marc Johnson will start his panel a little earlier at
1:15. We will reconvene in the other room, and then
meet for the afternoon panel.

will not allow us to go after those terrorists more effectively. This is the sort of thing that divides Americans,
produces suspicion. The agents in the FBI hate it. One
of the problems we found in our investigations is that
many agents hated what the politicians were ordering them to do. That’s why you need laws and regulations that make sense, so that agents can say no to
their higher-ups when silly, dangerous stuff like this is
being proposed. No, I don’t agree with that.
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moment to introduce each one of them to you. There
are more complete biographies in your conference
packet.
Starting right here is Andrew Malcolm. Mr.
Malcolm was for 26 years a correspondent with the
New York Times. He now works for the Los Angeles
Times and is a member of the editorial board. In
between those two newspaper stints, he served as the
communications director for Republican Governor
Marc Racicot in Montana and worked on the Bush
2000 presidential election campaign.
Judge Kevin Duffy is seated next to Andy. Judge
Duffy is a federal judge for the District of New York
and has been since his appointment by President
Nixon in 1972. He has presided over many high-profile cases. One that I will mention is the first World
Trade Center bombing case in 1993 and 1994.
Tom Moss is next to Judge Duffy. He is the United
States Attorney for Idaho, a former prosecuting attorney, a former state legislator, appointed by President
Bush to his current job in 2001.
Carolyn Washburn is the executive editor of the
Idaho Statesman and, as you’ve heard throughout the
day, the Statesman and Carolyn in particular have
been enormously helpful in staging a number of our
conferences over the last several years.
Next is Dr. John Deutch, former director of
Central Intelligence from 1995 through 1996. In his
long and distinguished public career, he has also served
stints as the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of
Defense. Dr. Deutch has been on the faculty of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1970.
David Broder, Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent and national political correspondent of the
Washington Post. Mr. Broder’s extremely well-regarded
column is carried in over 300 newspapers around
the globe, and we are particularly delighted that he
is doing double duty by sitting in on this panel this

CECIL D. ANDRUS: Let me introduce the moderator for the program this afternoon, Marc Johnson.
Marc is one of the senior partners of the Gallatin
Group, which is a public affairs/management issues
corporation with offices in Boise, Portland, Seattle,
Helena, and Washington. Marc has a journalism
background and graduated from South Dakota State
University. He has experience in radio, television, the
print media. When I enticed him away from journalism in 1986, he was then with the Public Television
station here in Idaho. He joined my attempt for my
second life in politics. I cut him a deal. I said, “If I’m
elected, you’ll have steady employment. If I don’t win,
you’re done.” I thought he was smarter than that, but
he agreed to it. He joined me and served me as Chief
of Staff, an all round outstanding gentleman, Mr.
Marc Johnson.
MARC JOHNSON: Thank you, Governor.
Good afternoon everyone. We heard a lot this morning about a delicate balance in the American system.
Our system is built around a whole series of delicate balances. The balances are designed to moderate among often - conflicting values in our system,
values that we hold, generally speaking, very dear.
They are such values as a free press, fair and speedy
trials, public trials. Other values that we hold dear are
openness in our system, and we’ve heard a lot of discussion today about the value that we place on being
secure in our country, secure from internal as well as
external threats.
But it’s in that clash of values where the delicate
balance brings about controversy. It’s not a new debate
in the United States. We’ve had it many, many times
before in our history, but it’s always an extraordinarily
important debate. We’re going to join that debate in a
slightly different way this afternoon. We have assembled a truly outstanding panel, and I’d like to take a
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afternoon. Mr. Broder, of course, will speak at 7:00
PM tonight.
Senator Gorton, whom many of you met earlier
today, probably needs no more introduction from me,
but I will digress just long enough to say that there are
lots of things in Slade Gorton’s career that deserve honorable mention, not the least of which is that, probably
more than anyone else, he kept the Mariners in Seattle.
I personally want to thank him publicly for that.
Judge Steve Trott has been a member of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals since his appointment by
President Reagan in 1988. He worked in the Reagan
Justice Department as the Associate Attorney General,
which is the number three job in the Department. His
responsibilities included, among other things, international terrorism issues. Judge, you haven’t set aside
any elections today have you? Just for the record, the
judge was not on the panel that decided the California
recall case.
Jim Brosnahan is a very prominent trial attorney from San Francisco with the firm of Morrison &
Foerster. He is a noted First Amendment authority
and is respected for his defense work, including providing defense for the so-called “American Taliban,”
John Walker Lindh.
Pat Shea, whom you met earlier today, has a very
checkered past. He is a lawyer in Salt Lake City now,
former Interior Department official and Intelligence
Committee staffer.
Last, but certainly not least, Pierce Murphy,
Boise’s Community Ombudsman, the first person to
hold that position. Please welcome the panel
This is not going to be an entirely conventional
panel discussion, but rather a dialogue based on a set of
circumstances that I will outline for the panelists, circumstances that I hope they will respond to — based
on their experience, their perspective, and frankly how
far they want to press the moderator. When we run
the course of that dialogue, we’ll have a more conventional discussion about many of the issues that we’ve
been probing so far today.
So let me set the scene for this hypothetical. Put
yourself in the not-too-distant future in the United
States. It is a very, very tense time. The global war
against terrorism is continuing and so are violent
attacks on American soil.
The most recent attack occurred just a month or
so ago in San Francisco. A bomb was set off in a transit
station. There were many casualties. There was apparently a related series of incidents in a number of com-

munities all across the western United States.
The political response in Washington, D.C. by
the Administration and by Congress was to heed
the call for additional law enforcement and judicial
efforts against terrorism. Among the changes produced by the Congress — and I promise I didn’t steal
Vice President Mondale’s line here — was administrative subpoenas, which did not require the approval of
a judge or a grand jury. There was a provision additionally to routinely deny bail in order to keep terror
suspects in custody, pending trial. Broader definitions
were created for when the death penalty might apply
against terrorists.
Pat Shea, very much out of type, is the FBI
Director today. Mr. Shea, your agents have determined that the suspect, who could be the bag man,
the financial brains behind this recent terrorist activity,
has been located. We know he is somewhere in Every
City, USA. We’re not quite sure where he is in the city,
but we think he may be holed up there somewhere.
You’re going to go after him, aren’t you?
SHEA: Absolutely.
JOHNSON: How are you going to do that?
SHEA: After 9/11, we, with the approval of
the Attorney General, implemented what we call
SOILHTT, which stands for State Operation
Intelligence with Librarians, Hotels, Truckers and
Taxi Drivers. We believe that digital and advanced
technology is very useful, but at the end of the day,
we needed to rapidly expand our human intelligence
capability. So we have activated the SOILHTT network in every city and believe that through the reporting from the hotels and taxi drivers, we will get information. We also brought in a group of young hackers, who have done an extraordinary job for the FBI
in being able to access digital records for credit cards.
We have put that operation into effect in the city and
are now able, in real time, to keep track of every credit
card that is used, as is required at all the hotels now,
of who is checking in and who is checking out, when
they checked in and when they checked out.
We are trying to expand it to the telephone operation, but given the confusion with the cell telephones,
we are not as successful there. We believe, however,
that within the next ten hours, we will be able to identify the hotel.
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JOHNSON: But to get this man, Mr. X, are you
going to talk to John Deutch at the CIA? He may have
some information on this fellow.

diction and cut him in on what your intelligence tells
you about this fellow? Talk to Mr. Moss?
SHEA: I’m a little worried, Judge Trott notwithstanding. Every city is in the Ninth Circuit, so we’re
never quite sure what the standard is. But I have good
evidence that the bag man has financed the explosion in San Francisco; we’ve traced that money. Our
librarian was good enough to give us some information about some books that the bag man’s family had
checked out, and they were on financing explosive
activities, so we think we have that done. As the U.S.
Attorney, what other directions would you give me,
given that you’ll be the one prosecuting this case?

SHEA: Well, he may, but that’s another agency,
and we’re having a little problem up on the Hill about
our budget. Quite frankly, I think the FBI is the
agency that needs to handle domestic intelligence, and
if I start asking for favors from the CIA, I think they
will begin asking favors from me that I am not willing to fulfill.
JOHNSON: Let’s assume that this terrible suspect has dual citizenship. He is a U.S. citizen, but he is
also a Saudi citizen. Would that make any difference?

THOMAS MOSS: Well, Mr. FBI Director, since
you haven’t given me very much, it doesn’t sound to
me like you have a direct link to this person. If you
have information that can help identify the bag person, I suggest that we have him picked up, advise him
of his rights, and see if he’ll talk to us.

SHEA: If I went to the CIA? Yes. They would
have better resources on Saudi Arabia, although since
World War II, the Bureau has been very successful at
placing our agents overseas as a preemptive measure
because we need that intelligence overseas before we
can do an effective job domestically.

JOHNSON: We know he’s in the city. We just
don’t quite know where he is. Why don’t you use this
new administrative subpoena and subpoena all the
hotel records or all the airlines records of people moving in and out of the city, for example?

JOHNSON: Mr. Deutch? Can you help the FBI
here?
JOHN DEUTCH: Mr. President, in the way
you’ve posed this problem, I don’t see a basis for
involvement by the Director of Central Intelligence.
I’ve heard nothing about serious foreign involvement
in what you’ve said . . .

MOSS: Well, because the administrative subpoena wouldn’t give you that broad an authority. If
we’re operating on today’s law, you couldn’t use an
administrative subpoena to go after this person.

JOHNSON: This guy is potentially the bag man
for a whole network of terrorists.

JOHNSON: Well, let’s put up the new law. This
is the new law we are operating under. It says, “In any
investigation concerning a federal crime of terrorism,
the Attorney General may subpoena witnesses, compel attendance and testimony of witnesses, require
the production of records, books, papers, documents,
electronic data.” Why couldn’t you go after the hotel
records under that power?

DEUTCH: Let me finish, Mr. President.
JOHNSON: I still run the cabinet meetings.
DEUTCH: It’s important for directors to speak
out. You haven’t laid the basis for an act of catastrophic
terrorism involving foreign subnationals or states
involved directly in the security of this country. I’m
perfectly happy, in this instance, to step aside to whatever capacity the FBI may have in this matter, which I
suggest to you may be quite little.

MOSS: If we had probable cause to believe a certain hotel had records to lead to this person, that is
what we would recommend they do, but you don’t just
go out and get subpoenas for every hotel in the city to
see where everyone is staying. That would go beyond
the authority that we consider vested under this law.

JOHNSON: The Attorney General really wants
to go after this Mr. X, Mr. Shea and Mr. Deutch. Why
don’t you call the U.S. Attorney in this particular juris-

JOHNSON: OK. Let’s assume for a moment that

33

we have a good indication that he is at a particular
location. Then what would you do, utilizing this new
tool that Congress has just given you?

Ashcroft has declared in a public way on national
television that the person has done something, then I
know he is innocent.

MOSS: When you say a particular location, are
you talking about a large hotel?

JOHNSON: I wonder if you would feel differently if these were the facts. Let’s assume for the
moment that we have found Mr. X in this hotel. We
have an administrative subpoena that has collected up
his laptop, his cell phone. He didn’t have much else
with him. Those would be potential pieces of evidence, would they not?

JOHNSON: Let’s say for the sake of the discussion that he is in a large hotel.
MOSS: If he is in a large hotel, I would recommend that the FBI go to the hotel, talk to them, and
see who is at the hotel. They may or may not volunteer the information because people in those situations
are concerned about civil liability. The administrative
subpoena authority was created largely to protect people who wanted to give law enforcement information.

BROSNAHAN: Yes.
JOHNSON: Is there anything wrong with that?
BROSNAHAN: It would depend on how they
are obtained. Every officeholder in the United States
takes an oath to follow the United States Constitution
and to protect the country from enemies foreign
and domestic, and that would include anything that
they’re doing. If you ask me, under present law, it
would depend on how they obtained it.

JOHNSON: But time is of the essence. This guy
is very mobile. He might be gone by the time you do
all that.
MOSS: Well, that’s the way the system works.
You’re going to have to go in there and see what you
can find out. If you arrive at some specifics, then you
go after that specific information.

JOHNSON: We’re operating under this law that
says the Attorney General can just issue one of these.

JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, as an aggressive FBI
Director, are you satisfied with that?

BROSNAHAN: Well, that’s a good start for the
government. The question is: Is there a Constitutional
argument that can be mounted against it? Maybe
the most important aspect, seriously, will be the
atmosphere in which the request is made. You have
described the decimation of the city in which I practice, and I am in front of a judge who is a human
being, surrounded by the mourning, which is occurring there as it occurred in Virginia and as it occurred
in New York City. Will I get a judge to throw it out on
a technicality? The answer, seriously, is no.

SHEA: I might try to see if I could find another
U.S. Attorney in another jurisdiction, but I think I
could persuade him with the evidence our agents had
brought together from our group of hotel, taxi, and
truck operators, and I probably have a few things on
the hotel manager that would help her cooperate.
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, does any of this
bother you?

JOHNSON: We use these administrative subpoenas all the time in civil cases. Would it make any
difference to apply them to criminal cases?

JAMES BROSNAHAN: Not until I hear some
evidence. I haven’t heard any evidence yet. Sometimes
when you hear a discussion like this morning, it’s
almost like we’re getting ready in America to say that
having actual evidence — witnesses, documents, videos, things that prove things — has become a kind of
outmoded technicality. I’m with the U.S. Attorney on
this one. He’s not ready to move on this one, and I
understand. More credit to him.
The second thing is that if Attorney General

BROSNAHAN: I think there is a big difference.
I’ve thought about this. Is this a serious problem that is
being proposed? I think it is a problem. A civil matter
is for a certain purpose. Here the purpose is to conduct
a criminal investigation, which is a much more serious thing. One of the great cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court came right out of this part of the country where
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the government tried to go into a meat packing plant
without a subpoena, without a proper process. This
part of the world — as you know because you all live
here — breathes freedom, OK? This is going to be the
last place to go, right here. So you’re safe here. But
the meatpacker said, “Hell no!” Which is what, in the
past, America has sometimes said. It went to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said, “You’re
right. You can’t do it. It’s not lawful.”

an application, or he can get the Grand Jury to issue a
Grand Jury subpoena for the same purpose. Why do
they need an administrative subpoena?
JOHNSON: I’m concerned that might not move
fast enough.
DUFFY: Who? The judge or the Grand Jury?
JOHNSON: Either one.

JOHNSON: Judge Trott, what’s going on here?
MOSS: When I was a state prosecutor, we ran
into that quite a lot, trying to find a judge after 5:00
PM, and they were all gone. A lot has been done with
telephonic warrants and all the rest, but I’d restructure the system so that if law enforcement is going to
be required to go to a judge to get assistance, there are
judges that are easily accessible by telephone or in person 24 hours a day. I think that’s a necessity, especially
after September 11th.

STEPHEN TROTT: The administrative subpoena, I think, is a major mistake because one of the
structural ways that we deal with the inclination of
human nature and people to do the wrong thing for
the wrong reasons is by putting in a series of checks
and balances, and we’ve always required in almost
every respect to require one branch of government to
oversee another. The administrative subpoena basically gives all the power to a single branch of government, and were I a United States Attorney, I wouldn’t
use an administrative subpoena. I would go the old
route of getting court approval, even if those were
on the books, until I had a definitive decision from
the courts saying that those were Constitutional and
appropriate under certain circumstances.
If you’re faced with an emergency, of course, you
don’t have to wait for any subpoenas. The Supreme
Court has made it very clear, as Justice Jackson said a
long time ago, that the Constitution is a not a suicide
pact, and if law enforcement is faced with a dire emergency, they can run into a house and grab the bomb
or the dying child or whatever it is. So I would be very
wary of administrative subpoenas until I had a definitive decision from the United States Supreme Court
telling me whether they were appropriate or not.

DUFFY: Well, you know, that is very surprising to me because I sit in a District Court where we
have a fair number of judges. I was just on the
Emergency Court. I was available 24 hours a day, plus
a magistrate.
MOSS: That’s what I mean about one of the
changes, but that isn’t true in a lot of the jurisdictions,
and it’s especially not true in state courts where you
still can’t find judges after 5:00 PM.
DUFFY: I’d like to say something about state
courts, but my wife is a state court judge, and I
wouldn’t dare.
BROSNAHAN: So is mine, and she is working
all the time.

JOHNSON: Judge Duffy, stay with me for a
moment. Let’s assume this administrative subpoena
has been issued. Mr. X’s laptop has been taken into
custody. All of this has happened without anybody
going in front of a judge. I thought judges were supposed to issue subpoenas.

TROTT: If you’re going to have to go to a judge,
the judge better be available all the time. I agree
with you.
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, are you as sanguine
as these two judges that no prosecutor would ever use
this administrative subpoena?

KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY: Judges at times can
issue subpoenas, but I agree with Judge Trott. Who
is going to use this thing if it is really unnecessary?
In the factual situation you have given us, it is really
unnecessary. The U.S. Attorney can appear and make

BROSNAHAN: No, I’m not, although I will say
that if you get right down to it, there are so many prosecutors in this country who go to work every day and
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do the job right. There are people in the Department
of Justice who are terribly concerned about the issues
you’re discussing in this wonderful gathering here
today. So I don’t know. If it’s Dave Kelly from New
York City, I’ll talk to Dave. He may not do this. He
may think this is not appropriate, but more important
is the competence issue, which we weren’t able to discuss after 9/11 because it was too serious and it’s our
president and we have to win.
The competence issue is: “How good a job is being
done? How many people speak Arabic or Pashtun, if
necessary? Not that we should know this, but it should
be done. What about the detectives on television
who solve crimes in one hour. One hour, OK? The
anthrax case is a very difficult case. The Unabomber
took 17 years. You have to be honest about it. It’s not
easy. How good a job are they doing with what they
have? And Washington — I speak as a way outsider in
California — is best at distracting attention from the
key issue. The key issue is — and great Americans are
back there working on it as we speak — how good a
job are they doing with what they have? We’re all talking about what they need to do the job.
One more thing, which I have thought about.
The other things I hadn’t thought about. This issue
is so interesting because every other issue divides us
– race, age, economics, whatever. There is one group
on one side, and one group on the other. Everybody
in this room and everybody in the United States has
a personal interest in their personal security — that it
be done right and that we really find out what’s going
on. You get the sense sometimes that there are people
in Washington who don’t understand that we are following this pretty closely.

— and to look at it as a legal collection, not only a
collection of information but understanding how to
protect the American people. You can’t do it with a
national security rubric on one side and a law enforcement rubric on the other side. The law enforcement
piece is (a) important to protect American rights and
(b) important in those cases where you want to bring
somebody to a court of law. But the principal thing is
to build competence, and it can only be done if you
build one organization that will collect the intelligence
for you, subject to the rules that are set out by the
judges here and others about what is proper behavior.
But we don’t have the competence because we
have two different systems, and the FBI, for all of its
greatness, is never going to be able to collect information on complicated foreign terrorist groups because
they have a culture, an education, and a capacity
which goes to law enforcement and bringing people to
justice, not collecting information which, over time,
will accumulate to understanding catastrophic threats
to the people of this country. I would be happy to help
my friend, Director Shea, build a system for competence, but I think there has to be one national system,
whether it is in the FBI or the CIA or somewhere else.
Competence is the issue here.
MOSS: I think there are a couple of things that
we need to clarify. The administrative subpoena is the
subpoena the FBI uses. There is a good chance they
wouldn’t even come to the U.S. Attorney and ask for
an administrative subpoena. They know they can do
it, but it’s very limited in the situations in which they
do it. It’s limited to four circumstances: health care
fraud; sexual abuse of children; false claims against the
United States; and threats against the president. Those
are the only cases in which, currently, an administrative subpoena can be used.
Take health care fraud. One of the reasons that
they allow it for those cases is that you have a criminal
aspect and a civil aspect to that case. If you go strictly
with a Grand Jury subpoena, then that’s secret, and
you can’t use the information you get there in a civil
case. You can’t use it because it’s a secret procedure. I
think that’s why the law developed in such a way that
you can get the information, and the government can
go after the dishonest doctor, who is defrauding the
government. At the same time, the criminal side can
look at prosecuting him. I think that’s important to
recognize.
My experience with the FBI is that they only use

DEUTCH: I would like to say a word about
competence, which I think is at the core of this. We
all want to be protected, and the fact of the matter is
that there are really two issues here. One is how do we
build the best competence? The other is how do we
protect the rights of people?
Let me say a word about competence. The notion
that the law enforcement system is going to develop
competence in this area is, in my mind, suspect. Let
me give you an example.
In 1995, we had an explosion in the barracks in
Saudi Arabia, the Khobar Towers. The reaction was
that this was a crime. We sent Louis Freeh, the director
of the FBI, to Saudi Arabia to investigate this crime
with his Saudi counterpart, — no Thomas Jefferson
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subpoenas to get information they could probably get
without any subpoena. But they have a person there
who wants to cooperate with them but is afraid they
will get in trouble civilly, so the administrative subpoena guarantees them immunity from a civil suit if
they give up the information.
In other words, you could walk into this hotel and
say, “Is there a guy staying in your hotel by the name
of such-and-such?” That person could tell you that
without violating anybody’s rights or any rule of law.
Often they don’t want to do it. So you give them an
administrative subpoena; then they do it. The penalty
under the current law, if you don’t give up the information in response to an administrative subpoena, is
the FBI then has to go to the U.S. Attorney, go to the
court, and petition for an order to require the person
to give it. There is no penalty for not coughing up the
information in an administrative subpoena.
The new law is simply applying a law to terrorists
that now applies to fraudulent doctors and people like
that. I would suggest that if it’s good enough for doctors, it ought to be good enough for terrorists.

Dr. Deutch is making the point that we really
ought to be talking about the competence of our intelligence-gathering organizations.
Senator, where do you come down on all this?
You touched on all that this morning in your opening
speech, but is it a question of competence more than
differently applying the law?
GORTON: First, I’m a bit restless with your
entire hypothetical because I don’t know any of the
background of the individual who is suspected of having engaged in this activity or how it is that immediately after he’s done it, we now know what hotel he’s in
and in what city, but we didn’t know enough to stop it
in the first place. There was obviously a failure there at
some point because the primary function of our government and of our agency should be to keep it from
taking place.
In some respects, your hypothetical might be
more difficult to deal with if we simply suspected that
this guy was about to engage in an activity of this sort.
Having given you those provisos, I agree completely
with the former head of the CIA, Dr. Deutch. We do
have a serious question of competence, but we also
have a natural and probably healthy American view,
perfectly expressed by Mr. Brosnahan: We know a
lot here, and those fools in Washington don’t know a
damn thing and simply get in the way.
I don’t think that’s true. There is a question of
competence, but we live in an extraordinarily complex
world. The qualities of foresight and imagination,
which are perhaps the most important characteristics of people who will work for an intelligence agency
— as against a law enforcement agency trying to put
together what happened after the fact — and of seeing
the world from a different perspective are very difficult
to find. One of the most important duties of the people who are there to protect us is to find those people,
to recruit those people, to give them enough recognition so that we do have highly competent people. If I
were to exhibit a prejudice, as I have, it would be that I
would put an even higher value on the people who are
trying to prevent these happenings than I would put
on the police officer or the FBI officer who is going to
catch them after it’s done. The very fact that he has to
catch them after it’s done shows we failed.

JOHNSON: I want to come back to Dr. Deutch’s
point about competence. Dave Broder, it seems to me
that the crux of at least some of this argument turns
on the concern on the part of some of the American
people that the government will go on some kind of a
fishing expedition, that your personal information will
be too readily accessible to the government, that they
will have access to things they really don’t need and
that aren’t going to help us in the war on terrorism,
but that might reflect badly on me, John Q. Citizen.
Is that part of the debate?
DAVID BRODER: Of course, it’s the heart of
the debate because people know too damned much
about us already, and we don’t particularly want the
government messing around in our lives, sopping up
even more information. We do want to be protected,
and that’s the conflict, of course, that you’ve been dealing with all day here.
JOHNSON: How about this question of competence? You all seem to be discounting the fact that
these administrative subpoenas, should they become
law — and the language I put up on the screen a minute ago, by the way, is right out of the law that has
been introduced in the House of Representatives —
could be used in these circumstances.

DEUTCH: I think I have another way of helping
Pat Shea…
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JOHNSON: He needs lots of help. He’s an
inexperienced FBI Director.

bring him into a court of law. I care about protecting
American lives. Bringing him to justice a long time
after an act has been committed doesn’t seem to me
to accomplish that. I can’t square those two notions
in my head, but my primary purpose is protecting
Americans, not bringing people, too late, to a court
of law.

DEUTCH: …partly because I’m an MIT guy as
well. It is possible that we can construct a computer
system to do overnight data mining. Basically, every
night, we will know where everybody is registered at
every hotel, Hertz, airlines — so that when a question
like this comes up, especially for an anticipatory act,
there will be a database we can mine which will inevitably mix foreign and domestic individuals and which
will be quite thorough, exhaustively so.

SHEA: So you take that information to the somebody in the White House you’ve been designated to
give it to, and you let them run with it. What you see,
in your judgment, is an abuse of power. Do you go to
them a second time?

JOHNSON: Sounds like a great federal grant
for MIT.

DEUTCH: You are kind to say that I go to the
White House. I just don’t do it on my own, which is
another story of the past. The answer is, yes, I quite
strongly believe that, as the DCI, I work for the
President of the United States. The director of the
FBI has a slightly different circumstance. I report
all my activities, as required by law, to these Select
Committees. But if I go and I find a bad person in the
White House, I don’t go to him again.

DEUTCH: Let me tell you that even in the more
conservative parts of the country like Massachusetts,
as opposed to here in Idaho, this is not a popular
thought, but it is a potential reality.
What I want to stress in the most severe terms
is that I do not want any FBI or law enforcement or
prosecutor anywhere near such a system if we chose to
put it into place. I want those guys to watch the people who are running that system, but if you start putting that kind of a collection strength in the hands of
the law enforcement community, I think there is a real
conflict. I would much prefer, if such a system were
put in Mr. Shea’s hands in order to protect Americans
from perhaps catastrophic acts, that there be a separation of that activity from what the right rules are and
whether they are being followed.
That’s the core of my point: Get the FBI out of
this intelligence business, let them do what they are
good at, which is law enforcement, and, we hope,
the Justice Department will worry about the rights of
Americans. That’s where I am.

BROSNAHAN: I want to make a couple of
points. What is it we didn’t know before September
11th that requires a restructuring of the government
and the creation of an entity that we need to make sure
does not become a secret police? We have to be very
careful with that.
MI-5 was mentioned this morning as “working.” Anybody out there of Irish-American extraction?
That’s a whole different subject, but here did we not
know that Osama bin Laden had declared a fatwah
against the United States? Did Judge Duffy not sit in
a case in New York that had something to do with it?
Did President Clinton not send missiles in 1997 into
one of the camps in Afghanistan? What is it that we
didn’t know that requires administrative subpoenas,
holding Mr. Padia in jail without a lawyer, which is
unprecedented.
A great book to read, by the way, is Nazi Saboteurs
on Trial. It will cheer you up. The Nazis that were
arrested in World War II got lawyers, and they had
evidence. Then they were electrocuted. The process we
are grasping for here today was met. The lawyers felt
good. Justice Stone felt OK. He had helped Roosevelt
do what they wanted to do, but there had been some
process in accordance with the Constitution.
My only background and knowledge about

JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, it sounds like the DCI
is not going to give you the password to his new
computer system.
SHEA: Let me ask a question then for the DCI.
Once you’ve generated that information, how do you
choose to present it to the policy makers who then can
direct the FBI to follow up as a prosecutorial matter or
to the U.S. Attorney for his follow up?
DEUTCH: I care about protecting American
lives, and it is a very second order for me as a DCI to
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Afghanistan comes from representing one individual,
none of which information is privileged or secret. The
Saudis were all over Afghanistan. They were everywhere. There are charities in Chicago. They have
money. That’s going to be one of your problems in the
hypothetical. Was this guy working for a charity? He’s
raising money for people. There are these issues.
But it’s interesting to me, just as a citizen, that
we are distracted from the real issue. The real issue
is how to protect ourselves. We knew everything
we had to know. That’s my opinion. It’s not classified. We knew everything we needed to know. That’s
true of the Clinton Administration and the Bush
Administration. It’s not a partisan remark. So before
we say that throughout the United States the government is going to have roving wiretaps that you might
be on, and that they may have a problem with that,
you should remember that this issue is not a spectator sport. You may speak to someone about a confidential matter, and it may be not only listened to by
agents but recorded. Have you said anything on the
phone in the last two years that you would not like
us to play now? So this is for all Americans, and it’s
serious stuff.

of how much are we going to distort who we are, how
we got here, and what we enjoy in terms of the blessings of liberty to cope with these problems?
It’s easy to over-react and to sell out the principles
that make us a great nation. I think we have to be very,
very careful when we use anything that intrudes on
our personal liberty, that it’s carefully balanced against
these principles, that it’s not unreasonable, and that
it’s not overkill.
Vice President Mondale mentioned a while ago
that we locked up all the Japanese-Americans during
World War II. That was a reaction of fear, and fear
caused us to do something that we look at now and
say, “Gee, that probably was a really big mistake.”
With the lessons of history clearly in our minds,
we have to look at every one of these proposals —
computer systems, computer chips, administrative
subpoenas — and ask ourselves, “Is this absolutely
necessary to protect these principles, or is it overreaching, and are we selling them down the river?”
So far, terrorists have done more than anyone
I can think of to take away our liberties. We had a
tremendous thing going for us prior to 9/11, and
we’ve dropped back a couple of notches. If you go
to the airport now, I think you’ll see what I mean.
I showed up in San Francisco the other day with a letter in my suitcase “We searched your suitcase while
you were eating a hamburger in the airport,” or something like that. It’s true. I think we’re now feeling very
edgy. The Attorney General — and I don’t say this
in a negative way — is on the tube and many people
in Congress are saying, “We need this, and we need
that.” Every one of us gets nervous when we hear these
things. They sound like they are invading our liberties
and our private lives. To a degree they are. You have to
look for that balance.
As I said before, the Constitution talks about
unreasonable searches and seizures. What is unreasonable depends on the circumstances. Right now, we
have a difficult task on our hands. It’s called “preventing these kinds of terrorist attacks.”
By the way, terrorist attacks can touch off world
wars. Look back at history. If the September attacks
had gone down as planned, it’s probable that there
would be no White House, no Capitol Building, and
five planes might have hit on the west coast at the
same time. I suggest that, under those circumstances,
if that had been pulled off the way it was originally
planned, somebody may have very well have launched
a nuclear attack on Afghanistan.

JOHNSON: I’d like to know how the judges here
feel about Dr. Deutch’s computer system and whether
it could be made to work in the way he would like to
see it work to protect Americans but also to protect
civil liberties. Judge Duffy?
DUFFY: I’m fearful of it, but we almost have one
of these systems set up. When was the last time you
used your American Express card? Every time you use
it, it enters into a computer. My wife and I got an
American Express Delta card because she likes to get
miles. Everything is recorded: every place we go, every
time we fly, every time we go to a hotel, every time we
have dinner out. It’s all there; it’s just a matter of who
gets to use it. You think American Express isn’t using
it now? I think they are. That’s why you get those
annoying phone calls, just when you sit down to dinner, telling you how to do better on your next flight.
TROTT: To be facetious, why don’t we plant a
computer chip in every child at birth and every immigrant that comes into the United States? Then we
could have a satellite and a printout, and we could tell
where everybody is with a computer chip. Obviously,
by reducing it to that absurdity, it raises the question
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So it’s not only important to prevent these attacks
simply because they are terrible, but they lead to terrible things including the erosion of our own basic civil
liberties. So we have to be very careful that we don’t
overreact and sell these rights down the river and that
we respond appropriately to the challenges that we
face as we try to stop the next one. It’s a tough task.
I might add one thing: I’m nervous about that
word “competence.” I’m not sure what is meant by
that. I worked for 23 years in law enforcement, and
I never ran into any more competent people in my
entire life than the agents of the FBI. I won’t stop here
and waste your time with all the attacks that were prevented or all the arrests of terrorists and others that
were made all over the world. I thought they were
tremendously competent and also had a remarkable
store of information on the various terrorist groups
that we took apart. Using the rule of law and using
prosecution, I personally was involved in driving
two terrorists organizations out of the United States
because they figured everything they did was under a
wiretap or some kind of surveillance, so they left the
country and went elsewhere. So you can use the rule of
law and law enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks.

everybody’s privacy, credit card fraud, and all of that,
we’re worried about reporting on the quality of the
investigation. This terrible thing has happened, there
is a legitimate threat out there, and as much as we
want to protect individuals’ rights, we want to make
sure that our government is doing the proper kind of
investigation. The FBI and the CIA aren’t talking to
each other, aren’t sharing anything. We think our local
criminal intelligence unit has some stuff, but they’re
not talking to anyone either. It’s a mess.
JOHNSON: Just another day in the newsroom.
Andy?
ANDREW MALCOLM: The first thing I’d do is
take the guy’s name and run it through Google, which
has the capability, unlike the CIA and FBI, to process
a lot of information in 3/10 of a second. I was at the
Little League game, watching my son play, when I saw
the U.S. Attorney get a cell phone call and leave just
before his kid came to bat, so I knew there was something up. I called the Chief of Police, and he said, “I
don’t know what it is but they told us to bring in the
SWAT team right away.” Then I would call him on his
cell phone and say, “Now about the SWAT team…
what’s going on?” He wouldn’t want to talk, and we
might go back and forth a little bit. Then I would
say, “OK, this is a big story, and I don’t know all the
details, and I don’t want to mess up what you’re doing.
If you promise to tell me everything that’s going on
tomorrow or what went down last night, I won’t put
it in this morning’s paper.” But I couldn’t find my
editor because she is out playing golf with the judges.
(I’m just joking about that.)

JOHNSON: Dr. Deutch, I want to go to the
reporters and editors on the panel.
CAROLYN WASHBURN: It is a mess out there.
We have rallies down the middle of Main Street
against the new law. We have somebody tied to the
flagpole on the top of the Statehouse in protest.
Complaints are pouring in to credit card companies because somebody has hacked in and is charging
things on somebody’s credit card.
We do know something about the suspect because
one of our FBI sources outed one of the hotel agents,
and we know who the person is and where they are.
We’ve done a little homework on them and can’t
figure out how in the world they could have done
anything wrong. They are foreign nationals, they are
in the country, they are here for education. As far as I
can tell, they haven’t been out of the city for about a
week. We’re confused about that.
Now the FBI knows that we have been on it, so
they have come and subpoenaed us, which we’re fighting because we don’t want to share our notes, but they
want our notes. We’re pursuing all of those angles as
well as the mess of the investigation.
As much as we’re worried about violations of

JOHNSON: One of the delicate balances here
is the job that the press wants to do, which Carolyn
helped articulate quite well. On one hand, you want to
understand the scope of the investigative powers of the
government, how they are proceeding to find these terrorist suspects, what kind of techniques they are using.
At the same time, Mr. Shea at the FBI and other agencies of the government think they have a legitimate
need to keep a lot of that information secret. They don’t
want to tip off other suspects out there that they might
find. How do we strike that balance?
BRODER: Well, we start with our basic business: to help people understand what is going on.
As Carolyn said, a lot of people are aware already that
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something big is going on here. This is not a story we
are going to keep out of the paper, so when I go to
Mr. Shea, what I am going to say to him is essentially,
“We are going to write about this story tomorrow
because it is the talk of the town. You can make a decision as to whether what we write is as well informed as
we can be or whether we are going to have to speculate
a lot about it. If you are cooperative and make a case
to me that there are some parts of this story that we
should not write about, I am prepared to listen to that
argument, but ultimately it will be our judgment, not
your judgment, about what we put in the paper.”

JOHNSON: I thought you were going to say you
would give the story to the Los Angeles Times then. Are
you comfortable with that, Mr. Broder?
BRODER: I’m not comfortable with it, but it’s
the kind of transaction that I’ve seen play out. At that
point, I would probably want to talk to my editor and
publisher, because it is a little bit above my pay grade
to make that decision.
DEUTCH: I have to ask a question here. So in
fact, what happens here is that the reporter who originally called you will tell you, “I got this from a leak in
your own agency.” So when you then call the publisher
and editor and say, “Please don’t print this because a
life is at risk,” or “You’ve interrupted an important
operation,” they will say yes, but they will worry, usually correctly, that the leaker will go to another paper,
and it will get published. Also a very important part
of this is that the information often comes, for reasons
we don’t know, from leaks within the agency. A very
serious matter.

DEUTCH: Isn’t that great? First of all, I don’t take
calls from reporters, but I will tell you what decides
what goes in the paper is the publisher. Every time I’ve
seen a serious problem, you call the publisher and say,
“There is a life at risk,” rather than a policy embarrassment. The press respects that. If you’re in public office,
my recommendation is: Don’t talk to the press. It will
get you into trouble.
JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, it sounds as though
Broder has pretty good sources here. He is really going
to work the story. Maybe we ought to wire up his
phone and see whom he is talking to.

MALCOLM: I was working for the Governor
of Montana at the time, but when we arrested the
Unabomber, we knew about it three hours before
because the FBI had alerted CBS. There was a satellite
truck sitting a half mile down the road from his house,
and the sheriff was clueless. This is not necessarily the
press making trouble. Internal things are the cause.

SHEA: A better idea would be to talk to his
neighbors and probably have his garbage collector
go through his garbage and see what we might find.
There is another thing we ought to think about. The
Attorney General has approached me, as director of
the FBI, and indicated that his deputy is going to be
leaving and that I ought to be thinking about applying
for that position. He really is looking for some good
examples of where, in the field, a good U.S. Attorney
would prosecute with vigor the right to have these new
administrative subpoenas. All those award systems are
in place.
With Mr. Broder, what I would do is call him
up. Unlike Mr. Deutch, I do return reporters’ calls
because I have ambition. What I would tell him is that
we have three incredible leads into a potential future
terrorist event involving threats to life and that if he
goes with the story the next day, that will disappear.
We would like him to cooperate and when we have
the three identified to the point that the U.S. Attorney
will begin to announce, he’ll have an exclusive for the
entire process.

JOHNSON: Let’s examine two other aspects
of the power that the government could have under
some of these changes that are proposed. Let’s say that
Mr. X’s computer does turn up some suspicious e-mail
traffic and that the FBI does arrest him as a likely participant or a bag man for the attacks that took place
a month ago in San Francisco. Mr. Moss, you don’t
want him out on bail, do you?
MOSS: Well, based on what you’ve told me, I
don’t know whether I do or whether I don’t. I need
more information.
JOHNSON: He is thought by the FBI to be the
specific bag man, the financier, for this network of terrorists that helped stage these attacks all across the west.
MOSS: I don’t care what the FBI thinks. I want to
know what their evidence is of that fact.
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SHEA: Let me give you the evidence we have.
There is a bank transfer from Saudi Arabia to the
Dutch Antilles. From the Dutch Antilles, we have five
leads into U.S. banks, and this individual is the only
signator on the accounts. Two of those banks have
money that went to San Francisco, and we have cash
receipts at stores that carry the material to build the
bombs. We think that there are three other sites in the
United States where similar transactions are about to
occur, and we don’t want him to have access to any of
those accounts.

JOHNSON: Yes, sir. He’s on the phone. He says,
“They’ve got my computer. They’re detaining me. It
doesn’t look like they are ever going to go in front of
a judge with any of this information relating to the
computer.” What do you do?
BROSNAHAN: Let me tell you what my standards are, and they are very low. But they’re relevant.
I remember Ed Williams saying in Washington, years
ago, “If you don’t control the case, you shouldn’t be
in it.” I can’t tell you how many times that has helped
me. So is this somebody seemingly related to the
Saudi family? Will I ever find out what’s going on in
the case? Will I control the case? If I’m not going to,
I hope that I have the wisdom to let someone else do
this case. That’s number one.
Number two, which might be number one, is:
Am I getting paid? Is this pro bono? Am I going to
be cursed and threatened for no money? What’s going
on here?
Number three. It’s an important scene. I would
go down to the jail and take the metal out, take the
shoes off, schmooze up the sheriff, go up into a little
cell where this person sits where the government has
put him. That’s a scene that the defense lawyers see.
When everybody is finished with all the policies and
all the stuff, it comes down to somebody in a cell, and
I would talk to him. I would find out whether this
is somebody I want to represent. Is this somebody
in trouble?
It is amazing to me, after 44 years, how often the
defendants in criminal cases are not guilty of what they
are charged with. They may be guilty of a lot of other
things, but they are not guilty of what they are charged
with. So is there a role that I can play for this guy?
The other thing I would do is talk to my partners and prepare them once again for this crazy
Brosnahan effort, and I would be guided by their
thoughts, including people in the New York office and
the Virginia office. Here, your hypothetical is in San
Francisco.
Here is another thing. If I emotionally couldn’t
do it, I wouldn’t do it. This might not be the case for
me. There are certain types of clients I just can’t do,
just for personal reasons. You’re saying downtown San
Francisco, where I commute and where my buddies
are, and everything has been blown up. If I think I
can’t stand on my feet, question the government, and
fight like hell for this person, then I’m not the person
to do it, and I might say no.

MOSS: Then you’re telling me that you can actually show that the money that came to him was used
for the terrorist attack?
SHEA: The material that our explosive labs have
demonstrated was used originated from the purchase
with his money.
MOSS: With that kind of information, you bet.
Let’s keep him in wraps.
SHEA: And would you keep his wife?
MOSS: No
SHEA: Or any of his neighbors?
MOSS: No, not unless they are involved. If you
could show a connection, that’s another matter. But no.
SHEA: Well, in one instance, we found that there
was another signature card. It had never been used,
but his neighbor had signed and was of the same
ethnic background. They were in the same charity for
that ethnic background.
MOSS: That wouldn’t rise to the level of bringing
criminal charges.
DEUTCH: The charity cover is a big problem in
this issue right now. A big problem.
JOHNSON: Mr. X really needs you right now,
doesn’t he, Mr. Brosnahan?
BROSNAHAN: Well, he might. Am I being
asked to represent him?
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SHEA: Director Deutch, a quick question. Using
your model of pure intelligence, would it be appropriate — if you had seen the evidence that there was
a very clear link between the money and the activity
that caused the explosion in San Francisco — then for
intelligence purposes only, to bug the interrogation
room where the lawyer was going to be conferring
with the defendant?

WASHBURN: …as long as we go after the
bad guys. Two-thirds of them are saying the media
shouldn’t question you, so the letters to the editors
are flooding in, abusing us for asking questions and
abusing you for not using all of these new tools at your
disposal. Especially if you have ambitions, how do you
respond?
GORTON: Oh, come on. If you can’t stand the
heat, get out of the kitchen. I spent more than thirty
years getting abused by letters to the editors. That is
so minor that it shouldn’t even rise to something that
causes you to consider a different course of action.

DEUTCH: The use of the word “pure” in relation
to intelligence is certainly not a connection I’ve ever
made. I don’t believe there is any circumstance where
I, as Director, would encourage, approve, or allow
that kind of activity to take place without following the law. I’d have Jamie Gorelick tell me whether
I was good shape or not, since she was my Counsel of
Defense.

WASHBURN: I didn’t say that we were considering a different course of action, but I suggest that I
have seen public officials consider different courses of
action under big public pressure.

BROSNAHAN: I accept that and have in mind
when you served. It is being done now. My colleagues
in the law are being listened to in their conversations
with clients.

GORTON: At one level at least, perhaps they
should. Public officials are supposed to reflect the
views of the people they represent. We do, obviously,
have a Constitution that says that some things aren’t
subject to the majority view, but a hell of a lot are. A
public official who doesn’t respond to public criticism
or public points of view probably doesn’t belong as
a public official. You’ve got to make judgments as to
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution, but
it’s perfectly appropriate for people to say, “I want you,
Congress, or you, State Legislature, to change the law
and to provide me with more protection than I feel
that I have now.” And you’d damn well better respond
to that.

DEUTCH: It is certainly not being done by the
intelligence community.
BROSNAHAN: Oh, no.
DEUTCH: What those other guys do…
BROSNAHAN: OK, I understand your point.
DEUTCH: It’s a very important point because
I felt very strongly this morning that — everybody
knows this — as a result of the reforms that have been
put in, these activities don’t take place by the intelligence community.

BROSNAHAN: I was just going to say that during the Lindh representation and reading history
about the internment of the Japanese-Americans,
many of whom were citizens, one of whom now sits
on the Ninth Circuit, the First World War, and the
Lindh matter, you could feel it. The image that came
to mind is a very disturbing one, depressing even.
What would it be like in this country after the third
attack like New York? What would be the picture? The
only thing I could think of to do — just to try to do
something — was to talk to lawyers, the ABA, and to
think about what that might be like. We have to capture the psychological imperatives on our leaders and
on our judges. The most distinguished judge in the
Third Circuit, whom I know and respect highly, wrote
an opinion deferring to the executive.

BROSNAHAN: I agree with that.
WASHBURN: But you’re getting big pressure
from the community because this terrible thing happened. Everybody seems to want to do the high-road
right thing, but you’re getting enormous pressure. We
came into this incident with already two-thirds of
Americans saying that government intrusion on their
lives is perfectly justified, given terrorist activity...
JOHNSON: …as long as we go after the bad
guys.
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These pressures are real, and they are enormous.
If we don’t handle them right as a people, they will
sweep aside what we were trained as kids to believe was
part of our country.

Washington establishment. I don’t think we ought to
just criticize agents because they didn’t gather stuff.
From a policy standpoint, I assume that at the Berlin
meeting in July of the 6 + 2, which the former ambassador to Afghanistan told me all about and which is
not classified, they discussed Afghanistan and what
they were going to do. I assume that was part of a policy, and those who are in charge of policy should step
forward, whether they be Democrats or Republicans,
and say, “You know, we didn’t quite act.”
Number two. For forty years, I’ve been investigating cases on both sides. Aren’t we going to go out and
check where this guy lives? Aren’t we going to talk to
his neighbors? Aren’t we going to talk to people who
know him? Where did he come from? When did he
come into the United States? Did he visit Afghanistan?
By the way, he was at a camp. Do we have people on
the ground there, the way did in Iran, as I understand
it from reading public things? We had people on the
ground there.
Why don’t we go after them and not the American
citizenry. Every time I take my shoes off to come up
here to Idaho, they are catching me every time, but
they don’t have Osama bin Laden.

GORTON: That validates much of what John
Deutch has said. The concentration should overwhelmingly be on the side of preventing these
events from happening in the first place, so that we
don’t have to face that. Mr. President, I was deeply
disturbed earlier in this conversation when you said,
“We had all the knowledge we needed before 9/11.”
BROSNAHAN: We did.
GORTON: We did not.
BROSNAHAN: This is my fantasy. People are
really listening to me. I’m not just sitting in my
kitchen…Go ahead.
GORTON: We did not know the locations of the
nineteen men who actually engaged in that hijacking.
There are those now who think in retrospect that we
should have known it, had all of the handful of facts
been put together by someone with real genius, but we
didn’t. We didn’t know where those people were who
were here with expired visas. We had no particular way
of checking people who were applying for visas.
If we want a hypothetical that is far more immediate than the one that our moderator here has given
us, it was just day before yesterday, I believe, that the
New York Times reported that the Department of
Homeland Security, with a several hundred million
dollar appropriation, desires that whenever someone,
a non-citizen of the United States, applies for a visa,
that person’s fingerprints will be taken and the visa will
be computerized so that we know where that person is
in the United States and be able to go after him or her
if and when that person’s visa has expired.
The ACLU has denounced that. I think that is
an extreme over-reaction. Why shouldn’t we know
more about people who have asked to be guests in the
United States and have no constitutional right where
they are to come here? Shouldn’t we be able to trace
them and see whether they have outlived their right to
be in this country?

GORTON: My question, however, had nothing
to do with any citizen whatsoever. It was visa applicants.
JOHNSON: A final comment, and then I want
to pose another quick hypothetical.
SHEA: To me, a political leader has an obligation
to reflect her constituency, but also at times — very
important to the history of this country — to restrain
that very virulent public opinion that can sweep away
things. To my mind, it’s the restraint we’re missing
now because the drums of war create a frenzy where
you have to reflect the reaction rather than imposing
some kind of civilized restraint.
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, a new set of facts
here.
BROSNAHAN: Oh, good.
JOHNSON: The FBI has detained a citizen,
a foreign national, in this country on an educational
visa. He is studying medicine at a major research hospital, and at this research hospital, there has been an

BROSNAHAN: I would like to see the question
of competence higher up on the food chain inside the
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MURPHY: The first thing I would do would be
to interview the family and try to find out what facts
they have, what evidence they have, and what the basis
is for their belief that the local police department was
gathering intelligence…

anthrax contamination. He is being detained as a
suspect in that case. As a foreign national, what is
going to happen to him?
BROSNAHAN: Well, it’s my area. Immigration
is not really my area. I dabble in it, but I don’t really
know. I suppose the first reaction after 9/11 was to
deport everybody, but a terrorist being deported and
going to Canada and having coffee in Vancouver and
then coming back is not a foolproof plan. So there
may be a secret hearing in the Third Circuit but not in
the Sixth Circuit, if I have it right. That will go to the
Supreme Court, and that will be important. What evidence is there about what he did or why he should get
crosswise with the law? What did he do?

JOHNSON: Well, there are plain clothes officers
around the neighborhood all the time.
MURPHY: Prior to his detention?
JOHNSON: Prior to his detention. He’s just a
medical student.

JOHNSON: Can you get this guy’s case in front
of Judge Duffy?

MURPHY: Again, there would have to be, on
the basis of the information I receive from the family,
some specific allegation of wrongdoing on the part of
the police.

BROSNAHAN: If it’s deportation, I don’t think
so. Habeas, maybe.

JOHNSON: OK. The police watch him just
because they don’t like him?

DUFFY: Possibly habeas, but it would be a long
reach, a very long reach. I don’t think it would fly.
I don’t think I would have jurisdiction

MURPHY: No, obviously, they can’t. So I think
we talked earlier about the concept of fishing expeditions. As the ombudsman, I don’t have the authority
to go on fishing expeditions either, so the first thing I
would need to have is some basis, offered to me by the
complainant, to believe that there was a policy violation or constitutional violation by some member of
local law enforcement.

JOHNSON: Judge Trott, what’s going on here?
What is going to happen to this foreign national? He
is just a suspect. We don’t know that he did anything.
TROTT: There would probably be the equivalent
of an immigration hold put on him. He is subject to
being held by the government until they figure out
what they are going to do with him. People who come
here on visas pretty much come here at our invitation
and our pleasure, and if we decide to revoke the visa
and send them back, that’s a reasonably simple process
that can happen fast. They’re not going to send him
back, but they’re going to hold him for a time until
they can figure whether they have a problem or not.

JOHNSON: They think some of his mail has
been intercepted; maybe there has been a wiretap.
They are very, very concerned about this.
MURPHY: As I said, that would be my first step,
as any time a citizen approaches our office, to begin
a preliminary review with the information that the
complainant can provide us, just to try and assess the
information to determine whether it provides a basis
to believe reasonably, if it is true, that there has been
a policy violation or that the local police might have
overstepped their authority.

JOHNSON: It turns out that the local police
have been shadowing this guy for a long time. Mr.
Murphy, this fellow’s family has come to you as the
city’s law enforcement ombudsman. They think he has
been harassed because he is a foreigner. They want you
to investigate what the police have been doing with
their Special Intelligence Unit to harass this fellow.
What can you do?

JOHNSON: Let’s say that the suspicion is that
the local police had been sharing this information
with Director Shea. He’s going to help you, isn’t he?
MURPHY: I don’t think so. He may want to, but
he probably and perhaps surely is prohibited under
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federal regulations from sharing any information with
me. So I wouldn’t go to him, and he certainly wouldn’t
be coming to me.

controlled investigation is the anthrax scare. It didn’t
say what is completely possible as a threat to America
today: A group of determined people might bring in
anthrax or, much worse, smallpox, and we discover it
in Community One. How do we get possibly fragmentary information as to the possibility of anthrax
out to other communities of the country? That’s my
concern. Defend the American people from harm.
There is a perfectly good case about how, if you
track it as a legal problem to a particular defendant
who deserves every protection under the law, you
lose sight of the security threat to our communities.
It’s not that I want to violate personal rights to get at
that; I have to figure out ways to advance protection to
American citizens. It’s a very real threat.

JOHNSON: How is he prohibited under federal
regulations?
MURPHY: Under federal regulations, my understanding is that I am not cleared for reception of
intelligence information from a federally-funded intelligence arm or law enforcement activity.
JOHNSON: But you’re the public advocate here.
MURPHY: With regard to the activities of
local law enforcement, so certainly I can go to local
law enforcement, those that I have local oversight
jurisdiction over, and I can compel them to answer
my questions. I can compel them to produce documents, evidence, and records, but as to the FBI or
federal agencies, I have no authority to compel them
to produce anything.

TROTT: The FBI does not see those two things
as mutually exclusive. I was involved in umpteen
situations where the idea was to arrest people, to stop
crimes, and also to warn the community.
DEUTCH: It’s a fair point. I just don’t think the
mechanisms are there.

JOHNSON: Mr. Deutch, you could care less
about his investigation, right?

TROTT: They are. I was involved in them for
seven years in the federal government and for seventeen in the state government. We saw it as two sides
of the same coin. We never, ever once said, “Oh, well,
we can just look at this criminal case and ignore the
possible dangers to somebody else.” I never saw it happen in 23 years. Tom, did you ever see that happen?

DEUTCH: Correct. I have two different reactions here. First, if it’s known that there is a foreign
national who is in possession of anthrax at location
X in the country, my first concern is not an orderly
collection of evidence to present to a court of law or
whatever you guys do. I’m concerned about whether
there are fifteen other places in the country in the
same circumstances. So my first worry is to get a warning out around the country and say to people, “There
may be many places where this anthrax is in the hands
of a few willful men and women who may try to perhaps poison locally.”
So my first notion then is warning and protection,
which is completely contrary to what you describe
here, which is a secret collection of evidence in the
custody of law enforcement officials, trying to hang
this person or not. What about warning other communities where this anthrax may be?
Let me further say that if hadn’t been for the really
quite instructive anthrax letter problem in Washington,
nobody in the community I live in would know how
to spell anthrax. They wouldn’t know what it is.
Indeed, perhaps the best example of the danger of
careful custody of information in a law enforcement-

MOSS: I never saw it happen. I prosecuted for five
years, and I knew great FBI agents, fantastic ones.
DEUTCH: I’m not trying to speak to a particular
special agent. I’m talking about the natural problem
of weighing collection of evidence for a case versus the
entirely different dissemination of information and
warning to communities and making sure it is in place
in different communities. I’m delighted if you’ve had
that experience. It has not been mine — by a lot!
TROTT: One of the reasons is that there was an
iron curtain drawn between the FBI and the CIA for a
long time. That’s one of the things that has been taken
down after 9/11, so the agencies can now talk to each
other and share information.
DEUTCH: If I can switch for a moment, certainly
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in the area of counterintelligence, great progress has
been made on this subject after Aldrich Ames. But if
you look at counter terrorism — and I haven’t looked
at it in the last couple of years in any detail — I’m
very concerned about whether it has been bridged sufficiently. But I am delighted that yours has been that it
works smoothly. It is not mine.

or a prosecutor, and I’ll say, “What have you got?”
They might tell me.
TROTT: Judge Duffy knows more about this
than I do, but it would seem to me that the basic writ
of habeas corpus, which is in the Constitution and
protected by the Constitution, is always available at
some level or another for somebody to go into court
and say, “You’ve got the body. Show me your authority
for holding the body.”
So at the very least, in the case of the Nazi saboteurs, the lawyers were allowed to go into the court on
a habeas corpus. Then you get into the question, once
you get into the court, of the government having to
make some kind of showing, under the Constitution
and the law, that permits the holding of the body.
Wouldn’t you think somebody could at least come to
you on a habeas and that you would have to look at
the situation?

JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, let’s go back for
a moment to our detained suspect here. This guy is
out of luck. You can’t get him in front of Judge Duffy.
His family, who is complaining to the local authorities, can’t get any satisfaction. The guy is sitting in
detention. What happens to him? Where is the due
process for this guy?
BROSNAHAN: If we bring it to the current day,
am I allowed to actually go talk to him? That’s a big
thing now. If I’m allowed to talk to him, at least I can
think about legal things that I can do.
Mr. Padia, who has been mentioned briefly here is
the central case to keep your eye on when you hear the
Administration talking about what they want to do.
Padia is a U.S. citizen, reported to be a Chicago gang
banger, arrested, and put in a jail cell. No lawyer has
been allowed to see him. Now it’s over a year. Right?
He is a U.S. citizen. He’s been declared an unlawful
combatant, which in our hypothetical — to come
back to that — is not the case. This fellow has not
been declared an unlawful combatant.

BROSNAHAN: Up to now, it’s been the normal
way, but then you have Padia.
WASHBURN: What do you do if the reason for
holding him is a sham? Twenty miles west of here,
Sami Al Hussayen has been sitting for five months
in the Canyon County Jail and, as far as we know,
will continue to sit there at least until January when
he has a court hearing. He was theoretically picked
up because they were sure he was involved in a terrorism ring, but there is no evidence of that. So he is
being held because he had some wrong things on his
visa application, so for that reason, he is sitting in the
Canyon County Jail.

JOHNSON: So you might be able to get in to
see him?
BROSNAHAN: Assuming I get in to see him,
then I can start to think about the question of what
evidence they have and so forth. He may not want to
talk to me. I will ask him, “What have you been doing
the last three months? Where have you been?” I give
him the fishy, trial-lawyer look, and if he keeps looking at the shackles on his feet, I know that we have
serious problems here. But I will do what I can for
him. This is not my area, but I suppose I’m going to
go to a hearing, even if it’s in secret, and I’m going to
argue: “You don’t have anything. What have you got?
You’ve got his credit card. He checked into a hotel in
Boise, Idaho and attended some kind of conference.
What have you got?” This is a healthy thing in the
legal system. “What have you got?” That’s what I want
to know. Somewhere there is an immigration person

TROTT: I can’t speak to a particular case, but
theoretically, every time somebody goes into a federal
court and says, “You’ve got a body. Show the authority
for holding that body,” the government has to show
some lawful authority. If the government can’t, the
judge is empowered to say, “Let that person go.”
JOHNSON: Mr. Moss, can you talk about this
specific case?
MOSS: In a very limited way, but I can certainly
talk about his reason for being incarcerated. The reason this man is incarcerated is that he was arrested on
12 charges, 8 of which could get him 25 years for each
charge, depending on what the evidence is.
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A hearing was held on his detention, and the
judge said, “I’m going to rule this way. Number one,
Mr. Al Hussayen, you’ve got to resolve your issues with
INS.” INS had put a hold on him after he was arrested
on the felony charges. “Number two, if you get that
straightened out, I will put you on house arrest in
your home with all the restrictions. You can’t have a
computer and other restrictions necessary for the
protection of society.”
He then had an INS hearing before a federal
judge. He not only had his criminal attorney there,
he had one of the best INS attorneys in the northwest
accompany him. They had a two-day trial. The INS
judge said, “You lied to come into this country, and
therefore you are out of status. You no longer have
a visa.” Given that set of circumstances, his attorney agreed that he should be transferred back to the
authority of the criminal court and be detained. That’s
why Mr. Al Hussayen is in detention today.
His trial is set for the 12th of January, and that’s
not a very late date for a case as enormous as this case
is. If you want to get into the terrorism aspects of it, go
read the indictment. It’s all there. It’s public record.

you would assign your equivalent of George Lardner,
who will drive them crazy with questions like, “Why
the hell do you have this guy locked up? What is your
justification?”
JOHNSON: What can you do, Carolyn?
WASHBURN: I think that’s right. I think we
would be the next stop. It’s happened. We do the best
we can to try to get to the bottom of it. In this kind
of case, our best opportunities are interviews because
we’ll start the process of trying to get documents, but
we will be rebuffed at every turn. So we will start legal
proceedings to get documents that we have a right to
but with the full expectation that it will take months
or years to get those. Where we can get them, they
will help.
MALCOLM: Another editorial comes into play
to help there as well.
DUFFY: I have a problem with that. The prosecutor doesn’t want to try the case in the newspaper. He
wants to try it in the court. If he starts giving out interviews, if he starts giving out all of this evidence, then
basically he is trying it in the newspapers. Then he
shows up in front of a guy like me, and I say, “That’s
very interesting. You just had your case. Why do you
bother coming to me? I can’t get a jury here.” All right?
Without a jury, I’m not going to be able to hear the
case. Do you want me to move the case to Camden,
New Jersey? By the way, I once threatened to do that
to a group of lawyers, and they said, “Oh, no. Judge.
We’ll withdraw the motion.”
But that’s what happens.

JOHNSON: Andy Malcolm. Back to our terror
suspect for a moment. Are you going to editorialize
about this guy being detained with what sounds like
very little recourse here?
MALCOLM: This one or the previous one?
JOHNSON: The one I posited, the one Mr. Murphy
is trying to investigate but can’t get anywhere with.
MALCOLM: Yes, eventually, but certainly not
the night of the breaking story. A day or two later
perhaps if we can get some independent explanation,
assuming the reporters get it. If they don’t, we’ll go get
it ourselves before doing an editorial.
I also might mention the subject to the publisher.

JOHNSON: Carolyn, do you care about that at
all, that you may taint the jury pool? This guy really is
not in good shape.
WASHBURN: To be honest, I really don’t care
about tainting the jury pool because I don’t buy that
we’re tainting the jury pool. Every time there is a high
profile case, somebody wants change of venue. It’s very
rarely given, and people always seem to come out OK.
So I think it’s mostly an excuse.

JOHNSON: Dave Broder?
BRODER: If this fellow’s family is at all smart
or sophisticated, when they get turned down by the
city ombudsman, their next stop will be the newspaper office. They will go to you and say, “They are not
doing right by our son. They have him locked up, we
can’t talk to him, and we don’t know what the charges
are. Can’t you do something about it?” I would guess

MURPHY: I just want to add that, even though
the ombudsman’s office doesn’t have the authority
to look into what the federal agents are doing, that
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fact at the 11th hour when this individual is incarcerated wouldn’t insert itself in trying to advocate on
his behalf. Somewhat as Carolyn said from the newspaper’s perspective, with regard to the actions of local
law enforcement, the complaint wouldn’t go away.
While it might take months and maybe even years, we
would relentlessly follow the complaint and finally get
down to the bottom of whether local law enforcement
followed their procedures and followed the requirements of the Constitution.

cases is just extraordinary. It’s the mood that governs
change of venue.
They land prisoners at Dulles so they can try
them in the Northern District of Virginia. It’s a scandal. They pick the judges, they pick the juries, and
it’s a scandal. Let me repeat that word. It’s a nice one,
and you’re not going to read about it in the newspapers, but it’s a legal scandal, and they do it. What is
a defense lawyer to do except to think about how to
try to turn public opinion a little bit to the idea that
this defendant we’re talking about is actually a human
being, a U.S. citizen, and has rights? Who’s interested
in that subject? That’s the point of view from the criminal defense lawyer.

BROSNAHAN: From the defense viewpoint, you
don’t want the jury to hear the defense before they get
in there for another reason, and Judge Duffy is quite
right. The first word we are going to tell them is,
“Nobody has ever heard this. I know you know about
this case, but nobody ever heard this.”
But there are exceptions. In Lindh, we picked our
spots. There were only two. The Attorney General had
made statements beyond what I was used to in pending criminal cases, and a sitting federal judge in the
Eastern District of Michigan wrote a letter to the New
York Times, condemning what the Attorney General
had done. So we were kind of in the paper already.
Finally, we put out this picture. It’s a photograph of
John, strapped to a gurney when we discussed theoretical questions about interrogation. He was naked, and
he had this bullet in his right thigh, which was there
for fifteen days after he was apprehended. It’s a large,
ugly bullet, which had hit metal before it hit him.
This is about two minutes before he is interrogated by
a single FBI agent.
Here I join the distinguished former chairman of
the CIA in criticizing the FBI.

TROTT: When I was there, we landed them at
Andrews Air Force Base. When did they switch to
Dulles?
BROSNAHAN: When several judges were
appointed.
JOHNSON: Senator Gorton, help us frame this
discussion about the foreign national that’s detained.
How would you have us think about that person’s rights
and the responsibility of our system to that person in
this environment of his potentially being a terrorist?
GORTON: Well, there is a continuum. Mr.
Brosnahan has spoken about the most troubling situation, the one in which we are dealing with a citizen of
the United States. We could be dealing with a foreign
citizen here on a perfectly valid visa, perhaps even with
a green card. We could deal with the situation that
this U.S. Attorney is dealing with right now: someone
here on an invalid visa or a visa that was presumably
obtained by fraud. We could deal with someone who
never had a visa at all.
There really is a continuum, and I think that
continuum involves the status of the person. We can
take the foreign combatant who was taken outside the
United States to Guantanamo or one who has never set
foot in the United States. It’s at least valid to consider
that different rules apply, given those different circumstances with obviously the greatest degree of consideration having to be given, it seems to me, inevitably to
a person who is a citizen of the United States.

DEUTCH: I wasn’t criticizing the FBI.
BROSNAHAN: OK, I withdraw it then. In any
event, John did not want this put out because in the
Koran, there is a discussion about modesty. You are
not, man or woman, to expose a part of the body
below your upper chest and above your knees. He
didn’t want to put it out. We did put it out, and we
began to hear from people. “I don’t care what he did;
this is not right.” It helped us a little bit in a hopeless
situation of public attitude.
My point is what defense lawyers do. As we sit
here today in Idaho, I have no doubt there are criminal defense lawyers fighting like crazy to do the right
thing for their client, but the mood in some of these

DUFFY: I tend to agree that we have to have
something for citizens and have judicial oversight
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of what’s going on with citizens. In fact, I feel very
strongly about that. As to the combatants, people
who are out in the field fighting, give them the right
that they have under the Geneva Convention, which,
believe it or not, is the right to be heard by a military
tribunal and nothing else.
I don’t think, as we have some people arguing
from time to time, that we ought to have the activities
of the CIA and the FBI viewed from the point of view
of the person, “the victim,” and have that measured
by, “Well, they didn’t give him his Fifth Amendment
rights, or they didn’t do this or do that.”
Let me give you an example. The Egyptian government arrested a defendant for a plot to kill the
president of Egypt. They questioned and — I don’t
think there is any doubt about it — tortured him.
He said, “Oh, I didn’t plan to kill the president. I was
here because I was running away because I blew up or
attempted to blow up the World Trade Center.” They
said, “Oh wonderful, he made a complete confession.”
After they had the complete confession, they turned
the matter over to the American delegation in Egypt,
but the defense counsel, believe it or not, was heard
to argue — and a great hullaballoo ensued over this
— that the prosecutor could not use the confession he
made to the Egyptians since they didn’t give him his
Miranda rights. Interesting, but I didn’t accept it.

not ask you about the imbroglio of the last few days
in Washington, D.C. with the alleged outing of a CIA
operative. Tell us your reaction to that, how serious it
might be, etc.
DEUTCH: I have no knowledge of the specifics
of this case, but it strikes me as being the kind of thing
that is invented in Washington, bruted about, and has
no particular consequence one way or the other. It will
go away. I don’t think it has any significance. That’s
my own view.
JOHNSON: Dave Broder? You guys have been
spilling a lot of ink for a story that will go away.
BRODER: That’s our habit. I don’t think this
one has large life, largely because I don’t think we are
ever going to know the names of the specific people
who were making these calls to reporters. Absent that,
this story will go away. It reflects oddly to me on the
purported purpose of the Administration in doing
this. They had a public relations problem with a seemingly credible, experienced diplomat coming along
and saying, “I went there, and I told them that there
was no evidence to support this notion that there was
the yellow cake going from Niger to Iraq.” That was a
public relations problem for them.
Where in their mindset they decided they could
minimize this story by revealing that the wife of this
diplomat worked for the CIA is the puzzling part
to me. It isn’t as if she worked for the Democratic
National Committee, and even in Washington, I
think people are capable of making that distinction.

JOHNSON: Mr. Murphy, is there anything
we could do to change your ability to look into this
case we’ve been talking about? What would it require
to give you, as an advocate for the citizen and the
public, more access to information relating to these
kinds of situations?

JOHNSON: Andy Malcolm, what’s the view
from the left coast of this Washington story.

MURPHY: In terms of the local level, the only
question that is still out there is the ability of the
ombudsman’s office to look into local intelligence files.
There has been a debate about that. We requested a
waiver from the U.S. Attorney’s office and were denied
that waiver. There is a city ordinance that gives me
access to those files and that access has not yet been
tested. If we didn’t expand the authority beyond local
law enforcement, that would be the one area where
there is still a question out there.

MALCOLM: Speaking on behalf of 35 million
Californians, we’re a little bit busy at the moment.
JOHNSON: Did you say dizzy or busy?
MALCOLM: Yes, dizzy and busy. I guess I’m in
David’s camp on this one. It reminded me of the episode in “The Pirates of the Caribbean” this summer
where Johnny Depp is a pirate, doublecrosses the good
guy, and gets his sword back. The good guy complains
that he was doublecrossed. Depp says, “Pirate.” It
strikes me the same way, “Spies, hello.”
But in terms of a manipulation through a leak

JOHNSON: We want to open this up for some of
your questions, but I have at least a couple more topics I want to touch on briefly. Out of the realm of the
hypothetical, John Deutch, I can’t get you here and
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— and I’ve read several versions, which gives me great
suspicion — if it happened generally that way, it’s
extremely clumsy. It would tell me, from some limited experience — not that I’ve ever leaked anything
— that it’s a freelancer. It’s very clumsy.
First of all, if you had several people doing it,
that’s too many tracks. Second, if several people called
several people, that doubles it. So if one person called
several people, that’s still a problem. Where is the
exclusivity in that? You don’t call the second guy until
the first guy doesn’t do anything. To have one or several people call lots of people doesn’t wash. I know
nothing about the specific case beyond that.
I have seen similar situations where somebody is
sitting as an aid in a meeting and hears people complain about this guy. They say, “By the way, his wife is
a CIA agent.” The aid talks to a friend at lunch, who
goes back to the Hill and mentions it. Not that it was
leaked intentionally to do anything, but it goes back
and becomes the gossip in the place, which is currency.
We all like secrets. I loved secrets on the playground
when I was in third grade. I know something you don’t
know. That becomes a currency that is exchanged, my
experience suggests, in centers of government, most
particularly in Washington.

tected in any event…

JOHNSON: John Deutch, apparently there is a
great deal of outrage in some sectors that they outed
an operative, destroyed her sources, and perhaps even
endangered her life.

TROTT: That’s why it was knocked off. It was
being abused rather than used properly.

DEUTCH: That’s my point, too, sir.
GORTON: …which means there is nothing to
investigate.
TROTT: I was in charge of a lot of these things,
and the big thing to watch out for is something like
this simply turning into a partisan political spear.
Both parties, since the Nixon Administration and
since Watergate, think that if you can get an independent counsel appointed to investigate the president,
that gives you political advantage. So it’s like a game
back there with these things. They start demanding an
independent counsel for political reasons and not for
reasons really related to the law or to national security.
I’m not saying that nothing happened here that violated the law, but too often, the independent counsel
thing simply became a partisan political effort to try
to overturn the person in the White House. It got very
much out of control.
DEUTCH: That’s the reason the law was not
extended.

BRODER: As I said to you at lunch, that would
be consequential if somehow this revived that independent counsel law. Getting rid of it was one of the
few good things that you can actually say Congress has
done in the last few years.

DEUTCH: I don’t understand this sheet of music
on any one of the lines. First of all, you don’t usually
find an important case officer in Washington. That’s
the first thing. There is a whole set of circumstances
here. I don’t know everything about this individual,
but it just doesn’t strike me as being an authentic issue.
I guess it’s part of the chatter that comes in the public and in the press about intelligence. Everything is
exciting and interesting, but it does not go to the core
of any important issue that I know about. Just none.
There is nothing about it that I think is important in
relation to the issues we have discussed here today.

WASHBURN: The real core in all of this is how
ready people are to be distrustful of their government,
which is why all of this openness is so important in
the first place.
TROTT: Part of that is the legacy of the Watergate
era, Richard Nixon, and the kind of stuff that the
Church Committee uncovered.

JOHNSON: Senator Gorton? Same view?

MALCOLM: I would suggest another aspect to
it. Of course I went into government after 26 years
in journalism. Governor Racicot used to always introduce me as a “recovering journalist.” I found accountability to be the ultimate defense. That is, if you could
be open, then it’s been there all this time. So then it’s

GORTON: I don’t know that I know enough
about it. I was just going to ask David Broder. At least
one of the few stories I’ve read about it indicated that
her assignment in the CIA wasn’t one that was pro-
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not your responsibility for hiding it; it’s somebody
else’s responsibility for not looking or not finding or
whatever.
We had some disputes in the state administration
— nothing to do with national security — over openness. I went to the Governor, and I said, “Now you
have five kids. When you go home tonight, if four
bedroom doors are open and one is closed, what do
you want to do?” He said, “Well, I’m going to look in
the fifth one.” I said, “Right. Do you want to fight this
every day for four or eight years?” He said, “No.”
The next day, he issued an executive order and
totally turned the presumption around. That is, you
didn’t have to prove you had a right to get the information. All information was open. It was up to the
state to prove that something was proprietary and
should be kept secret. He also opened his cabinet
meetings, all phone calls, all of his correspondence.
Anybody could come in.
You know what happened? The reporters didn’t
have — as he called it — the ”butt power” to come
in and sit through an entire cabinet meeting. The
only person who ever asked for a secret meeting with
the Governor after that was a newspaper publisher.
So there was an element of hypocrisy on both sides,
and we get involved in these constant feuds, which
then take on a life of their own and get away from
the issue.

into the World Trade Center, the Center would withstand the blow. Apparently, the problem came about,
not because of the impact of the airplane, but because
of the fire, something that he never testified about at
all. This was an open trial, but everybody who came
to the trial — and I mean everybody — had to produce picture I.D. and had to sign in. Amazingly, we
did not have too many followers of Osama bin Laden
show up. I don’t think we will. I have a couple more
to go. I have the U.S.S. Cole, and I have the residue
of the embassy cases to do. I don’t think we’ll be bothered with them.
At the first World Trade Center trial, we had more
than 200 requests for press credentials. I said, “All
right, the press can have half of the courtroom, and
the regular folks will be in the other half.” Most of the
trial had one or two people in back. One young lady
was there every day, and she was the only reporter who
was there every day. Hangers-on would come in, but
not everybody attended every day. Most of the time,
we played to an empty house.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: My question is in
regard to the administrative subpoena. Earlier, during
the hypothetical, Tom Moss referred to the four different areas in which they are usable currently. My question is this: To me, a doctor is very understandable and
easy to identify. Do you think a terrorist is that easy
to identify?

JOHNSON: Question from the audience, John?
MOSS: No, but I don’t know what that has to do
with your question.

JOHN FREEMUTH: We have a couple, Marc.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: A question for Judge
Duffy. We’ve heard a lot today about conducting
the war against terrorism as a criminal prosecution.
I wonder if you could comment on something I’ve
heard and read happened in your courtroom regarding the first World Trade Center bombing. During
the testimony, an expert witness was called, and he
testified that the only way to knock down those towers would be to fly large fuel-laden aircraft into those
buildings. Seated in the back of your courtroom that
day were a number of friends of the Muslim extremist perpetrators, and they were copiously taking notes.
Is that true, your honor?

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Using that comparison, it seems like we’re comparing apples and
oranges.

DUFFY: No. The only testimony that came out
about that was from the engineer who took the stand
and testified that a 707, taking off from JFK, if it ran

DUFFY: This has reference to the penultimate
question. A comment was made this morning about
the Manila bombing case, which I also tried. Ramzi

MOSS: What I’m saying is that under the present
law, one of the four areas of investigation that allows for
the use of administrative subpoenas is health care fraud.
The proposal is simply applying that same law to terrorists. My point is simply this: If we’re going to keep
the laws in place that we have, is it so bad to extend that
law to include terrorist investigations? I agree with you
that doctors and terrorists are a lot different, but in both
cases, they are difficult to investigate.
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Yousef in the Manila bombing case had a computer,
and we went through the computer at great length.
In the computer was a plan of Ramzi Yousef ’s to blow
up eleven airplanes, 727s or whatever the big ones are,
over the Pacific Ocean, all at the same time, with the
assumption that there would be 400 people on each
one. Now he tried out the plan on a Japan Airlines
plane, maybe it was Philippine Airlines.
The plane flew. It did not blow up because Ramsey
didn’t want it to blow up. It landed in Okinawa. That
was part of this entire thing. Ramzi never suggested
and never would suggest that he wanted to sacrifice
himself.
By the way, one of the four people who were going
to put the bombs aboard was Wali Khan, a guy I used
to call “Fingers” Khan because he’d blown off most of
his fingers but still constructed bombs. Another was
Khalid Mohammed, who shows up from time to time
in the newspapers now, under arrest, and supposedly
talking to our country.
There is no suggestion that any one of the four
of them would have sacrificed themselves. I would
almost guarantee that. Ramzi is not the type of person
to commit suicide. I know only two others of the four.
I don’t know Khalid Mohammed on a personal basis.
I don’t even know Ramzi on a personal basis, but I
watched him for about eleven months. I’ll tell you this
much: Those fellows would not commit suicide under
any circumstances. There was no suggestion that the
United States knew about suicide bombers taking airplanes into buildings, or at least not from the cases I
tried. I don’t know whether someone else knew about
it, but I sure didn’t.

says that when you have enemy combatants, they can
be detained until the hostilities subside or until they
are determined to be no longer a threat.
I understand that several dozen have been released
because they have been determined to be no longer
a threat to the security of the United States. That’s
being done in spite of the fact that the government’s
position has been that they do not have those rights
because to be entitled to rights under the Geneva
Convention, first, you have to represent a sovereign
power. Al-Qaida does not. Number two, you have to
have a line of authority within your ranks that takes
you to the government. You also have to wear a uniform with an emblem that clearly defines who you’re
fighting for. Most of the people at Guantanamo don’t
satisfy those requirements. However, the government’s
position is that we are treating them like enemy combatants. They’ve been allowed to contact their families
to let them know where they are. That is as far as it has
gone. The determination has been that hostilities are
ongoing, and we’re not going to turn them loose so
they can go home, get their rifles, and start fighting us
again. That’s the status as I understand it.
BROSNAHAN: I just want to say a couple of
things if I might on Guantanamo. My public knowledge is that the people there were taken from the field
in Afghanistan and that they were taken there approximately December or January of 2002, which means
they don’t have any intelligence. They have been in
cages, and they don’t know anything unless these spies
they have just arrested have been taking things in to
tell them. So what they know is — and I don’t work in
the intelligence field — what they knew as of January
of 2002. How helpful that is, I don’t know.
Number two is an excuse for me to recommend
that you read a book by Hugo Grotius [On the Law
of War and Peace], who lived in the late 1500’s. The
king of France said he was one of the brightest people in Europe, and he wrote on war, the rights of war,
and the law and war, which is what we’ve been talking
about all day. He lived around the time of Vermeer,
who did those wonderful paintings and showed the
interiors at Delft and all of that.
What interests me about the book — you might
want to take a look at it. It’s out there; you can get it
— is that in order to lay a basis for humane treating
of prisoners in war, he examined the Bible, the same
one that is available to all of us now. It says, among
other things, “You will not vex your prisoners.” That is

JOHNSON: One more question, and then we’ll
thank our panel.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to know
whether anyone on the panel — this was suggested
by our U.S. Attorney Moss, at least in my mind —
believes that a foreign national, like the hundreds or
thousands at Guantanamo, has any legal rights whatsoever for counsel, or are they subject to indefinite detention under the laws of this country or the Geneva convention?
MOSS: I’ll attempt to explain it as best I can.
The people at Guantanamo are mostly al-Qaida and
Taliban. The way our government is treating them is
under the terms of the Geneva Convention, which
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God’s word. There have been over 30 attempts at suicide since they were put down there. It is government
action by the United States government. The question
we’ve been looking at all day is: What are we becoming? That’s the issue for all of us. Where are we going?
Who is leading us? What are we becoming? What
price are we paying?

Finally, the only time we will be safe is when we’re
dead. That is the only thing that will bring us complete safety. Safety is a chimera. It can’t be maintained;
it can’t be secured.
How safe do we want to be? This is really the
question we have to ask ourselves. The Greeks had
a virtue that describes this golden mean somewhere
between security and freedom. It seems like an
obvious word to mention here because in our contemporary lingo, it has a kind of fear-laden sense to it. The
word is “prudence.” It meant originally “to know the
good and do it,” to exercise right thinking and balance the best we possibly can. What we really are calling upon our leaders to exercise and ourselves, in our
own responses, to exercise is a certain amount of selfenlightened prudence.
To obsess over threats to safety while ignoring
threats to liberty demonstrates as little enlightened
self-interest as would a person who thought nothing
about borrowing logs from the walls of his home to
replenish his supply of firewood. As the house grows
draftier, in order to keep the fire burning brightly to
make up for the lost heat, he must take more and more
wood from the walls. Tending his hearth, he destroys
his home. Since we can purchase no security whose
warranty will not one day expire, wisdom counsels
lavishing at least a little security in exchange for
liberty, especially in this nation, which is founded
upon the principle of liberty.
Once we as a nation have done all of the obvious and defensible things to protect ourselves against
another terrorist attack, each additional fraction
of protection will exact a proportional sacrifice of
freedom — and not only freedom. When our alarms
warn us only against threats that imperil our safety,
they fail to alert us to dangers that may jeopardize
our humanity. Whoever fights monsters should see
to it that, in the process, he does not become a monster, wrote the philosopher Frederic Nietzsche. When
you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.
When President Roosevelt reminded the American
people that the only thing they had to fear was fear
itself, he sought to make us less vulnerable to our
enemies, not more like them.
Thank you.

JOHNSON: I am going to publicly beg the indulgence of Congressman Otter, who made a real effort
to be here today. The press of business in Washington
wouldn’t allow him to do that. We thought we might
continue this discussion a little longer this afternoon
and include him, but we’ve abused our panelists here
for two hours, and I don’t want to take any more
advantage of them. Please join me in thanking these
panelists.
APPLAUSE
Now, before you all leave, we’re going to have some
quick closing comments from Dr. Forrest Church.
FORREST CHURCH: We’ve all been enormously privileged today to witness these thoughtful,
committed patriotic men and women, grappling with
the issues of such enormous importance to all of us in
this nation.
It was just seventy years ago that President
Franklin Roosevelt — not always perfect as none of
our presidents has been perfect — said, “The only
thing we have to fear is fear itself.” The only thing
we have to fear is fear itself. He wasn’t using fear to
frighten us; he was trying to alert us to the danger
of being overly frightened because our responses to
the reality — always difficult, always challenging —
confronting us with all of its dangers would be only
compromised and our difficulty compounded by the
fear we felt.
There is a golden mean somewhere between fear
and security. In a way, liberty and security or freedom
and safety are opposites. Somewhere in between, in
the Aristotelian sense, there is a golden mean, which
we will never find. We do know that it is dangerous to
sacrifice too much of our freedom to secure our safety.
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CECIL ANDRUS: To those of you who were
unable to be with us all day today, we had a long, full
day. It was exciting, very analytical, and it was a day in
which we had the opportunity to listen to some of the
greatest minds in America give their views on where
we are today, particularly when it comes to the question of freedom versus security. Do we want security?
Absolutely. Will we do whatever is necessary? Certainly.
But how much is enough? What is the balance?
You’re here tonight to listen to David Broder, who
is, without question, one of the greatest journalists that
America has ever known. When you ask someone inside
Washington, D.C. and the Beltway to name the most
respected reporter in town, the answer, nine out of ten
times, will be Dave Broder. When you ask a person
outside the House of Mirrors, the same question elicits the same answer. It is Dave Broder, a man of great
intellectual honesty, a man who tells it the way it is, a
man who has his column in more than 300 newspapers around the globe. He is also not only in the print
media, he is very good on television. If you watch “Meet
the Press” or “Washington Week in Review,” you find
that he doesn’t pound on the table and shout as some
do. He actually has something to say. His comments are
informed, insightful, and interesting.
I could go on a long time about all the accolades
and honors he has received, but I’m going to read just
one little paragraph out of Esquire magazine, in the
intellectual part of that magazine. “Broder has few
challengers as the most influential political journalist
in the country.” Media critic Ron Powers on CBS-TV
said, “Broder is not famous like Peter Jennings. He’s
not glamorous like Tom Brokaw, but underneath that
brown suit, there is a real superman.”
Besides that, I like his hair style. Any man that
works hard to get it looking like that, I know what
he does through. He’s won the Pulitzer Prize and

has received many awards for many years. I first met
this man when I was a greenhorn Governor back in
the early 1970s, my first life. He gets outside of the
Beltway to places where he can find the people and
discuss the politics and issues of the world.
Ladies and gentlemen, please help me welcome
David Broder.
DAVID BRODER: Thank you. Governor
Andrus, I thank you very much for your willingness
to sacrifice on my behalf whatever little credibility you
have might built up with this crowd.
It has been a spectacular day here. I missed the
morning because I was flying in from Chicago, and
I particularly regret not having heard Senator Slade
Gorton. The parts that I heard have just been wonderful, and I congratulate all of you who had a part
in putting this program together. It reminds me, as I
mentioned just moments ago to Mrs. Andrus, of a line
that Mo Udall used to use when he was the last speaker
on a long program. Mo would say, “Well, everything
has been said, ladies and gentlemen, but not everybody has said it.”
So we’re going to go on. The only difficulty with
the program that I heard this afternoon was that
it made me go back to the hotel and re-write these
comments because really everything that’s important
has been said and been said much better than I can
possibly try to summarize it.
I’m not going to try to summarize all of those
wise observations that have been made. I think what
I might try to do would be to put it into a little bit
different context, a Washington, D.C. context, and
then just simply try to put a framework around it that
may or may not be of any use to you.
As all of us all day have been starting, I am starting
with the acknowledgment that our lives, as individu-
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als and the life of this country, changed and changed
in a fundamental way on September 11th. The oddity
for me, in repeating that date, is that it happens to be
my birthday. It’s a bad date to celebrate your birthday,
but luckily, I have a daughter in San Francisco whose
birthday is on September 12, and Lauren has generously said, “You can share my birthday with me.” So
we celebrate together now on September 12th.
Certainly in the city where I work and have
worked for a long time, the atmosphere, the environment — in almost every way that you can measure
it — is very different now from what it was. Those
of you who have been to Washington in the last
couple of years know that all over the city now, you
have physical barriers that were not there before. The
security checks in your old department and other
departments that seemingly have no direct relationship to national security — all of them now have their
own security checks.
The whole psychology of the city has changed
from what it was before. It’s reflected in the legislation that was passed and that we’ve been discussing
here today. It is certainly reflected also in the way
the administration of justice is being carried out in
Washington and around the country. We know now
— and it’s been the topic all day — about the Patriot
Act. We know that it is there, but we know not nearly
as much as we need to know in terms of information
about the way in which that new authority is being
used.
In June, Attorney General Ashcroft reported that
he had asked 170 times now for what they are referring to as authority for “emergency surveillance,” which
gives them the authority to examine the papers, records,
and so on for up to 72 hours before a court says, “You
are authorized to use that kind of surveillance.”
There was a survey I read about what was done by
the library science school at the University of Illinois
in which they talked to 1500 major libraries around
the country. They found that 178 of them reported
that they had been visited for one reason or another
by FBI members, asking them about somebody’s use
of the library. Clearly those statistics represent only
the tip of the iceberg of what has been going on since
September 11th.
We have learned that there have been 215
reported surveillances of financial and other records
that have been reported to Congress, but again I suspect that is only the tip of the iceberg. We know that
Section 215 of the Patriot Act has allowed a number

of broader inquiries into the records than would have
been permissible under law before that. We know that
immigration statutes have been used for long-term
detention of people and for the rapid repatriation of
people and that there has been a stinging report from
the Justice Department’s own Inspector General about
conditions in which some of those detainees have been
held. We know that there has been expanded use of
the material witness statute to detain people and to
keep them in detention.
My paper and George Lardner, who has been
part of the program today, examined 44 cases of
those material witnesses and found that in almost
half the cases, the so-called material witnesses had
not even been called to testify before a Grand Jury.
Of course, during the day, we’ve had a good deal of
discussion about the use of the “enemy combatant”
status, including the cases the judges talked about of
two American citizens, who have been placed in the
hands of the military, held incommunicado, denied
lawyers, and facing — at some point, one presumes
— military courts.
All of these various areas have properly caused a
good deal of controversy and discussion. That controversy has been the topic of our meeting here
today. What strikes me is that it may be useful just to
organize our thinking about the monitoring of this
process by focusing on three sets of institutions that
traditionally we have relied on in our country to keep
the checks and balances, which the founders wanted
to have, particularly when it came to the administration of justice. The institutions I’m thinking about are
the courts, the Congress, and the press.
I want to try to talk briefly about each of those
institutions, what they have attempted to do and what
they have been able to do.
Let’s start with judicial review, which is built right
into the Constitution as probably the most important
of the safeguards for individual liberties. I think that,
in the two years since September 11th, judicial review
has not really been able to put much of a dent into
some of the more controversial Justice Department
activities.
Something I was not very familiar with until
we started covering this whole area is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, known by its acronym
as FISC, made up, as I understand it, of 11 District
Court judges, who routinely are asked to review FBI
requests for wiretaps or electronic surveillance. Over
the last 25 years — I couldn’t find any breakout of the
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last two years — but over the last 25 years that court
has been in existence, the figures show something like
15,000 applications for that type of surveillance, and
the stunning figure is that in all of that time, they have
been refused only five times. Either the FBI is being
very careful about its applications, or the courts are
being very permissive about going along with these
applications.
This court did, in fact, rule in one case that the
mixing of national security surveillance with routine
criminal prosecutions raised serious problems. But
when that case was appealed to the appellate level of
that FISC Court, judgment was reversed, and the government was allowed to go ahead with the blending
that the Patriot Act involved and allowed the use of
intelligence data in normal criminal prosecution.
Last May, there was a case that came to the
District Court in Washington, D.C., a press kind of
case, an appeal to use the Freedom of Information Act
to disclose the names and the numbers and the types
of cases to which the Patriot Act was being applied.
The District Court in Washington said Freedom of
Information Act does not apply to those cases.
In December of last year, a district judge ruled that
the United States, in the Padia case we talked about
today — the American citizen who is being held someplace in a military brig — could hold Padia under those
conditions but that he must be given access to an attorney and allowed to challenge that status. But that judgment by a District Court has now been appealed and is
still pending, at least that is my best information.
As was referred to this afternoon, two separate
circuits in this country have given opposite judgments
about the Constitutionality of holding deportation
hearings in secret when the government asserts that
there is a special security interest in the alien that is
up for deportation. So we don’t know what the final
judgment will be on those matters.
On the question of keeping secret the names of
those who are being detained as material witnesses,
a District of Columbia circuit court has held that
Attorney General Ashcroft is well within his rights in
keeping those proceedings secret. So at best, it’s a mixed
record that we have in terms of the judicial role.
Congress obviously has a Constitutional duty to
maintain oversight over the administration of justice
by the Justice Department and the FBI, and it’s clear
that Congress has run into great difficulty in trying to
fulfill that role. The material that was obtained, finally,
from the Justice Department and the FBI, constituted

several hundred pages of information, but almost all
of it was blacked out, “redacted,” to use the technical term, so that the members of Congress could only
guess what was really being done in these cases.
The Judiciary Committee on the Senate side sent
about 50 questions to the Attorney General and asked
him to respond to their queries about the use of the
Patriot Act. When the answers came back, this is what
the Judiciary Committee reported:
“We are disappointed with the non-responsiveness of the Justice Department and the FBI.
Although the DOJ and the FBI have sometimes
cooperated with our oversight efforts, often legitimate questions went unanswered or the DOJ
answers were delayed so long and were so incomplete that they were of minimal use in the oversight efforts of this committee.”
As all of you in Idaho know, your member
of Congress, Butch Otter, did succeed in getting the
House of Representatives to delete funds for one of the
key provisions of the Patriot Act, the one he refers to
as the “sneak and peek” surveillance provision, which
allows them not only to examine records of people
that are of interest to them but to insist that those who
have custody of the records not inform the person
whose records were being examined of the fact that the
surveillance had taken place. By a very large margin,
309 to 118, Mr. Otter was able to strike the funds in
the House Appropriations Bill that would have been
used to carry out that provision. But there is no similar
provision in the Senate version of that Appropriation
bill, so we do not know, at this point, what the effect
of this will be.
Now we turn to the third institution, the press.
I should say here not just the press but a wide variety
of public interest groups that are also attempting to
monitor the use of this new authority. What we find
is that the private organizations have done really an
excellent job of trying to compile information and an
excellent job, in my judgment, in raising the kind of
issues that were being discussed here this afternoon.
We in the press have covered the controversy about
those interesting provisions and, in some cases, have
fought hard to break through the barriers, the curtain
of secrecy behind which some of these laws are being
administered.
Once again, the results have been rather
meager. I have to say, in candor, that in journalism, we
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are facing a kind of built-in conflict of interest when
it comes to our roles as monitors, specifically of the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and the other parts of
our Executive Branch that have prosecutorial authority. The reporters who cover the Department of Justice
and the FBI depend on the Department of Justice and
the FBI for much of the information they need to
report on the enforcement of these laws.
We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that there
are serious, important, and legitimate cases involving security, which those agencies are dealing with.
In our world as reporters, having access to the people
who can help us understand those highly publicized
cases is of great importance to us. I suppose that a
news organization could have a Team A, which would
deal with the law enforcement agencies as sources of
information about prosecution, and a Team B, which
was dedicated to monitoring the behavior or even the
misbehavior of those same agencies. I know of no
news organization that has the luxury of that kind of
staffing arrangement. So all of the reporters who are in
part monitors are also in part dependent on those very
same agencies for the daily information that is vital to
their covering the beat.
Let me try to conclude these comments by going
back to what I began with, which is to try to emphasize the environment in which these decisions are made
and these actions are being carried out in Washington,
D.C. since September 11, 2001. Washington, perhaps, was more affected by the attacks that day than
any other place in the country, except for New York.
Washington saw what happened at the World Trade
Center. We saw and heard and lived with and smelled
what happened at the Pentagon. In my neighborhood, two miles from the Pentagon, filled with military families, we didn’t lose anyone from the neighborhood, but all of my neighbors lost personal friends,
colleagues, and comrades in that attack, and it is a
living memory for them and for all of us who share
that space with them.
Soon after the attack of September 11th, we of
course had the anthrax attacks in Washington, which,
in some ways, affected the psychology of the city much
as — or perhaps even more — than the September 11th
attacks because that was an unexpected and insidious
intrusion, and we still don’t know where it came from.
At the Washington Post, to give you a trivial example,
we still do not bring any unopened mail onto to the
newsroom floor of our building. If we want to open our
mail, we go down to an isolated dark floor, one floor

below the newsroom, and we open our mail there and
then bring whatever we want back into the newsroom.
We are that afraid of possible contamination.
I ride the Metro, which you all were nice enough
to build for us in Washington, into work every day. I
have noticed that when the spacing on the trains in the
Metro gets a little off and they stop your train between
stations to get the spacing right, since September 11th,
people look around rather nervously at each other and
ask, with their eyes if not their voices, “What’s going
on? Why have we stopped here? What’s happened?”
There is this real sense that the threat of terrorism has not been forgotten in Washington, and as I
travel the country, it seems to me that in most places
in our country, most people are living their daily lives
very much as they did before September 11th. Unless
you happened to be going through an airport that day,
the likelihood is that your routine is probably very
much what it was on September 10th. That is not the
case in Washington, and it affects the way in which
Washington is weighing the balance between security
and individual freedom.
There is one other aspect of the Washington environment that I think needs to be understood. That
is the internal environment, the mindset of the people who are governing in Washington. The President
always sets the tone in Washington. He sets the agenda.
This president said explicitly in the days immediately
after September 11th that the war on terror, to use his
phrase, was now the priority for his Administration. In
fact, he has remarked to people more than once that
he believes that he now understands why he became
president. It was not clear to him before September
11th what his mission was, but he now understands
that protecting this nation from terrorism is the mission that he was sent to Washington to accomplish.
That sets the tone for the entire government. It sets
the priorities for the budget. It sets the priorities in
law enforcement.
I came across something a few days ago that I
want to read to you. It’s from a publication called
The Presidential Studies Quarterly, published by the
Center for the Study of the Presidency. It is written by
a woman named Nancy Baker who is a political scientist at New Mexico State University. I just want to read
you one paragraph because I think it makes the point
that I’m trying to make here about where the priorities of Washington lie. She is talking particularly about
Attorney General Ashcroft and she says:

58

“The Administration characterizes its antiterrorism measures as fully consistent with civil
liberties and denies that any of its actions constitute restrictions. ‘A commitment to civil liberties extends up to the President,’ according
to Attorney General Ashcroft. ‘President Bush
insists that our responses to evil respect the
Constitution and value the freedoms and justice the Constitution guarantees.’ The Attorney
General has been the most outspoken member
of the Administration on this theme. He told
Senators this past spring, ‘The Department of
Justice has acted thoughtfully, carefully, and
within the Constitution of the United States,
that framework for freedom.’
Throughout the past two years, he has made
similar assurances in press releases and public statements when discussing anti-terrorist measures. For
example, he described the plan to end the informational firewalls between federal prosecutors and
intelligence officers as ‘rooted in our Constitutional
liberties.’ Interrogation of thousands of foreign
nationals he described as exhibiting ‘full respect
for the rights and dignity of the individuals being
interviewed.’ In a talk to FBI agents regarding
revised guidelines that would allow them to monitor public gatherings, he escribed them as as a ‘demonstration to the American public that the agency
would protect them from terrorism with a scrupulous respect for civil rights and personal freedoms.’”

Thank you very much.
ANDRUS: Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve just
heard from the best of the best in the area of journalism in America. David, thank you very much. Now
we’re going to have some questions. We have Dr.
Freemuth and Marc Johnson here with microphones.
But remember what I said earlier today: questions, yes;
speeches, no way.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: All day we’ve been
talking about preventive measures and the consequences of all that. I’m just curious. What are we
doing to deal with the root of the problem so we are
not creating enemies faster than we can kill them.
BRODER: The root of the problem? Can you
spell it out a little bit?
AUDIENCE: Why do people hate us? What is it
that we are doing that causes such great animosity?
BRODER: Well, that’s a question that is way
above my pay grade. I think to the extent that the
problem is rooted in Middle East, we know some of
the causes, the historic causes of the conflict in that
part of the world. The difficulty — I almost used
the word futility, but I don’t want to say futility —
the extraordinary difficulty that successive American
administrations have had in trying to find a pathway to peace and ending the struggle between the
Palestinian people and Israel. That’s part of the story.
Part of the story, which frankly I do not understand very well — and I’m sure there are others in
this room that could speak to it much more clearly
than I can — is in the nation of Saudi Arabia and our
checkered relationship with them, our dependence on
their oil, and our difficulty in finding a way to express
American values to the rulers of that country. But
those are just two of the elements of something that is
a very large question.
I have to say for myself that I think we need, in
our policy, to be addressing both the symptoms and the
causes of terrorism. I don’t think we can give ourselves
the luxury of saying, “If we can just get to the roots of
this, there would be no problem.” There are people who
are products of these forces who do intend us evil. We
have to be prepared to confront that evil. But if we stop
at that point, we have simply consigned ourselves, our
children, and our grandchildren to living perpetually in

And there are other examples. The comment
about this that I want to leave you with comes from a
former dean of the Washington and Lee Law School
in Virginia, who was running a forum at the opening
this past summer of the Center for the Constitution,
which is open now in Philadelphia. The former dean
told me this story. He said, “I wish that it were possible for the press to have been in this session. I didn’t
see any reporters in the room when we were having
this discussion. A recently-retired Justice Department
official, who was there in effect representing the Bush
Administration, made this comment to the forum:
“You need to understand that President
Bush today, in his role as the leader of the war
on terrorism, is in very much the same position
as President Lincoln during the Civil War. Like
Lincoln, he will try to preserve the Constitution,
but he is determined to preserve the Union.”
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a land that is less free and has fewer resources to deal
with its other needs than would otherwise be the case.

that is an internal problem for the government. It is
not, in itself, a press problem.
What we routinely do, when we are dealing in
an area of national security, once information comes
to us that we believe is credible — and we will make
every effort to test its credibility — a conversation
takes place between some official at some level at the
Washington Post and some official at some level —
including sometimes, as in the past, the President of
the United States — about what we are about to do.
The conversation goes something like this:

AUDIENCE QUESTION: If I may, I’d like to
ask a question about the recent allegation of a leak
identifying a CIA operative. The Statesman had a
front page article today with a Washington Post byline,
I believe, indicating a very recent poll suggesting that
over 80% felt that was a very serious issue, and over
70% felt there should be independent investigation of
those allegations. I thought I heard you suggest this
afternoon that that was an issue that would soon blow
over. Can you tell me what you know about the issue
that perhaps I don’t? I happen to be in the majority
reflected by that poll.

“This is what we have learned. This is how
far we have come in our reporting. If our reporting is wrong and you can prove to us that it’s
wrong, we would like you to give us that proof.
Second, if our reporting is incomplete and you
can supplement what we know, we would like
you to provide that additional information, context, or background so that we can be as accurate as possible. Now, this information is in our
hands. It is out of your hands. Now you have
an opportunity to persuade us to do something
that is contrary to our nature, which is not to
share what we know with the people who read
the newspaper. Our inclination and our likely
judgment is that we will publish what we have
found out, but you have an opportunity now to
persuade us that we should not, in this instance,
publish it.”

BRODER: Thank you for the question. I’m
unclear in my mind as to what degree, if any, the life
and work of the operative in the CIA was put in jeopardy by the publication of her name. This is a difficult area for a journalist, but I think it behooves us to
give great heed to the plea that was made to my friend
Bob Novak to withhold the name. I don’t think that
the name added any great value to the public, and I
do think that if it is at all a serious jeopardy for the
woman, the name should not have been published.
When I said that I don’t think this is likely to be a
major continuing controversy, I did so because the life
cycle of “scandals” in Washington tends to be rather
brief, particularly when they run into a dead end in
terms of adding names or information to it. I will be
very surprised if we ever learn the names of the people who leaked this information, and I will be very
surprised if this story continues indefinitely without
names attached to it. I hope I did not suggest that
I thought that outing a CIA operative was, in itself,
unimportant. If this puts the woman in jeopardy, it
is a very important thing, and it is something that
should not have happened.

That conversation takes place. There have been
instances, which have since become public, where the
persuasion worked.. The Post learned about a ship
called the Glomar Explorer, which was going to try
to try to retrieve a Soviet submarine. The people in
the government said, “We would like you to withhold that story until we have a chance to try to lift
the submarine. We don’t want to have an incident on
the high seas with the Soviet Navy about whether or
not we can try to lift that ship of theirs.” We did what
they asked us to do. Other publications did not, so it
became public. So there is that kind of dialogue that
takes place.
From what I know about the case Bob has written about, Bob talked to the CIA, and they made a
representation to him that it would be contrary to
the interests of the agency and of the woman for
her name to become public. He decided it was not a
serious enough case that he wanted to withhold the

AUDIENCE QUESTION: If it is a serious matter, do you fault Robert Novak for publishing it?
BRODER: I will give you a longer answer than
you probably want. The view at our paper, George
Lardner’s and mine, is very simple. It is the government’s responsibility to keep the government’s secrets
secret. That is not our job in the press. When people
in the government start talking about subjects that
others in government wish they would not talk about,
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information. Whether he made the right judgment or
not, in my view, depends very much on what, in fact,
this woman’s job was at the CIA, and I’m not clear
what that job really entailed. If she has been put in
jeopardy, as I said before, or if her contacts have been
put in jeopardy, I think he made the wrong call.
But the basic fact is that it is the government’s job
to protect its secrets. We do not have an official secrets
act in this country. Thank goodness. It’s the government’s job to protect the government’s secrets.

enterprises rather than allowing what happened in
radio to happen in other media.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Mr. Broder, prior to
your birthday, German visitors to this country used
to express amazement at our freedom to travel, our
freedom to be left alone. They were just in awe of this
because it was something unknown to them. Given
the direction in which we’re going now, isn’t there a
very real danger that we might be facing a re-run of an
old World War II movie whereby, if we want to travel
from New York to Philadelphia or Boise to Mountain
Home, we might be faced with checkpoints where
someone in uniform says, “Your papers, please”?

AUDIENCE QUESTION: With the recent
changes in the FCC rulings on how many papers
and radio stations a person or corporation can own,
in your opinion, could this jeopardize a journalist’s
ability to get the truth and information to the public?

BRODER: My instinct is to say that’s probably
not in our future, and it’s certainly not inevitable.
But as soon as I say that, I have to say that what you
are describing is daily life within the borders of the
District of Columbia. You can’t go anywhere in the
District of Columbia, you can’t enter a single building
of any size in the District without producing an identification for yourself, whether you are talking about
the Washington Post or any other office building in
the city or any government building in the city. So it’s
happening already within the borders of the District of
Columbia. So I should not be so quick to say it can’t
happen in the broader range of the country.
We are sacrificing freedom. There is no question
about that. All you have to do is watch, as I did this
morning, the people lining up at the checkpoint, dutifully removing their shoes and putting them in the little bin, then hopping on one foot and the other to put
their shoes back on. That is an infringement on freedom. You didn’t have to do that to go an airplane flight
until now. Yes, it’s possible. I don’t think — fingers
crossed — it’s going to happen to us very soon.

BRODER: Thank you. I think the FCC should
proceed with great caution in this deregulation. What
happened in radio after they deregulated radio has
resulted in a concentration of ownership that has been
well publicized in that field, one that is inimical to
broad public discussion in that medium. I think they
would have been well advised to proceed with great
caution in applying the same rules to other media.
There is a reality, which they cite, which is that
we now have, all of us, access to a far greater variety of
sources of information than any previous generation
of Americans had. Wherever you live in this country now, in addition to all your local media options,
you have three national newspapers, two of which
are among the very best in the country: The New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The third,
U.S.A. Today, is rapidly becoming a more serious and
substantive newspaper. You have all of the resources
of National Public Radio, to which I am addicted.
You have the cable news channels in all of their
varieties, and of course now you have the wonders of
the Internet.
I see the change in my reporting as a political
reporter. You now can go into any community of any
size anywhere in this country, and you will find a group
of people, self-selected, who are every bit as engaged in
public affairs, every bit as knowledgeable as any group
that you would find at the Brookings Institution or
Cato or AEI or any of those Washington policy think
tanks. They get it. They have made it their business to
exploit these information sources.
Even so, I would still think that we would be
better off with additional owners and additional

AUDIENCE QUESTION: I was wondering
why this big deal in Iraq, which evidently was false
information, about weapons of mass destruction. It’s
so scary to the United States when we have a man
over in North Korea who says he is making them and
will send them to other rogue nations. I don’t get the
connection.
BRODER: You will understand that I am not
a State Department or Pentagon spokesman. They
would not accept me in their wildest dreams in that
role. Why was it scary? Well, two reasons. First, Iraq
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is a large country sitting on top of a vital resource and
located in the heart of a strategic part of the world.
So what happens in that country is of consequence to
the region and therefore of consequence to the United
States. The man who was running that country was
a thoroughly bad actor, and if he had access to those
weapons of mass destruction, I think it would be a safe
presumption that our security would be, by that fact,
somewhat more jeopardized.
Could we have done it by continuing containment and the embargo, etc.? That is an argument that
people made seriously and that can be made seriously.
But I don’t think it was hallucinatory to think that
we had security stakes in Iraq. Does that excuse what
appears to be faulty intelligence? Absolutely not.
The question of why we so badly misjudged,
apparently, what he had available and how quickly he
could have used it is a terribly serious question, which
we are still in the very early stages of unraveling. I don’t
pretend to know why that intelligence appears to have
been as faulty as it was.
North Korea is a different country in a different
part of the world, also important but also one that presents a totally different strategic challenge. They have a
huge army that jeopardizes their immediate neighbor,
South Korea, and could cause problems in the wider
area. So it is perfectly logical to think, yes, we’re going
to deal with that situation but in a different approach
and method. I think, fingers crossed, that the situation in North Korea may still be manageable without
the kind of direct military confrontation that we saw
in Iraq. But will it be an easy proposition to bring that
about? Clearly not. There were false starts at the beginning of this administration that probably have delayed
and perhaps ultimately made it more difficult to deal
with the North Korean situation.

overnight intelligence, and discussion of both the international and the domestic intelligence as to what may
be taking place that might require a response from the
American government. Beyond that, I can’t really give
you much in the way of definitive information.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Bill Clinton reportedly learned about the massacres in Rawanda by reading a news magazine. Do you have any sense about
how much information and breadth of opinion the
President actually has access to on a day-to-day basis?

ANDRUS: Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve just
been treated to an evening with one of the fairest
analytical minds in America, and we appreciate your
being here with us. I say that on behalf of my colleagues, fellow sponsors, the Frank Church Institute,
the Idaho Statesman. The three of us banded together
this time to put together the conference today.
I’ve been asked by the press several times, “What
did you hope to achieve?” What we would like to
see is an enlightened citizenry who will take it upon
themselves to help make the determination on how
much of our freedom we must sacrifice, how much is
necessary? It’s not necessarily what the governmental

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Regarding the war
in Iraq, if the President was wrong — I’m not saying
he is — if he was wrong about the weapons of mass
destruction and the connections to al-Qaida, considering the resources and lives we have expended, is it
possible we have already lost the chance to win the war
against international terrorism?
BRODER: Well, what I can understand about
the war on international terrorism is that it is not a
single struggle taking place in a single location but
rather an effort to discover and then to counter efforts
that are probably being fostered by loosely-linked
organizations, exploiting local and international grievances and using a whole variety of tools. So while Iraq
represents obviously a huge policy gamble on the part
of the United States and this administration, a huge
investment of lives and dollars, I don’t think that it
probably is the definitive or ultimate battle in the war
on terrorism.
I’m inclined to think that those who say we are
looking at something analogous to the Cold War in
terms of the variety of forms it will take, the variety of places where the engagements will be found,
the length of time it will require, and the tenacity it
will take on our part and our allies’ part are probably
correct. So I would not think that this is, in any realistic sense, the definitive battle that has determined the
outcome of the war on terrorism.
Thank you all very much.

BRODER: I don’t know the answer to that. He
has access to everything in the American government and a good many things that come from allied
governments. How he uses that information is a question that I cannot give you any firsthand information
about. What we are told is that the President begins
each day with a rather lengthy security briefing,
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entity says it’s what they need. I’m not convinced that
they need everything I hear about.
I’m a veteran of Korea, and I’m as patriotic as anyone else, but I also want to know that my government
is the same government it was when I went to Korea
some fifty years ago.
Ladies and gentlemen, we’re not asking that
anybody accept our viewpoint. We’re asking that
we share viewpoints with one another and come up
collectively with the right answer. Do I know what
that is? No. Does Bethine know? No. Do the people at

the Statesman know? No. But it’s someplace short of
what I think they’re asking for.
We hope you have been enlightened, and once
again, I’d like to express our collective appreciation to
the outstanding group of individuals who joined with
us today to discuss this issue. Many are still here this
evening. I would hope you have a safe journey back to
your homes, and we’re pleased to have had the chance
to spend the day with you.
Thank you again, Mr. Broder.
*****
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Conference Participant Biographies

Governor Cecil D. Andrus: Chairman, Andrus
Center for Public Policy; Governor of Idaho, 1987 to
1995; Secretary of Interior, 1977 to 1981; Governor
of Idaho, 1971 to 1977. During his four terms as
Governor of Idaho and his four years as Secretary of
Interior, Cecil Andrus earned a national reputation as
a “common-sense conservationist,” one who could
strike a wise balance between conflicting conservation
and development positions. He played a pivotal role in
the passage of the Alaska Lands Act and the National
Surface Mining Act of 1977 and in the creation of the
Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness Area,
the Snake River Birds of Prey Area, and the Hell’s
Canyon National Recreation Area. Governor Andrus
elected not to run again in 1994 and subsequently
established the Andrus Center for Public Policy to
which he donates his service as chairman. His awards
include seven honorary degrees, the William Penn
Mott Park Leadership Award from the National
Parks Conservation Association, Conservationist of
the Year from the National Wildlife Federation, the
Ansel Adams Award from the Wilderness Society, the
Audubon Medal, and the Torch of Liberty award from
B’Nai Brith. In 1998, he authored with Joel Connelly
a book about his years in public service: Cecil Andrus:
Politics Western Style. He and his wife, Carol, have
three daughters and three grandchildren.

David Broder: National political correspondent for
The Washington Post. Broder writes a twice-weekly
column that is carried by more than 300 newspapers
around the globe. He was awarded the Pulitzer Price
in 1973 for distinguished commentary and named
“Best Newspaper Political Reporter” by Washington
Journalism Review. A survey for Washingtonian
magazine found that Broder was rated “Washington’s
most highly regarded columnist” by both editorial
page editors and members of Congress, leading 16
others in ratings for “overall integrity, factual accuracy,
and insight.” Broder won the White Burkett Miller
Presidential Award in 1989 and the prestigious 4th
Estate Award from the National Press Foundation in
1990, which also honored him with the Distinguished
Contributions to Journalism Award in 1993. In
addition, he won the 1997 William Allen White
Foundation’s award for distinguished achievement
in journalism and, in the same year, was given the
National Society of Newspaper Columnists Lifetime
Achievement Award. Before joining the Post in 1966,
Broder covered national politics for The New York
Times, The Washington Star, and the Congressional
Quarterly. He has covered every national campaign and
convention since 1960, traveling up to 100,000 miles
a year to interview voters and report on the candidates.
He is the author of seven books, the most recent of
which are: Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns
and the Power of Money (Harcourt 2000); The System:
The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point with
Washington Post alumnus Haynes Johnson (Little,
Brown & Company, 1996); and Behind the Front Page:
A Candid Look at How the News is Made (Simon &
Schuster, 1987) Broder was born in Chicago Heights,
Illinois. He received his bachelor’s degree and an M.A.
in political science from the University of Chicago,
served two years in the U.S. Army, and began his
newspaper career at the Bloomington, Ill. Pantagraph.
He has been a Fellow of the Institute of Politics of the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University and a Fellow of the Institute of Policy
Sciences and Public Affairs at Duke University. Broder
and his wife (the former Ann Creighton Collar) have
four grown sons and make their home in Arlington,
Virginia.

LeRoy Ashby, Ph.D.: Professor of History,
Washington State University. Dr. Ashby received his
doctorate from the University of Maryland in 1966
and has enjoyed a distinguished career as an author
and professor of 20th Century American History
and Popular Culture. He was awarded the WSU
President’s Faculty Excellence Award and honored as
the 1990 and 1993 CASE Professor of the Year for the
State of Washington. His books include The Spearless
Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in
the 1920’s (University of Illinois Press, 1972); Saving
the Waifs: Reformers and Dependent Children (Temple
University Press, 1984); William Jennings Bryan:
Champion of Democracy (Twayne 1987); Fighting the
Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church (WSU Press
1994); and Endangered Children: Dependency, Neglect,
and Abuse in American History (Twayne, 1997).
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James J. Brosnahan: Senior Partner with Morrison &
Foerster of San Francisco and a much-sought-after
public speaker. Mr. Brosnahan received his B.S.B.A.
degree in 1956 from Boston College and went on to
attend Harvard Law School. His post-law school
career led to five years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney,
prosecuting federal cases in Phoenix and San Francisco.
He has particular expertise in civil and criminal trial
work and continues to be regularly engaged in civil
and criminal trials, having tried more than 130 jury
cases on issues including patents, money laundering,
libel, murder, manslaughter, mail fraud, insurance bad
faith, environment, property damage, divorce, child
custody, tax evasion, bank embezzlement, theft of
government property, real estate fraud, narcotics,
obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy, interstate
transportation of wagering information, antitrust,
wrongful death, maritime personal injury, product
liability, professional misconduct, immigration and
other miscellaneous civil and criminal cases. Most
recently, he is best known for his defense of the
“American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh. Mr.
Brosnahan has argued both civil and criminal cases in
state and federal court, including two cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court: United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S.741(1979), and Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee, 109 S.Ct. 1013 (1989).
His honors include induction into the State Bar of
California’s Trial Lawyers Hall of Fame in 1996 and
selection as Trial Lawyer of the Year by the American
Board of Trial Advocates in 2001 and as “Legend of
the Law” by the Lawyers’ Club of San Francisco in
2002. His lecture series, “Great Trials and Great
Lawyers,” was featured in The Teaching Company’s
America’s Superstar Teachers.

Bethine was active in many civic organizations in
the Washington, D.C. area, including the Kennedy
Center for the Performing Arts, the U.S. Capitol
Historical Society, Meridian House, and the Center
for Responsive Politics. She has contributed energy,
time, and treasure to many of Idaho’s most worthwhile
charities: the Anne Frank Human Rights Memorial,
the Terry Reilly Health Services, the Basque Museum
and Cultural Center, the Martin Institute for Peace
Studies, and the Governor’s Task Force on Home
Care. Her awards include an honorary degree from
Lewis Clark State College, Boise State University’s
Silver Medallion Award for Public Service, and the
Lifetime Achievement Award from the Silver Sage Girl
Scout Council. Her special interests are senior citizen
advocacy, environmental protection, home health
care issues, and children’s programs. She enjoys the
company of her two sons, Chase and Forrest, and of
her grandchildren. Her memoir, A Lifelong Affair: My
Passion for People and Politics, has just been published
by Frances Press, Washington, D.C.
Forrest Church, Ph.D.: Rev. Church is currently
serving his twenty-sixth year as Senior Minister
of All Souls Church (Unitarian) in Manhattan.
He was educated at Stanford University, Harvard
Divinity School, and Harvard University, where he
received his Ph.D. in Early Church History in 1978.
Dr. Church, who is 55 years old, has written or
edited 20 books, including Father and Son: A
Personal Biography of Senator Frank Church of Idaho;
Our Chosen Faith: An Introduction to Unitarian
Universalism; God and Other Famous Liberals; Life
Lines; Lifecraft; Bringing God Home; and The American
Creed. His is the editor of The Essential Tillich
(University of Chicago, 1999); The Macmillan Book
of Earliest Christian Prayers (1988), a new edition of
Thomas Jefferson’s Bible (Beacon, 1989): and Restoring
Faith: America’s Religious Leaders Answer Terror with
Hope (2001). Eight of his addresses have been selected
for inclusion in the annual anthology, Representative
American Speeches (Wilson & Co.). Dr. Church is a
member of the Executive Board at the Franklin and
Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. Mayor Giuliani appointed
him Chairman of the Council on the Environment of
New York City in 1995. Now serving in his eighth
year as chair, he directs, among other programs, 32
green markets in the city. He is married to Carolyn
Buck Luce and has four children: Frank (25), Nina
(22), Jacob (19), and Nathan (16).

Bethine Church: Chair of The Frank Church
Institute, President and Founder of the Sawtooth
Society. Bethine Church, widow of Senator Frank
Church, returned to Idaho following his death in 1984
and is best known now for her own achievements. In
addition to chairing the many Frank Church Seminars
at Boise State University in the intervening years, she
has spearheaded the movement to save Idaho’s scenic
Stanley Basin in Idaho through her inspired leadership
of the Sawtooth Society. She is the daughter of Idaho
Governor Chase Clark, who later served as a federal
judge; the niece of another governor, Barzilla; and the
cousin of a United States Senator, D. Worth Clark.
During Senator Church’s three terms in the Senate,
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Law. His many honors include Honorary Doctor of
Humane Letters from the College of New Rochelle in
1998, the Dean’s Medal from Fordham Law School
in 1997, Community Leadership Award from the
Federal Law Enforcement Foundation in 1995, the
Lifetime Achievement Award (Justice William O.
Douglas Award) from the Association of Securities
and Exchange Commission Alumni in 1995, the
Distinguished Public Service Award from the New
York County Lawyers’ Association, and numerous
others. Judge Duffy is a prolific writer, and a sampling
of his articles includes: “The Civil Rights Act: A
Need for Re-Evaluation of Non-Exhaustion Doctrine
Applied to Prison Section 1983 Lawsuits,” Pace Law
Review, 1983; “Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans? The
Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11,” 54 Fordham
Law Review (1985); and “Cross-Examination of
Witnesses: The Litigator’s Puzzle” (with Aron and
Rosner), Shepard’s McGraw-Hill, 1989. The long list
of his notable decisions includes: USA v. Mohammad
Salameh et al., 1993-1994 (The World Trade Center
Bombing Case); National Basketball Association et al
v. Charles L. Williams et al., 1994; USA ex rel Israel v.
Mkousa Mohammed Abu Marzook 1996 (extradition of
Hamas Chief for murders); USA v. Yousef, et al, 1997
(Manila Bombing Case); USA v. Yousef and Ismoil,
1997 (The World Trade Center Bombing Case II). Judge
Duffy and his wife of 46 years, Judge Irene Duffy, who
is retired from the New York Supreme Court, have
four children: Kevin Thomas Jr, Irene Moira, Gavin
Edward, and Patrick Giles.

John M. Deutch, Ph.D.: Institute Professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as
Director of Central Intelligence from May 1995 to
December 1996. From 1994 to 1995, he served as
Deputy Secretary of Defense and as Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology during
1993-1994. Dr. Deutch also served as Director of
Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Energy Technology, and Undersecretary in the U.S.
Department of Energy. In addition, he served on
the President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee
(1980-81; the President’s Commission on Strategic
Forces (1983); the White House Science Council
(1985-89); the President’s Intelligence Advisory
Board (1990-93); the President’s Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security (1996); the
President’s Commission on Reducing and Protecting
Government Secrecy (1996-970; and as Chairman
of the Commission to Assess the Organization of
the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1998-99). Dr.
Deutch serves as director of the following publiclyheld companies: Citigroup, Cummins, Raytheon, and
Schlumberger Ltd. He is a director of the Council on
Foreign Relations, Resources for the Future, and the
Urban Institute and an overseer of the Museum of
Fine Art in Boston. Dr. Deutch has been a member of
the MIT faculty since 1970 and served as Chairman
of the Department of Chemistry, Dean of Science,
and Provost. He has authored over 160 technical
publications in physical chemistry as well as numerous
articles on technology, energy, international security,
and public policy issues.

Mark H. Gitenstein: Attorney, Mayer, Brown, Rowe,
& Maw, Washington, D.C. Mr. Gitenstein was
counsel to the Senate Intelligence Committee (19751981). He was deeply involved in the Committee’s
investigation of domestic security matters at the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. He served as Minority Chief Counsel
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (1981-86) and
as Chief Counsel of the Committee (1987-89). In
those positions, he directed the Democratic staff ’s
substantive work on all matters before the Committee.
Among his responsibilities was overseeing the
Committee’s review of all judicial nominations. Mr.
Gitenstein led the Democratic staff in 1987 when the
Committee rejected the nomination of Robert Bork to
the Supreme Court. His book on the subject, Matters
of Principle: An Insider’s Account of America’s Rejection

Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy: Judge, U.S. District
Court, New York. Judge Duffy received his LL.B
from Fordham University School of Law in 1958 and
began his distinguished legal career as clerk for Judge
Edward Lumbard, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit. From there he moved to the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York and
became Assistant Chief of the Criminal Division. In
1961, he joined the firm of Whitman, Ransom &
Coulson and subsequently Gordon & Gordon. In
1969, he was named Administrator of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the New York Regional
Office and was appointed to the federal bench by
President Nixon in 1972. He has served as Adjunct
Professor of Trial Advocacy in the Fordham University,
Pace University, and New York University Schools of
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of Robert Bork’s Nomination to the Supreme Court,
was the recipient of the American Bar Association’s
1993 Silver Gavel Award. He became a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw in 1990 and founded the Government Practice
Group at the firm. Mark is a 1968 graduate of Duke
University, and he received his law degree from
Georgetown University Law Center in 1972.

previously in that role for the Hattiesburg American
in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Ms. Hurst has extensive
experience in both the reporting and marketing sides
of journalism, having reported for the Shreveport
Journal and the Columbia Missourian. She was
director of marketing for the News-Press, Fort Myers,
Florida; the Pensacola News Journal, Pensacola,
Florida; and The Times, Shreveport, Louisiana. Leslie
is a recipient from the Gannett Company of the
president’s rings for excellence as both a marketing
director and a publisher. Her civic involvement
includes the West Virginia Roundtable; the Executive
Committee of the Huntington Area Development
Council, the Board of Directors of the Shreveport
Economic Development Foundation, the Chambers
of Commerce in Huntington, Hattiesbureg, and
Shreveport, and a guardian ad litem in Fort Myers. She
is active on the Diversity Committee of the Southern
Newspaper Publishers Association as well as the Board
Diversity Committee for the Newspaper Association
of America. Leslie was born in Turkey into an Air
Force family and grew up all over the world, living in
such diverse places as Taiwan, France, and Germany.
She is a graduate of the University of Missouri with a
bachelor’s degree in journalism. She is married to John
Severson, a photojournalist with The Indianapolis
Star. Her enjoyments include reading, traveling, and
contemporary visual art.

Senator Slade Gorton: Three-term U.S. Senator
from Washington State, now a member of the
Seattle law firm of Preston Gates & Ellis LLP and a
member of the 9/11 Commission. Gorton’s years in
the Senate saw him appointed to powerful committee
posts, including Appropriations, Budget, Commerce,
Science and Transportation, and Energy and Natural
Resources. Gorton served as the Chairman of the
Interior Appropriations Subcommittee (1995-2001),
the Commerce Subcommittees on Consumer Affairs
(1995-99) and Aviation (1999-2000). He was a
member of the Republican leadership as counsel to
the Majority Leader (1996-2000). Senator Gorton
began his political career in 1958 as a Washington
state representative; he went on to serve as State
House Majority Leader. In 1968, he was elected
Attorney General of Washington state where he
argued 14 cases before the Supreme Court. His most
popular achievement as Attorney General came when
he sued the American League in 1970 to keep baseball
in Seattle. To this day, Slade Gorton is remembered by
fans across the state for “saving the Mariners.” In June
1980, he received the Wyman Award as “Outstanding
Attorney General in the United States.” He also served
on the President’s Consumer Advisory Council (197577) and on the Washington State Criminal Justice
Training Commission from 1969-1981. He has
served on the board of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer
Research Center since 1987. In April, 2003, Senator
Gorton became the first non-Estonian to receive the
1st Class Order of the Cross of Terra Mariana, the
country’s highest national award. The honor was the
culmination of Gorton’s many years of interest in and
support of Estonia and the other Baltic states, Latvia
and Lithuania.

Loch K. Johnson: Regents Professor of Political
Science at the University of Georgia, author of several
books on U.S. national security, and editor of the
journal Intelligence and National Security. He has
won the Certificate of Distinction from the National
Intelligence Center and the V. O. Key Prize from
the Southern Political Science Association. He has
served as secretary of the American Political Science
Association and president of the International Studies
Association, South. Johnson was special assistant
to the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in 1975-76, staff director of the House
Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight in 1977-79,
and special assistant to the chair of the Aspin-Brown
Commission on Intelligence in 1995-96. Born in
Auckland, New Zealand, Professor Johnson received
his Ph.D. in political science from the University of
California, Riverside. At the University of Georgia,
he has won the Josiah Meigs Prize, the University’s
highest teaching honor, as well as the Owens Award,
its highest research honor.

Leslie Hurst: President and Publisher of The Idaho
Statesman, she was named to her present position
in May of this year. She relocated to Boise from
Huntington, West Virginia where she was president
and publisher of the Herald Dispatch and served
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Marc C. Johnson: Boise partner of the Gallatin
Group, a Pacific Northwest public affairs/issues
management firm with offices in Boise, Seattle,
Portland, Spokane, Helena, and Washington, D.C.
He serves in a volunteer capacity as President of the
Andrus Center. Mr. Johnson served on the staff of
Governor Cecil D. Andrus from 1987 to 1995, first
as press secretary and later as chief of staff. He has a
varied mass communications background, including
experience in radio, television, and newspaper
journalism. He has written political columns and
done extensive broadcast reporting and producing.
Prior to joining Governor Andrus, Mr. Johnson
served as managing editor for Idaho Public Television’s
award-winning program, Idaho Reports. He has
produced numerous documentaries and hosted
political debates. Several of his programs have been
aired regionally and nationally on public television.
He is currently at work on a biography of progressive
era Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. Johnson
is a native of South Dakota and received a B.S. degree
in journalism from South Dakota State University.
His community involvement includes a past
presidency of the Idaho Press Club and the Bishop
Kelly High School Foundation. He is a past board
member of the St. Vincent De Paul Society and the
Ada County Historic Preservation Council. Currently,
he is chairman of the Idaho Humanities Council and
a member of the boards of the Federation of State
Humanities Councils, the City Club of Boise, and the
Idaho Housing Company, a non-profit corporation
devoted to developing low-income housing projects
in Idaho. Mr. Johnson is married to Patricia L.
Johnson, Ph.D., a senior planner with the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare. Their two sons,
Rob and Nathan, both attend college in Idaho.

Andrew H. Malcolm: Member of the Editorial
Board of the Los Angeles Times. Previous to joining
the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Malcolm served as
Deputy Communications Manager for Bush 2000,
as press secretary to Laura Bush, and as a member of
the transition team, Washington, D.C., July 1999January 2001. Mr. Malcolm has roots in Canada
but was educated at Culver Military Academy and
Northwestern University, where he earned a B.S. and
an M.S. in journalism. He is the author of ten books,
including The Canadians and Fury: Inside the Life
of Theoren Fleury, the true story of Theoren Fleury,
the smallest player in the National Hockey League
(McClelland & Stewart, Canada, November 1997).
Malcolm’s awards include the American Society
of Newspaper Editors Award for Editorial Writing
(2003); the Los Angeles Times Editorial Award (2002
and 2001); New York Page One Award from the New
York Newspaper Guild (1975 and 1985), the New
York Times Publisher’s Award, 18 times; the George
Polk Memorial Award for National Reporting (1975),
and the Peter Lisagor Award for Reporting, Chicago
Newspaper Guild (1983).
Walter F. Mondale: Vice President of the United
States, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, U.S. Senator, and
Minnesota’s Attorney General. In addition to those
offices, Fritz Mondale was also the Democratic Party’s
nominee for President in 1984. He is currently a
partner with the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney LLP,
headquartered in Minneapolis with 16 offices
worldwide. He serves as chair of the firm’s Asia Law
Practice Group. Vice President Mondale is the product
of the small towns of southern Minnesota where he
attended public schools. In 1951, he earned his B.A.
in political science from the University of Minnesota
and, after completing service as a corporal in the U.S.
Army, he received his LL.B (cum laude) from the
University of Minnesota Law School. In 1960, he was
appointed by Minnesota Governor Orville Freeman to
the position of State Attorney General. Mondale was
then elected to the office in 1962 and 1964 when he
was appointed to fill the U.S. Senate vacancy created
by Hubert Humphrey’s election to the Vice Presidency.
The voters of Minnesota returned Mondale to the
Senate in 1966 and 1972. Jimmy Carter and Walter
Mondale were elected President and Vice President of
the United States on November 2, 1976. He was the
first Vice President to have an office in the White
House, and he served as a full-time participant,

George Lardner Jr.: Staff writer for the Washington
Post since 1963, working for most of those years as an
investigative reporter on the newspaper’s national staff.
He has covered presidential campaigns, major court trials,
and beats ranging from the White House and Congress
to the CIA and the FBI. He won a Pulitzer Prize in
1993 for stories about the 1992 murder of his youngest
daughter, Kristin, in Boston by a young man under court
order to stay away from her. He later expanded that
work into a book, The Stalking of Kristin. He has written
numerous articles for national magazines and is chairman
of the Fund for Investigative Journalism, which provides
grants to free-lance journalists to expose governmental,
corporate, and institutional wrongdoing and failings.
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Pierce Murphy: Boise’s Community Ombudsman.
Murphy was appointed by the Mayor and the City
Council on March 2, 1999 and began work on
April 5, 1999. Mr. Murphy has extensive experience in
human resource management, facilitation, mediation
and investigation. He earned a Master of Pastoral
Studies degree from Loyola University of New
Orleans, a Master of Arts degree in Counseling
Psychology from Gonzaga University in Spokane,
Washington, and a Bachelor of Science degree in
Commerce from Santa Clara University in Santa
Clara, California. Mr. Murphy began his career in
1972 as a law enforcement officer with the City of
Menlo Park in California. Following his graduate
studies and from 1986 until 1994, Mr. Murphy
maintained an active Human Resource Management
consulting practice with clients throughout the United
States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In 1994, Mr.
Murphy joined the Paper Division of the Boise
Cascade Corporation as Manager of Human Resource
Development. Mr. Murphy is married, and he and his
wife have seven children.

advisor, and troubleshooter for the Administration.
During this period, Joan Mondale served as a national
advocate for the arts and Honorary Chairman of the
Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities. He ran
unsuccessfully as the Democratic candidate for
President in 1984, returned to Minnesota where he
practiced law, and was appointed in 1993 by President
Clinton as Ambassador to Japan. During that period,
he helped negotiate several U.S.-Japan security
agreements, including a resolution to the controversy
about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. He also
helped to negotiate numerous trade agreements
between the United States and Japan, and he promoted
the expansion of educational exchanges between the
two nations. Mondale has authored the book The
Accountability of Power: Toward a Responsible Presidency
and has written numerous articles on domestic and
international issues. Mondale is married to the former
Joan Adams. They have three children - Theodore,
Eleanor Jane, and William - and three grandchildren.
Thomas E. Moss: United States Attorney for the
District of Idaho. Tom Moss graduated from the
University of Idaho College of Law with a Juris Doctor
in 1965. He practiced law in Blackfoot and served as
Prosecuting Attorney for Bingham County for 25
years. From February 2000 until his appointment as
United States Attorney in August, 2001, he served
as member of the Idaho House of Representatives.
Mr. Moss has been a presenter to Idaho attorneys
on behalf of the Idaho State Bar Association and the
Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association in the area
of trial advocacy, media relations, and legal ethics.
He has also served on the faculty for the National
Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina.
Moss has presented many lectures and training
sessions to law enforcement officers on preparing
and presenting a criminal case, including crime scene
investigation, preserving evidence, writing reports,
and testifying in court. Mr. Moss is past president of
the Idaho State Bar Association and currently serves
on two subcommittees of the U.S. Attorney General’s
Advisory Committee concerning Native American
issues and Borders and Immigration. He also serves on
the Executive Working Group, whose objective is to
maintain and improve working relationships among
federal, state, and local law enforcement. Tom and his
wife, Bonny, have raised seven children.

Patrick A. Shea: Attorney, Ballard Spahr Andrews
& Ingersoll, Salt Lake City, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals
Management. In that role, he oversaw the Bureau
of Land Management, Minerals Management
Services, and the Office of Surface Mining – agencies
responsible for the management of over 270 million
acres of land and for all offshore drilling for oil and
gas production in the United States. Before entering
government service, Mr. Shea was a lawyer, educator,
and businessman in the Intermountain West. Along
with practicing law in Salt Lake City and the District
of Columbia, Shea was an Adjunct Professor of
Political Science at the University of Utah and taught
at the Brigham Young Law School. In September
1996, he was appointed by President Clinton to
serve on the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security. Mr. Shea teaches seminars on
Land Use Management and Biotechnology for Federal
judges. Prior to his private law practice, he served as
General Counsel and Assistant Secretary to a private
communications company, operating television,
radio, and newspapers. He also served as counsel to
the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate.
Shea is a native of Salt Lake City and received his
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Carolyn Washburn: Executive Editor of The Idaho
Statesman. Washburn has held the position of
executive editor of The Idaho Statesman since March
1999. A Cincinnati native, Carolyn holds a bachelor
of arts in political science and journalism from Indiana
University at Bloomington. She started her journalism
career at the Lansing State Journal in Michigan as a
business reporter covering Oldsmobile and General
Motors. She worked for ten years at the Gannett
newspapers in Rochester, NY, a community of about
1 million people on the shores of Lake Ontario, from
1987-1993. She was a business reporter covering
Eastman Kodak Co., business editor and AME/metro.
She returned to Rochester as managing editor of The
Democrat Chronicle, after serving as managing editor
in Boise from 1993 to 1995, and held that position
from 1995 until her return to Boise in 1999. Carolyn
served for two years as the chair of the Reporting,
Writing and Editing Committee of the Associated
Press Managing Editors Conference. Carolyn, an avid
reader, is married to Perry, a journalist by trade and
now a stay-at-home dad. She has three children—a 13year-old son and daughters 6 and 5. The entire family
enjoys hiking and camping in Idaho’s mountains.

undergraduate degree from Stanford University in 1970,
a master’s degree from Oxford University in 1972, and a
law degree from Harvard University in 1975.
Judge Stephen S. Trott: Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
9th Circuit. Judge Trott was nominated by President
Reagan and sworn in on April 19, 1988. From 1983
until April 1988, he served in the Justice Department.
During that time, he had primary responsibility for
the Department’s initiatives against international
terrorism, drug trafficking, and money laundering, and
he was required to approve personally all applications
to the federal courts for electronic surveillance. From
1986 until 1988, he was the Department’s Associate
Attorney General, the third ranking position in
the Department of Justice. He also served as U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California and
as prosecutor for the District Attorney’s Office of Los
Angeles County. Judge Trott has been on the faculty of
the National College of District Attorneys at Houston
and is a member of the American College of Trial
Lawyers. Born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey, he holds a
degree in French literature from Wesleyan University,
a law degree from Harvard Law School and honorary
Doctor of Laws degrees from Santa Clara University
and the University of Idaho. Judge Trott is an active
member of “The Highwaymen,” a folk music group
best remembered for its gold 1960’s record hit,
“Michael Row the Boat Ashore” and “Cottonfields.”
He is past President of the Boise Philharmonic
Association and is on the board of Directors for the
Children’s Home Society in Boise.
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